Thomas Patterson v. People of the State of Colorado Ex Rel Attorney General of the State of Colorado

Citation51 L.Ed. 879,10 Ann. Cas. 689,205 U.S. 454,27 S.Ct. 556
Decision Date15 April 1907
Docket NumberNo. 223,223
PartiesTHOMAS M. PATTERSON, Plff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. Thomas M. Patterson in propria persona, Harry M. Teller, Charles S. Thomas, Sterling B. Toney, James H. Blood, Harvey Riddell, S. W. Belford, John A. Rush, and Richardson & Hawkins for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 455 intentionally omitted] Messrs. I. B. Melville, Horace G. Phelps, William H. Dickson,

[Argument of Counsel from page 456 intentionally omitted] Samuel Huston Thompson, Jr., and N. C. Miller for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to review a judgment upon an information for contempt. 84 Pac. 912. The contempt alleged was the publication of certain articles and a cartoon, which, it was charged, reflected upon the motives and conduct of the supreme court of Colorado in cases still pending, and were intended to embarrass the court in the impartial administration of justice. There was a motion to quash on grounds of local law and the state Constitution and also of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This was overruled and thereupon an answer was filed, admitting the publication, denying the contempt, also denying that the cases referred to were still pending, except that the time for motions for rehearing had not elapsed, and averring that the motions for rehearing subsequently were overruled, except that in certain cases the orders were amended so that the Democratic officeholders concerned could be sooner turned out of their offices. The answer went on to narrate the transactions commented on, at length, intimating that the conduct of the court was unconstitutional and usurping, and alleging that it was in aid of a scheme, fully explained, to seat various Republican candidates, including the governor of the state, in place of Democrats who had been elected, and that two of the judges of the court got their seats as a part of the scheme. Finally the answer alleged that the respondent published the articles in pursuance of what he regarded as a public duty, repeated the previous objections to the information, averred the truth of the articles, and set up and claimed the right to prove the truth under the Constitution of the United States. Upon this answer the court, on motion, ordered judgment fining the plaintiff in error for contempt.

The foregoing proceedings are set forth in a bill of exceptions, and several errors are alleged. The difficulties with those most pressed is that they raise questions of local law, which are not open to re-examination here. The requirement in the 14th Amendment of due process of law does not take up the special provisions of the state Constitution and laws into the 14th Amendment for the purposes of the case, and in that way subject a state decision that they have been complied with to revision by this court. French v Taylor, 199 U. S. 274, 278, 50 L. ed. 189, 192, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638, 639, 50 L. ed. 899, 900, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560; Burt v. Smith, 203 U. S. 129, 135, 51 L. ed. 121, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37. For this reason, if for no other, the objection that the information was not supported by an affidavit until after it was filed cannot be considered. See, further, Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569. The same is true of the contention that the suits referred to in the article complained of were not pending. Whether a case shall be regarded as pending while it is possible that a petition for rehearing may be filed, or, if in an appellate court, until the remittitur is issued, are questions which the local law can settle as it pleases without interference from the Constitution of the United States. It is admitted that this may be true in some other sense, but it is not true, it is said, for the purpose of fixing the limits of possible contempts. But here again the plaintiff in error confounds the argument as to the common law, or as to what it might be wise and humane to hold, with that concerning the state's constitutional power. If a state should see fit to provide in its Constitution that conduct otherwise amounting to a contempt should be punishable as such if occurring at any time while the court affected retained authority to modify its judgment, the 14th Amendment would not forbid. The only question for this court is the power of the state. Virginia v. Rives (Ex parte Virginia) 100 U. S. 313, 318, 25 L. ed. 667, 669; Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 171, 48 L. ed. 133, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53.

It is argued that the decisions criticized, and in some degree that in the present case, were contrary to well-settled previous adjudications of the same court, and this allegation is regarded as giving some sort of constitutional right to the plaintiff in error. But while it is true that the United States courts do not always hold themselves bound by state decisions in cases arising before them, that principle has but a limited application to cases brought from the state courts here on writs of error. Except in exceptional cases the grounds on which the circuit courts are held authorized to follow an earlier state decision rather than a later one, or to apply the rules of commercial law as understood by this court rather than those laid down by the local tribunals, are not grounds of constitutional right, but considerations of justice or expediency. There is no constitutional right to have all general propositions of law once adopted remain unchanged. Even if it be true, as the plaintiff in error says, that the supreme court of Colorado departed from earlier and well-established precedents to meet the exigencies of this case, whatever might be thought of the justice or wisdom of such a step, the Constitution of the United States is not infringed. It is unnecessary to lay down an absolute rule beyond the possibility of exception. Exceptions have been held to exist. But, in general, the decision of a court upon a question of law, however wrong and however contrary to previous decisions, is not an infraction of the 14th Amendment merely because it is wrong or because earlier decisions are reversed.

It is argued that the articles did not constitute a contempt. In view of the answer, which sets out more plainly and in fuller detail what the articles insinuate and suggest, and in view of the position of the plaintiff in error that he was performing a public duty, the argument for a favorable interpretation of the printed words loses some of its force. However, it is enough for us to say that they are far from showing that innocent conduct has been laid hold of as an arbitrary pretense for an arbitrary punishment. Supposing that such a case would give the plaintiff in error a standing here, anything short of that is for the state court to decide. What constitutes contempt, as well as the time during which it may be committed, is a matter of local law.

The defense upon which the plaintiff in error most relies is raised by the allegation that the articles complained of are true, and the claim of the right to prove the truth. He claimed this right under the Constitutions both of the state and of the United States, but the latter ground alone comes into consideration here, for reasons already stated. Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930. We do not pause to consider whether the claim was sufficient in point of form, although it is easier to refer to the Constitution generally for the supposed right than to point to the clause from which it springs. We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the 14th Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the 1st. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United States but also of the states, still we should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. Com. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313, 314, 15 Am. Dec. 214; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325, 1 L. ed. 155, 158, 1 Am. Dec. 246. The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the...

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