Murphy v. United States, 14309.

• Decision Date: 06 August 1953
• Docket Number: No. 14309.,14309.
• Citation: 206 F.2d 571
• Parties: MURPHY v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

206 F.2d 571 (1953)

MURPHY v. UNITED STATES.

No. 14309.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

August 6, 1953.

George F. Edwardes, Texarkana, Ark., for appellant.

Harlon E. Martin, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Warren G. Moore, U. S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., for appellee.

Before HOLMES, BORAH, and RIVES, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, commonly called the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312, for the transportation in interstate commerce of two motor vehicles, "knowing the same to have been stolen". The theory of the Government's case was that appellant fraudulently induced Johnny Camp to deliver to him possession of, but not title to, the automobiles by giving him a check in payment for each, which checks were returned unpaid for "insufficient funds." The theory of the defense was that the automobiles were not "stolen" within the meaning of the Act because Camp voluntarily parted with title to, as well as possession, of the automobiles at the time of their alleged sale.

In submitting the case to the jury the District Judge in effect followed the holding in Ackerson v. United States, 8 Cir., 185 F.2d 485, that Congress employed the word "stolen" in the same sense as used in the common law definition of larceny, that ordinarily there must be a felonious taking by trespass and carrying away of the motor vehicle of another without the owner's consent and against his will and with the intent to deprive the true owner of his property; but that where a person, intending to steal another's automobile, obtains possession, although by and with the consent of the owner, by means of fraud or through fraudulent trick or device, and feloniously converts the property to his own use, the owner is regarded as having retained constructive possession and the conversion constitutes the trespass which is an essential element of larceny. The District Judge further charged the jury, "That rule is not applicable where the owner, although induced by fraud, intends to part voluntarily with the title to the property, as well as his possession thereof, not expecting the property to be returned to him or be disposed of in accordance with his directions." The Government insists upon a less technical definition of the word "stolen" as enunciated by the District Court in U. S. v. Adcock, D.C.Ky., 49 F. Supp. 351; compare Davilman v. U. S., 6, Cir., 180 F.2d 284; Collier v. U. S., 6 Cir., 190 F.2d 473; U. S. v. Sicurella, 2 Cir., 187 F.2d 533. The statute being criminal should be strictly construed and we think the District Judge correctly interpreted the meaning of the word "stolen".

Camp was a member of a partnership engaged in the business of selling new and used cars in Tyler, Texas. He had known the appellant for four or more years, and knew him to be an automobile dealer in Cleveland, Mississippi, under the style of Standard Auto Company. The appellant came to Camp's place of business in Tyler, Texas "looking for some cars to buy." Camp agreed to sell him a 1951 Ford and a 1951 Oldsmobile, both new cars, and the appellant gave him for the Ford a check drawn on the Bank of Cleveland, Mississippi for $2,000.00, and for the Oldsmobile, a check drawn on the same bank for $2,550.00. Both checks were returned marked "insufficient funds." There was no other evidence as to what amount, if any, the appellant had on deposit with the Bank of Cleveland at the time the checks were given. Over the appellant's objection, the Government was permitted to prove an admission by the appellant that he sold both automobiles, did not bank the...