McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97-8483,97-8483
• Citation: 206 F.3d 1031
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) Robert E. McANDREW, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Successor in Interest to Lockheed-Aeronautical Systems Company, a division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, J.A. Blackwell, Jr., T.A. Graham, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1031

206 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2000)

Robert E. McANDREW, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Successor in Interest to Lockheed-Aeronautical Systems Company, a division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, J.A. Blackwell, Jr., T.A. Graham, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-8483.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 8, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, MARCUS, WILSON, Circuit

Judges,^* and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.^**

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

This case raises the discrete question of the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) and alleging a conspiracy among corporate officers and the corporation itself to deter by force, intimidation, or threat, an individual from testifying in a court of the United States. These allegations plainly describe criminal conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512 and a criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Accordingly, we hold that just as the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot shield a criminal conspiracy from prosecution under the federal criminal code, the doctrine cannot shield the same conspiracy, alleging the same criminal wrongdoing, from civil liability arising under 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). Therefore, we reverse the district court's order dismissing McAndrew's 1985(2) claim as barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The facts of this case are straightforward. In 1993, the United States Department of Justice was investigating Lockheed's sale of three C-130 aircraft to the Arab Republic of Egypt for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 U.S.C. 2409 et seq. Robert McAndrew had served as Lockheed's Director of International Marketing since 1989 and was responsible for negotiating the sale of aircraft to foreign nations.

In the fall of 1993, McAndrew and more than 30 other Lockheed employees were subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury. McAndrew alleges that on the morning he was scheduled to appear before the grand jury, June 21, 1994, he received a phone call from T.A. Graham, Vice President of Business Development at Lockheed (and McAndrew's immediate supervisor). During the course of the conversation Graham supposedly expressed his dissatisfaction to McAndrew about McAndrew's appearance before the grand jury, and told him specifically that "the company was very unhappy with [McAndrew's] decision to testify." Indeed, the complaint alleges that Graham made clear to McAndrew that "it would not be in his best interest to testify." McAndrew explained that he had no choice about testifying, that he had been under subpoena since October, 1993, and that he had been ordered by the court to give testimony. McAndrew told Graham, according to the complaint, that McAndrew had to appear and answer truthfully whatever questions were posed to him. Plaintiff alleged that Graham was in Mexico when he called McAndrew and that Graham made it clear by his words that he was not only expressing his own personal sentiments, but was also speaking for Lockheed.

On June 21, 1994, under compulsion of subpoena and a separate court order, McAndrew appeared and testified before the grand jury regarding his knowledge of the sale of aircraft to Egypt. Two days later, McAndrew alleged, he received another call from Graham during which Graham told McAndrew that he, and Defendants A. Goldfarb (Vice President for Administration) and T.F. Powell (Vice President of Human Resources) were discussing what to do about McAndrew. Graham allegedly told McAndrew to take a couple of days off. Thereafter, according to the complaint, on June 28, 1994, Graham fired McAndrew by reading him the following statement: "The company has decided to end our relationship. This is due to your performance in International Marketing."

In June 1996, McAndrew sued Lockheed and five senior management employees-Graham, Powell, Goldfarb, J.A. Blackwell (Lockheed's Aeronautical Senior President and Chief Executive Officer), and J.S. McLellan (President of Lockheed Martin Aeronautical System Company, a division of Lockheed Martin)-alleging that they conspired to prevent him from testifying and then retaliated against him by firing him after he testified in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) and 1986, and the United States Constitution. McAndrew also brought supplemental claims alleging violation of the Georgia Constitution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lockheed filed counterclaims asserting that McAndrew breached his fiduciary duties to the company and committed fraud in connection with the sale of Lockheed aircraft to Egypt. In addition, each Defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. In doing so, the court held: first, that McAndrew's 1985(2) claim was barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; second, that his 1986 claim was derivative of the 1985 claim and failed for the additional reason that the one year statute of limitations had run; third, that his constitutional claims failed because he did not allege state action; and finally, that his pendent state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the statute of limitations.

McAndrew appealed the district court's rulings dismissing his 1985(2) claim and his state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but did not appeal the trial court's rulings dismissing his claim under 1986 and dismissing his federal and state constitutional claims. A panel of this Court affirmed the district court's ruling dismissing McAndrew's state law claim but reversed the ruling dismissing the 1985(2) claim holding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not apply to 1985 claims alleging civil rights violations. See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 177 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.1999). On August 11, 1999, we vacated this opinion and granted rehearing en banc.

II.

The only issue before us ¹ is whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to and bars a claim arising under Title 42 U.S.C. 1985(2),² alleging a criminal conspiracy among a corporation and its employees to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, an individual from testifying in a federal court. We hold that it does not. This outcome flows from the long-established conclusion that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply to criminal conspiracies. Because a 1985(2) claim alleging a conspiracy to deter a person by force, intimidation, or threat from testifying in a federal court proceeding squarely and unambiguously alleges a criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, 1512, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply and, therefore, cannot shield the Defendants from civil liability.

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy. Simply put, under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves. The doctrine is based on the nature of a conspiracy and the legal conception of a corporation. It is by now axiomatic that a conspiracy requires a meeting of the minds between two or more persons to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. See Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 912 (11th Cir.1998) (explaining that a civil conspiracy ordinarily requires "an agreement between two or more people to achieve an illegal objective, an overt act in furtherance of that illegal objective, and a resulting injury to the plaintiff"). However, under basic agency principles, the acts of a corporation's agents are considered to be those of a single legal actor. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir.1981); see also United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir.1982). Therefore, just as it is not legally possible for an individual person to conspire with himself, it is not possible for a single legal entity consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself. See Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603 (noting that "the multiplicity of actors necessary to conspiracy" is negated when the agents' acts are attributed to the corporation and the corporation and its agents are viewed as a single legal actor); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.1952) (explaining that "[i]t is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation").

Not surprisingly, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context where it seemed particularly logical to conclude that a single corporation could not conspire with itself to restrain trade in the way imagined by Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.³ As the former Fifth Circuit explained in Nelson Radio, while a single corporation could act in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act⁴-which prohibits attempts to monopolize-it could not alone form a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade so as to violate Section 1 of the Act. See Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914 (explaining that Section 1 of the Sherman Act "does not purport to cover a conspiracy which consists merely in the fact that the officers of the single defendant corporation did their day to day jobs in formulating and carrying out...