Martin v. PGA Tour

Decision Date06 March 2000
Docket NumberNos. 98-35309,98-35509,s. 98-35309,98-35509
Citation204 F.3d 994
Parties(9th Cir. 2000) CASEY MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PGA TOUR, INC., a Maryland corporation, Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

COUNSEL: William J. Maledon, Andrew D. Hurwitz, Osborn Maledon, Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendant-appellant.

Roy L. Reardon, New York, New York, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Thomas E. Chandler, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for amicus United States; Guy G. Ward, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois, for amicus U.S. Golf Association; Brian D. Shannon, Texas Tech University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas, for amicus Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome Support Group.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-06309-TMC

Before: William C. Canby, Jr. and Thomas G. Nelson Circuit Judges, and Jeremy Fogel,1 District Judge.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

PGA Tour, Inc. ("PGA") appeals from the district court's decision in favor of Casey Martin, a disabled professional golfer, ordering PGA to make an exception to its "walking rule" to allow Martin to ride a golf cart during PGA competitions. We conclude that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") applies to PGA competitions and that allowing Martin to use a cart is a reasonable accommodation that does not fundamentally alter the nature of those events. We therefore affirm the district court's decision.

BACKGROUND

Casey Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a congenital, degenerative circulatory disorder that is manifested in a malformation of his right leg. This disorder causes Martin severe pain and atrophy in his lower leg, rendering him unable to walk for extended periods of time. The mere act of walking subjects him to a significant risk of fracture or hemorrhaging. There is no dispute that Martin is profoundly disabled.

PGA is a non-profit association of professional golfers.2 It sponsors three competitive tours: (1) the PGA Tour, its most competitive tour, (2) the Nike Tour, one step down from the PGA Tour, and (3) the Senior PGA Tour, restricted to professional golfers age 50 and over. On days of tour competition, PGA is the operator of the golf course.3

The primary means of gaining entry to the PGA Tour and Nike Tour is by a competition known as the qualifying school. The best scorers in that competition qualify for the PGA Tour, and the next-best finishers qualify for the Nike Tour. Players in the Nike Tour may qualify for the PGA Tour by winning three Nike Tour tournaments in one year or by being in the top fifteen money-winners in the Nike Tour.

The qualifying school competition is conducted in three stages. In the first two stages, players are permitted to use golf carts. In the third stage, and in the PGA and Nike Tours themselves, players are required to walk as they play the course.4 After qualifying for the third and final stage of the 1997 qualifying school, Martin requested permission from PGA to use a golf cart. PGA denied this request, and Martin sued.

The district court granted Martin a preliminary injunction and, using a golf cart, he performed well enough in the final stage of the qualifying school to earn a spot on the 1998 Nike Tour. The court subsequently granted Martin partial summary judgment, holding that PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns, operates and leases golf courses, which the ADA identifies as places of public accommodation. 5 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998). After a six-day bench trial, the district court concluded that modifying the walking rule for Martin was a reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter the nature of PGA golf tournaments. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). It accordingly entered a permanent injunction requiring PGA to permit Martin to use a golf cart in PGA and Nike Tour competitions in which he is eligible to participate, and in any qualifying rounds for those tours. PGA appeals.6

DISCUSSION
I. Applicability of Title III (Public Accommodation)

The district court granted Martin's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, Title III of the ADA applies to the PGA and Nike Tour competitions. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the ADA. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).

We begin our analysis, as did the district court, with the terms of the statute. The basic anti-discrimination clause of Title III of the ADA provides:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. S 12182(a). The first issue for decision is whether Martin seeks to enjoy the facilities of a "place of public accommodation." The definition section of Title III of the ADA provides:

The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of this subchapter . . .

. . .

(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.

42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(L) (emphasis added). There is nothing ambiguous about this provision; golf courses are public accommodations. Indeed, PGA does not dispute that during one of its tournaments a golf course is a public accommodation with regard to the spectator areas; its contention is that the competitors' area "behind the ropes" is not a public accommodation because the public has no right to enter it. Despite the surface plausibility of this argument, it too narrowly construes the nature of a public accommodation.

The district court held that a public accommodation could not be compartmentalized in the fashion PGA desired. At least in the present context, we agree. It is true that the general public cannot enter the area "inside the ropes," but competitors, caddies, and certain other personnel can. PGA contends that the restricted area is not being used as a "place of exercise or recreation," within the meaning of S 12181(7)(L), because the competitors are trying to win money, not exercise or recreate. Even if we were to agree with this point, it would not aid PGA. The statute also defines "public accommodation" to include a "theater, . . . stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment." 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(C). If a golf course during a tournament is not a place of exercise or recreation, then it is a place of exhibition or entertainment. The statute does not restrict this definition to those portions of the place of exhibition that are open to the general public. The fact that entry to a part of a public accommodation may be limited does not deprive the facility of its character as a public accommodation. See Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D. Or. 1997) (arena's executive suites contracted by businesses are public accommodations). Indeed, the underlying premise of the cases dealing with disabled student athletes is that Title III applies to the playing field, not just the stands. See, e.g., Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483-90 (D.N.J. 1998); Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1996 WL 680000, at *8-11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); see also Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992) (undisputed that Title III applies to access to coaches' box on baseball field).

The Third Circuit dealt with a somewhat analogous problem in Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, 154 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998). There a physician with a disability sued a hospital under Title III after it denied him hospital staff privileges. The Third Circuit rejected the argument that Title III could be invoked only by the patients of a hospital, and held that denial of staff privileges qualified as a denial of "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation" prohibited by Title III, S 12182(a). Id. at 122. Staff privileges, of course, entail access to parts of the facility to which patients and the general public are denied entry.

In contending that it may compartmentalize golf courses during tournaments, PGA leans heavily on two examples set forth in the regulations. One is of a "mixed use facility," in the form of a large hotel that has a separate residential wing. See 28 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 36, app. B, at 623 (1999). The nonpublic residential wing (which would be covered by the Fair Housing Act) is not a place of "public accommodation." See id. The hotel wing, however, would fall under 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(A) as an "inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging." 28 C.F.R. ch I, pt. 36, app. B, at 623; see 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(A). But in this example, the residential wing has never functioned as a hotel. A golf course during a tournament, however, is serving as a golf course.

The other example cited by PGA is that of a commercial facility, such as a factory, that allows public tours over specific routes at particular times. See 28 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 36, app. B, at 624. The tour route is a public accommodation but the portions of the facility merely viewed from that route are not. See id. There are two reasons why this example is not persuasive. First, it applies to commercial facilities "not otherwise a place of public accommodation." Id. Second, the example would be analogous only if Martin were a spectator seeking to use his golf cart within the competitors' area of a tournament.

This point brings us to the greatest difficulty with PGA's argument. It...

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