U.S. v. Chavez

Decision Date29 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-6878,98-6878
Citation204 F.3d 1305
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Zoilo CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Zoilo Chavez appeals his judgment and sentence, including the conditions of his probation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 to review the final judgment of the district court. We affirm for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

After a bench trial, Chavez was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4), 1 assault by striking, beating or wounding within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The district court denied Chavez's motion for a jury trial because the charged crime was a petty offense that carried a potential maximum six month term of imprisonment and maximum fine of $5,000.

At trial, Chavez's wife, Jacqueline Chavez testified that on May 31, 1998, her husband picked her up from church and took her to the commissary on Maxwell Air Force Base ("commissary"). At the commissary, an argument ensued between them which was later revisited in Chavez's vehicle in the parking lot of the commissary. According to Mrs. Chavez, her husband grabbed her by the hair, slapped her in the face and hit her with his fist in the back of the neck, while screaming and cursing at her. Thereafter, she threw a cup of soup at him.

An independent eyewitness testified that he saw Chavez struggling with his wife in his lap, holding her by the hair and placing his hand around her neck in a choking manner. The witness and Mrs. Chavez testified that they smelled an odor of alcohol on Chavez. A physician who treated Mrs. Chavez for her injuries testified that they were consistent with either slapping or rubbing against hands or pants.

Chavez's version of events is that he purchased a box of chicken for his grandchildren over Mrs. Chavez's objections. When he and Mrs. Chavez left the commissary, Mrs. Chavez screamed at him, threw a cup of soup at him and began to hit him. Chavez claimed that he held her merely to restrain her from hurting him or herself. He denied hitting her in the face or grabbing her neck. He could not explain the marks on her neck.

The couple subsequently separated, and at the time of Chavez's sentencing, a divorce proceeding was pending in state court.

At trial before the district court, the court admitted evidence of Chavez's prior abuse of his wife as proof of motive, opportunity, design or absence of mistake.

Chavez moved for a new trial, and the court denied his motion. At sentencing, the court adopted the probation officer's findings of fact, considered Chavez's objections to the probation report and recommendation, and sentenced Chavez to five years' probation. The court required Chavez to comply with the court's standard conditions of probation; prohibited him from possessing a firearm, destructive device or illegal controlled substances; required him to submit to drug testing and/or treatment, to undergo at his expense a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment; and required him to pay (1) $1,400 to the Family Sunshine Center as restitution for his wife's treatment, (2) a fine in the amount of $5,000, (3) a special assessment of $10,2 and (4) $1,200 per month (or an amount determined by a local court) to his wife for living expenses. Chavez was also required to attend a rehabilitation program for domestic violence offenders, reside in a community correctional facility ("halfway house") and retain his health insurance for himself and Mrs. Chavez. He was prohibited from disbursing any funds from his portfolio or inheritance without court approval.

Chavez filed a motion to appoint his brother as attorney-in-fact to act in his stead during court proceedings in Puerto Rico. The court denied the motion. Chavez filed several other motions that were denied, including a motion to stay and a motion to bar the government from charging him for his "costs of incarceration." This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Chavez requests that this Court reverse his sentence and conviction, remand this case for a new trial by jury and deem the conditions of his probation unlawful or plainly unreasonable. He asserts seven grounds for his appeal: (1) he was denied his right to a trial by jury; (2) the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior acts of assault against his wife; (3) the court exceeded the maximum fine allowed by requiring him to pay for his "costs of incarceration;" (4) his sentence of "six months' incarceration is unlawful and/or plainly unreasonable;" 3 (5) the court erred in changing the condition of his probation that required him to "attend" a domestic violence rehabilitation program to a requirement that he "successfully complete" the program; (6) the court erred by requiring him to undergo a mental health evaluation and to pay the associated costs; and (7) the court infringed upon his access to court and right to contract by notifying all who had financial dealings with him or were in litigation with him about his incarceration, by denying him the right to have his brother act as attorney-in-fact in other court proceedings, and by requiring him to pay $1,200 a month "restitution" to his wife.

Right to Jury Trial

Chavez contends that the district court deprived him of his right to a jury trial on the ground that 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4) is a petty offense that carries a maximum prison term of six months and a maximum fine of $5,000. The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial when charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4) and the issues implicated by Chavez's arguments are ones of first impression in this Circuit. This appeal presents questions of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 846 (11th Cir.1996) (whether an offense is petty or serious is a question of law). Sentences for Class B misdemeanors, such as the charged offense, are not subject to the Sentencing Guidelines and will not be disturbed on appeal unless "they were imposed in violation of law (such as by exceeding statutory limits) or are 'plainly unreasonable.' " United States v. Bichsel, 156 F.3d 1148, 1151 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy a right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This amendment has been construed to apply only to "serious" offenses, and not to "petty offenses." See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The most relevant factor for ascertaining whether a crime is serious or petty is the maximum penalty that the legislature has authorized. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (plurality opinion). The maximum penalty reveals the legislature's determination about the severity of an offense. A court should not substitute its own judgment regarding an offense's severity for that of Congress, which is the branch "better equipped to perform the task." Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (quotation omitted).

An offense that carries a possible sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment is severe and affords a defendant the right to a jury trial. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69, 90 S.Ct. 1886 (plurality opinion). In contrast, a crime that carries a maximum incarcerative term of six months or less is presumed petty, not entitling a defendant to a jury trial. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S.Ct. 1072, 122 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993). "A defendant can overcome this presumption, and become entitled to a jury trial, only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a 'serious' one." Id. at 3-4, 113 S.Ct. 1072.

Assault by striking, beating or wounding within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is presumptively a petty offense. It carries a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment or a $5,000 fine or both. See 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4), 3571(b)(6) (fine), 3581 (imprisonment). The offense is classified as a Class B misdemeanor. See 18 U.S.C. 3559(a)(7). Congress has expressly designated Class B misdemeanors as "petty offense[s]." See 18 U.S.C. 19.

Only one other circuit has published opinions regarding whether 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4) carries a jury trial entitlement. The Sixth Circuit has held that 113(a)(4) proscribes a petty offense for which there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury. See United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 503 (6th Cir.1978) (analyzing statute under predecessor designation 113(d)). Although our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit shed light on the historical treatment of the offense and the maximum penalty authorized by the legislature, they were not confronted with the issues at bar,4 including whether the "additional" penalties authorized by the legislature are so severe that they reflect Congress' judgment that the offense is indeed serious.

Chavez has failed to overcome the presumption that the offense is petty because he has not demonstrated that Congress considered the offense to be serious. See Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4, 113 S.Ct. 1072. Chavez's contentions rest on the premise that the harsh penalties authorized by Congress, which he received, are "in addition to or in alternative to the maximum sentence of a six month term of imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5,000" and render his offense serious. This reasoning is faulty for several reasons.

First, Chavez's...

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