U.S.A. v. Frazier

Citation204 F.3d 553
Decision Date24 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-4462,FRAZIER-E,D,98-4462
Parties(4th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLINTON BERNARDefendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: Denise Charlotte Barrett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Tarra R. DeShields-Minnis, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Jeffrey E. Risberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and Frank J. MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge Magill joined. Judge Murnaghan wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION:

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Clinton Frazier-El was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 188 months imprisonment as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e). On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in (1) refusing to allow him to dismiss his court-appointed attorney and proceed pro se; (2) instructing the jury on the mens rea requirement of 922(g); and (3) sentencing him as an armed career criminal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

Clinton Frazier-El purchased a 20-gauge shotgun from a Wal-Mart department store in Catonsville, Maryland, in November 1996, indicating on the required firearms transaction form that he had never been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. When a routine examination of Wal-Mart firearms sales records revealed that Frazier-El had been convicted of a battery and sentenced to a term of five years, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant for Frazier-El's arrest. They executed the warrant at Frazier-El's apartment on December 9, 1996. At the time of his arrest, Frazier-El was holding the shotgun that he had purchased at Wal-Mart a month earlier. He told law enforcement officers that he had "papers for the gun" and that, while he knew he was prohibited from possessing a handgun, he did not know he was prohibited from possessing a "long gun."

Following Frazier-El's arrest and the appointment of Jeffrey Risberg, a federal public defender, as his counsel, Risberg filed a motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Frazier-El's competence to stand trial. At the April 1997 hearing on this motion, Frazier-El told the court, "I would prefer to have Ms. Watts represent me at this time and I am requesting the dismissal of Mr. Risberg as my attorney on these particular grounds and issues." Frazier-El explained that he wanted to file dismissal motions based on the fact that he "was ordained a consecrated sheik under the prophet," a fact that Risberg considered "irrelevant." Frazier-El also stated, "I do not want to be represented by a public defender who thinks that the only defense that I have is to plead insanity or mental incompetency." The district court responded, "I have denied your motion to replace Mr. Risberg with Ms. Watts." At that point Frazier-El announced that Risberg "no longer represents me or speaks for me." The district court directed Risberg to remain as Frazier-El's attorney "in this proceeding for the purpose of this hearing today."

After Dr. Neil Blumberg, a court-appointed psychiatrist, testified at the April 1997 hearing that Frazier-El "was not competent to stand trial" at that time because he was suffering from "schizophrenia paranoid type along with cocaine abuse, prior history of cocaine abuse," Frazier-El stated:

I dismissed Mr. Risberg before this proceeding started in terms of bringing Dr. Blumberg to the witness stand and have him ask questions. . . . I at this particular point represent myself and I would like to cross-examine Dr. Blumberg since I am representing myself in this hearing.

The court, refusing to grant Frazier-El's request, explained the nature of the hearing and then committed Frazier-El to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization, treatment, and further evaluation. When the court indicated that the decision was in Frazier-El's best interest, Frazier-El responded, "I think this case could be more properly handled with another public defender."

Eight months later, after Frazier-El's hospitalization, a second competency hearing was conducted during which the court concluded that Frazier-El was competent to stand trial. The court adopted the conclusions of the "Camp Butner Evaluation Team," which evaluated and treated Frazier-El. The report concluded that Frazier-El "has an understanding of the adversarial nature of criminal law and verbalizes an accurate understanding of criminal process, procedural protection of his rights, and the roles of courtroom personnel." The report indicated, however, that Frazier-El persisted in his view that the United States government does not have authority over him because "he is a Moorish national." The report explained:

We do not view his belief system to be delusional in nature, as it is loosely based on the doctrine of the Moorish Science Temple of America, a recognized organization in the United States. Mr. Frazier-El appeared to have exaggerated, added to, and distorted the doctrine to benefit himself. We attribute that behavior to his personality disorder and not to a severe mental illness.

During this hearing, Frazier-El spoke at length about the fact that members of the Moorish Science Temple were not subject to the United States courts and that the Moors were "being incarcerated and treated as slaves as federal contraband property." Frazier-El complained that his attorney Risberg worked for the federal government and had "never worked in my interest." When he sought to have Risberg removed as counsel, the court denied the motion.

At a motions hearing conducted on January 20, 1998, the day trial was scheduled to begin, Frazier-El again expressed his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. He complained that Risberg had refused to file motions arguing that Frazier-El, as "an officer in the Moorish Science Temple," was not subject to the court's jurisdiction. The following colloquy ensued:

The Court: Is it your position that any attorney--that you would ask for a new attorney in every instance where the attorney would refuse to file the motions; is that your position?

* * * * * *

The Court: Your position is that the Court has no jurisdiction over you, is that right? That this court has no jurisdiction over you; is that your position?

Frazier-El: Well, yes, sir.

The Court: In other words, if you should represent yourself, you would want to argue that; is that correct?

Frazier-El: That would be one of the issues.

The Court: Just a minute. If I understand it, I have been advised this morning that in the event the Court does not excuse Mr. Risberg and appoint new counsel, you want to represent yourself; am I correct?

Frazier-El: Yes, sir.

The Court: And you would argue that this Court has no jurisdiction, in representing yourself; is that correct?

Frazier-El: That would be one of the issues, Judge, yes, it would.

* * * * * *

The Court: If I do not dismiss Mr. Risberg, did you want to represent yourself? . . . . You want to represent yourself?

Frazier-El: Yes, sir.

The Court: You want to present -- your basic argument would be that this Court has no jurisdiction over you; is that right?

Frazier-El: That is one of the basic arguments.

* * * * * *

The Court: In other words, if new counsel were appointed and refused the same as Mr. Risberg, to proceed the way you desired, you would want another new counsel; is that correct? You want a lawyer who will take the position precisely that you are suggesting this morning; is that right? That is what you want?

Frazier-El: Yes, sir. . . . If that is at all possible.

The court denied Frazier-El's motion to substitute counsel and his request to represent himself. In doing so, the court stated its belief that Frazier-El's efforts to substitute counsel and, failing that, to proceed pro se represented efforts "to argue matters which would not be permitted by the court." The court continued:

He would argue that this Court has no jurisdiction and the Court has ruled that that motion and that argument is absolutely frivolous.

I think Mr. Frazier-El is in a position where he is not competent because of arguments he has made to represent himself. However, the Court is absolutely convinced that Mr. Frazier-El understands the nature of the proceedings and is able, if he so desires -- he is an intelligent man - to assist in his own defense, if he so desires. I think Mr. Frazier-El is trying to argue in this Court not applicable legal principles but positions taken by an organization whose position is very well known to the courts of this country. Therefore, the motion, Mr. Frazier-El, to represent yourself will again be denied based on the matters which you have presented.

Trial commenced the next morning, with Risberg acting as defense counsel. On January 22, 1998, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court, having determined that Frazier-El had three prior convictions for "violent felonies," sentenced Frazier-El as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e). This appeal followed.

II

As his principal argument on appeal, Frazier-El contends that the district court denied him his right to represent himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment implicitly provides an affirmative right...

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