State v. Grist

Decision Date29 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. 33652.,33652.
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Harold E. GRIST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin Curtis argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daniel Bower argued.

HORTON, Justice.

This appeal arises from Harold Grist's conviction for seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. Grist argues that the district court improperly admitted evidence relating to prior uncharged sexual misconduct. We vacate and remand for further proceedings and a new trial.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Grist of sexually abusing his live-in girlfriend's daughter, J.M.O., over a period of eight years. The abuse started shortly after Grist and J.M.O.'s mother moved in together when J.M.O. was ten years old. Grist would have J.M.O. sit on his lap while he rubbed his pelvis against her. The abuse progressed as J.M.O. grew older. Eventually, Grist started to touch J.M.O.'s breasts, buttocks, and vagina. Grist would also force J.M.O. to undress for him. The abuse stopped when J.M.O. moved out of the house after she graduated from high school.

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) to admit evidence of prior uncharged acts of sexual misconduct as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The evidence indicated that Grist previously sexually abused his ex-wife's daughter, A.W. The district court permitted A.W. to testify, finding the evidence to be relevant to Grist's "alleged conduct." A.W. testified that she lived with Grist from ages eight until thirteen and that Grist would ask her to sit on his lap or lay and cuddle with him. During this time, Grist would touch A.W.'s breasts and buttocks. The jury convicted Grist of all ten charged counts relating to his conduct with J.M.O. Grist timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005)). In this review, we examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

Grist asks this Court to overturn State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991), and State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992), which permit a trial court to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct in child sex crime cases, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). Grist argues that Idaho courts have treated the admission of evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime prosecutions differently than other cases under Rule 404(b). Grist argues that the admission of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct by a defendant has evolved into a blanket exception that turns on whether the case involves allegations of sexual misconduct with a child. Grist asks this Court to hold that the admissibility of evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime cases is subject to the same analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as other cases.

We decline to overrule Moore and Tolman in their entirety. However, as these decisions have been interpreted as creating an exception in child sex cases to the prohibition of character evidence, we find it necessary to revisit a theoretical underpinning for the introduction of uncharged misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. We further clarify that the admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to the same analysis as the admission of such evidence in any other case. Any decision from this Court or the Court of Appeals that suggests that evidence offered in a case involving an allegation of sexual misconduct with a child should be treated differently than any other type of case is no longer controlling authority in Idaho's courts.

Grist is not the first person to point out that Idaho courts appear to distinguish child sex crime cases from other cases for purposes of I.R.E. 404(b). Professor Lewis notes the following in his treatise on trial practice in Idaho:

[I]n sex crime prosecutions, particularly those involving minors, the courts have used a variety of rationales to justify the admission of evidence of a defendant's uncharged deviant sexual misconduct, including admission on the issue of credibility, to corroborate the victim's testimony, to show plan or intent, and on the issue of identity. Indeed, the evidence has been held to have been properly admitted so often that it seems to constitute a special exception to the character evidence prohibition.

D. CRAIG LEWIS, IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK 2D ED., § 13:1 (2005) (emphasis added). Although this Court has not expressly stated that there is a distinction between child sex crime cases and other cases for purposes of I.R.E. 404(b),1 the Court of Appeals has found that our decisions in Moore and Tolman create such a distinction. In State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 880 P.2d 771 (Ct.App. 1994), the Court of Appeals stated "we understand our Supreme Court's rulings in Moore and Tolman to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases where other similar incidents of sexual misconduct by the defendant with the same or similar victims tends to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged incident." Id. at 247, 880 P.2d at 777.

A. I.R.E. 404(b) admissibility standard

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. I.R.E. 404(b); Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. This rule has its source in the common law. The common law rule was that "the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged." See WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE, 3D ED., p. 81; see also, Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172, 181-82, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-51, 136 L.Ed.2d 574, 588-89 (1997) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reflects the common law).2

The policy underlying the common law rule was the protection of the criminal defendant. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5239, pp. 436-439. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character." State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978). Character evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial. Id. The drafters of I.R.E. 404(b) were careful to guard against the admission of evidence that would unduly prejudice the defendant, while still allowing the prosecution to present probative evidence.

Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp. 1985) (citing U.S. v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979); U.S. v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir.1980)). The trial court must also determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Id. Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283 (citing I.R.E. 404(b); Moore, 120 Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145). Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 912-13.

Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003) (citing State v. Law, 136 Idaho 721, 726, 39 P.3d 661, 666 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002); I.R.E. 403). This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985).

In the instant case, the district court admitted evidence of Grist's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with his ex-wife's daughter. When ruling on the admission of this evidence, the district court expressed discomfort with the status of I.R.E. 404(b) jurisprudence in Idaho, stating:

Well, I have had the opportunity to review Moore along with a number of other cases that have addressed this issue and, well, I'll tell [you] that I'm not really comfortable with the analysis of Moore, but I'm certain certainly I think stuck with the state of appellate law regarding these kinds of issues.

I think that there has largely been a class of cases that have developed that are unique to sexual abuse cases. And I'm—I think that I'm bound to follow...

To continue reading

Request your trial
186 cases
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • January 11, 2018
    ...propensity but instead objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts. Id. ; State v. Grist , 147 Idaho 49, 54-55, 205 P.3d 1185, 1190-91 (2009).In support of determining that the evidence was admissible to prove identity, the district court found the above-mentio......
  • State v. Almaraz
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 1, 2013
    ...Furthermore, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is also not admissible to prove criminal propensity. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009) ; see I.R.E. 404(b). However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or prior acts may be admissible if offered to prove "motiv......
  • State v. Ehrlick
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 21, 2015
    ...wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009) (citing I.R.E. 404(b) ). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such......
  • State v. Fox
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • September 9, 2022
    ...issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Nava , 166 Idaho at 893, 465 P.3d at 1132 (citing State v. Grist , 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009) ) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The first tier is reviewed de novo. Id. The second tier requires the tria......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT