BROWN v. COBB

• Decision Date: 08 March 1949
• Docket Number: No. 5164,5164
• Citation: 53 N.M. 169,204 P.2d 264
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. COBB.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

53 N.M. 169

204 P.2d 264

BROWN et al.

v.COBB.

No. 5164.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 8, 1949.

[204 P.2d 265, 53 N.M. 170]

Crampton & Robertson and Robert S. Skinner, all of Raton, for appellant.

H. M. Rodrick, of Raton, and H. A. Kiker, of Santa Fe, for appellees.

COMPTON, Justice.

Appellees, legatees under the last will and testament of Sadie Smyth, deceased, seek to cancel a written instrument by the terms of which the said Sadie Smyth leased certain ranch lands to appellant. From an adverse judgment appellant brings this appeal.

It is alleged in substance that Sadie Smyth was old, mentally weak, without sufficient mental capacity to transact business, and that appellant Cobb aided byDalton Ladd, her employee, exerted undue influence upon her and thereby induced her to make the lease in question, and for a grossly inadequate consideration. By answer, all material matters are put in issue.

The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:

'2. That Dalton Ladd was employed by Sadie Smyth for several years while she was actively engaged in the cattle business as aforesaid and gained her trust and confidence which lasted to the end of her life.

'5. That in January, 1947, the said diseases with which she was afflicted again made it necessary for her to be brought to Raton, for medical attention, her abdomen, legs, feet and arms having become greatly swollen, and so, after a short time, she was again taken to said hospital for treatment, where she remained for about one month and then returned to her sister's home in Raton to recuperate, where she remained until about March 27, 1947 when the said Dalton Ladd returned her to her ranch home where she remained until May 29, 1947 when her condition became such that an ambulance was sent from Raton to her ranch, which brought her to said hospital again where, on June 8, 1947, she died of the said cardio renal disease.

'6. During the early part of her confinement in said hosptial in Raton, in January, 1947, Sadie Smyth was so enfeebled and disabled physically and mentally by said disease that she did not have the mental capacity to enable her to attend to any business matters of importance, and during said time of such incapacity, which lasted for several days, she could not have known or understood the nature or substance of any kind of contract affecting her business affairs.

'8. That on May 8, 1947, the physical condition of the said Sadie Smyth was practically identical with her physical condition in the month of January, 1947 when she was taken to said hospital in Raton; and by reason of her infirmities and diseased condition, her mental faculties were impaired as they were during the first days of her confinement in said hospital in the month of January, 1947.

'10. That the said Tom Cobb knew the said condition of Sadie Smyth at and before the time she signed the same, knew that Dalton Ladd had great influence over her, and that she trusted him, and took advantage of that knowledge to get her signature to said lease.

'11. That the said Dalton Ladd exercised an undue influence over Sadie Smyth and in so doing, aided Tom Cobb in procuring said lease for a grossly inadequate price.

'12. That the said Tom Cobb, aided by Dalton Ladd, deliberately and designedly so managed that the said Sadie Smyth should not have the benefit of disinterestedadvice of her attorney or her relatives with respect to said lease transaction, or the terms, form or execution thereof, but, on the contrary, took advantage of her mental and physical weakness in persuading her to sign said lease, thereby securing for said Tom Cobb the lease for a grossly inadequate consideration.' (Emphasis ours.)

Appellant requested the trial court to make separate findings of fact which were refused. These requests are themselves a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the material findings made. Consequently, the facts thus found are the facts to be reviewed, and if supported by substantial evidence the findings must be sustained. In re White's Estate, 41 N.M. 631, 73 P.2d 316; Krametbauer v. McDonald, 44 N.M. 473, 104 P.2d 900; Flippo v. Martin, 52 N.M. 402, 200 P.2d 366, recently decided.

The case turns on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. The evidence must be considered in an aspect most favorable to appellees and all evidence to the contrary must be disregarded. Indeed, for our consideration, all evidence to the contrary is presumed to be untrue. Marchbanks v. McCullough, 47 N.M. 13, 132 P.2d 426, 429; Flippo v. Martin, supra.

In Marchbanks v. McCullough, supra, we define substantial evidence in the following language: 'If reasonable men all agree, or if they may fairly differ, as to whether the evidence establishes such facts, then it is substantial.'

Substantial evidence may also be defined as evidence of substance which establishes facts and from which reasonable inferences may be drawn. International Ry. Co. v. Boland, 169 Misc. 926, 8 N.Y.S.2d 643.

We make no attempt to define 'undue influence'. Neither is it susceptible of any fixed formula. Whether undue influence is present is always a question to be determined from the circumstances of the particular case, and any attempt to define it may well suggest a clear path of evasion. But, undue influence in the sense as used means influence, improperly exerted, which acts to the injury of the person swayed by it or to the injury of those persons whom she would have benefited. It is immaterial whether such influence is exercised directly or indirectly.

At 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, 'Undue Influence', we find the following: '* * * In order to render this rule applicable, it is not necessary that one of the parties should occupy such a dominant position towards the other as to justify the inference that the latter was without power to assert his will in opposition to the former. Nor is the rule confined to cases in which the relation between the parties is of a strictly fiduciary nature. It applies whenever a confidential relation exists as a fact, * * *. The mental weakness of one ofthe parties is an important element in raising a presumption of undue influence or in determining its existence. It is undoubtedly the law that when, by physical or mental superiority, one obtains an advantage in a transaction over another who is enfeebled in mind and body, or by disease or old age, the person obtaining such advantage will be required to show that the transaction was a fair one.' (Emphasis ours.)

Black on 'Rescission and Cancellation', Vol. 2, Sec. 247 says: 'In determining whether undue influence has been exerted, it is important to take into consideration the age and physical condition of the person in question. * * * And it is well known that in most cases, though not invariably, this susceptibility is increased, and those powers of resistance are weakened, by the effects on the mind and will of advanced age, sickness and the prostration of the physical powers. * * * And if a gift or grant is made by a person thus enfeebled by age and infirmity to one shown to possess an influence over him, and especially if the transfer does not appear to be based upon any proper consideration or to be prompted by any adequate motive, a very strong showing of undue influence will have been made.' (Emphasis ours.)

Sadie Smyth was admitted to the Miners Hospital in Raton June 13, 1945 and was discharged August 7, 1945; she was again admitted January 14, 1947 and discharged February 13, 1947; she was...