People ex rel. Swift v. Luce

• Decision Date: 27 February 1912
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. SWIFT et al. v. LUCE et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

204 N.Y. 478

97 N.E. 850

PEOPLE ex rel. SWIFT et al.

v.LUCE et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 27, 1912.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Quo warranto by the People of the State of New York, on the relation of Theodore H. Swift and others, against Robert E. Luce and others. From a judgment of the Third Appellate Division (132 N. Y. Supp. 1143) affirming a judgment for defendants (133 N. Y. Supp. 9), relators appeal. Affirmed.

Morgan J. O'Brien and Frank S. Black, for appellants.

D-Cady Herrick, for respondents.

CULLEN, C. J.

This action is in the nature of quo warranto brought by the people to oust from office the defendants, who were appointed commissioners of the Board of Claims under chapter 856 of the Laws of 1911, and to reinstate the relators as judges of the so-called Court of Claims, which the act referred to purported to abolish.

The only question involved is the constitutionality of this act of the Legislature. The history of the disposition of private claims against the state is as follows: The state, being sovereign, is immune from suit except in the Supreme Court of the United States at the instance of another state under the provisions of the federal Constitution. Claimants had, therefore, to rely on the sense of justice of the Legislature. By chapter 321 of the Laws of 1870 jurisdiction was conferred on the canal appraisers to hear and determine certain classes of claims arising from the use and management of the canals, but the great mass of claims against the state were submitted to and passed on directly by the Legislature, which provided for their payment. By an amendment to the Constitution made in 1874, which is now reproduced in section 19 of article 3 of the present Constitution, it was enacted that the Legislature ‘shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account against the state, but may appropriate money to pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to law.’ Thereupon it became necessary, unless the state was either to violate its obligations or was willing to surrender its immunity and subject itself to suits in the courts like other litigants, for the Legislature to create some board or tribunal which could pass upon and audit claims against it. Hence in 1876 (by chapter 444) it was enacted that the Comptroller, Secretary of State, and State Treasurer should constitute a state board of audit with power to hear all private claims and accounts against the state, except such as were then heard by the canal appraisers, to administer oaths and take testimony in relation thereto, to determine the justice and amounts thereof, and to allow such sums as should be equitable. The board was authorized to establish rules as to the forms and methods of procedure before it. In 1883 (by chapter 205) the canal appraisers and the state board of audit were abolished and the Board of Claims constituted, to consist of three commissioners to be appointed by the Governor and to hold office for the term of six years. The board was given jurisdiction to hear, audit, and determine all private claims against the state, and it was also enacted that it should have jurisdiction of all claims on the part of the state against any person making a claim against the state and should determine such claims or demands both on the part of the state and the claimant: and if it found that the demand of the state exceeded that of the claimant, it should award such excess in favor of the state against the claimant. It will thus be seen that the jurisdiction conferred on the Board of Claims was of the broadest character. It included every private claim against the state and authorizedthe determination of set-offs or counterclaims by the state against the claimant.

Chapter 36 of the Laws of 1897 enacted that the Board of Claims should be continued and thereafter known as the ‘Court of Claims.’ The act provided for the procedure by and before it and assimilated the procedure to that in regular courts, but did not add one iota to the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the Board of Claims. Indeed, it was impossible that the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims, so far as the subject-matter of private claims by or against the state, could be increased, for already it was universal. Jurisdiction to determine public claims against the state was not conferred upon the Board of Claims (Board of Sup'rs of County of Cayuga v. State of N. Y., 153 N. Y. 279, 47 N. E. 288), nor was it ever conferred on the Court of Claims, except in some special case by act of the Legislature. One must not be misled by the fact that special laws were passed referring cases to the Board of Claims. Such were not rendered necessary because of any limitation on the jurisdiction of that board, but because such claims were not legal ones, but rested solely on morals and equity, and, therefore, were not enforceable until recognized by the Legislature. Examples of cases of this character are to be found in Cole v. State of N. Y., 102 N. Y. 48, 6 N. E. 277, and O'Hara v. State of N. Y., 112 N. Y. 146, 19 N. E. 659, 2 L. R. A. 603, 8 Am. St. Rep. 726. By chapter 692 of the Laws of 1906 the terms of the judges then in office were extended 10 years from the date of the act, and it was provided that they should continue in office until their successors were appointed and qualified.

[1] The statute of 1911 (chapter 856), already mentioned, amended section 263 of the Code of Civil Procedure so that there was no longer any authority for a Court of Claims, but the Board of Claims was continued to be composed, instead of judges, of three commissioners. The judges of the Court of Claims, then serving as such, were to be known as commissioners. Their terms were abrogated and their successors directed to be appointed by the Governor within 60 days after the passage of the act. The appellants challenge the validity of this act of 1911, claiming the Court of Claims was a court of law, and the judges thereof judicial officers who, under the provisions of section 11 of article 6 of the Constitution, could be removed only by the Senate with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members on the recommendation of the Governor. It is not denied that if they do not fall within this provision the Legislature may shorten or abrogate their terms the same as those of other officers whose tenure is not prescribed by the Constitution. We are of the opinion that the section does not apply. It cannot be extended so as to include any but judges of courts of law. There are many quasi judicial officers in the state as to whom there is no pretense that they fall within the constitutional provision. The canal appraisers were such, as were the members of the board of audit. So also are the public service commissions (People ex rel. C. P., N. & E. R. R. R. Co. v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383, 87 N . E. 517), the members of town boards of audit, supervisors acting as members of a board of audit of claims against a county, assessors, and tax commissioners. The question is, therefore, whether the Court of Claims-so denominated by the Legislature-was in reality a court within the constitutional provisions, or only an auditing board and a quasi judicial body.

We think it was the latter. The Legislature was without power to create a new court with state-wide jurisdiction. In the leading case of Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 297, 299, which arose under the Constitution of 1846, providing for a Supreme Court which ‘shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity,’ it was expressly declared that ‘the provision (of the Constitution) respecting the higher courts, whose jurisdiction pervades the whole state, is exclusive in its character, and * * * no other courts of the same jurisdiction can be added by the Legislature.’ In 1869 the judiciary article of the Constitution was amended. By that amendment the superior local courts of the cities of New York, Buffalo, and Brooklyn were recognized and continued with the powers and jurisdiction they then had and such further criminal and civil jurisdiction as might be conferred on them by law. Despite this broad language, it was held that the Legislature could not confer upon these courts jurisdiction throughout the state, as that would trench upon the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Landers v. Staten Island R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450;People ex rel. Ryan v. Green, 50 N. Y. 295. It is even more plain under the Constitution of 1894 that the higher courts there enumerated are intended to be exclusive, because not only the city courts above mentioned, but the Courts of Oyer and Terminer, General Sessions, and Circuit Courts were abolished, and it certainly was not contemplated that the Legislature should be empowered to create any similar courts though with different names. As said by Judge Vann (Koch v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 152 N. Y. 72, 78,46 N. E. 170, 172): ‘The theory was to simplify the judicial system by reducing the number of high courts and to embed those retained so thoroughly in the fundamental law that they could not be changed or abolished without amending the Constitution.’

It is sought to withdraw the so-called Court of Claims from the general rule thus declared on the ground that the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction of claims against the state. That fact does not affect the principle involved. The Supreme Court had not jurisdiction solely because of the immunity of the defendant from suit, not because it did not have jurisdiction of such a cause of action. Of the constitutional provision that the Supreme Court shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity, it was said by Mr. Justice Daniels in De Hart v. Hatch, 3 Hun, 375, 380: ‘The terms used are so comprehensive that they include all cases of every description in law and equity, from the most important and complicated to the most simple and insignificant, and they imperatively and positively...