Application of Jackson

• Decision Date: 22 May 1962
• Citation: 206 F. Supp. 759
• Parties: Application of Nathan JACKSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

206 F. Supp. 759

Application of Nathan JACKSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

May 22, 1962.

Daniel G. Collins, New York City, for petitioner.

Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Kings County, William I. Siegel, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel, for respondent.

DAWSON, District Judge.

This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus initiated by an order to show cause. The petition urges that petitioner's constitutional rights were violated and that conviction must be set aside for three reasons: (1) his confession was involuntary, (2) the court's instructions to the jury on the question of voluntariness were inadequate, erroneous and prejudicial, and (3) the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions is violative of due process as a matter of law.

Petitioner was jointly indicted with one Nora Elliott by a grand jury of Kings County for murder in the first degree in the shooting and killing of William J. Ramos, Jr., a police officer, following the commission of the felony of robbery. Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. Elliott was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to a term in prison. Elliott did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on behalf of petitioner the judgment was affirmed (10 N.Y.2d 780, 219 N.Y.S.2d 621, 177 N.E.2d 59). A motion for reargument or for amendment of the remittitur so as to certify a federal constitutional question was denied by the New York Court of Appeals, People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 816, 221 N.Y.S.2d 521, 178 N.E.2d 234, on October 5, 1961 as to reargument but was granted as to amendment of the remittitur and the constitutional question was certified that the Court of Appeals had necessarily passed upon the voluntariness of certain confessions and had found that defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated. Application was made to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied on December 18, 1961, Jackson v. State, 368 U.S. 949, 82 S.Ct. 390, 7 L.Ed.2d 344. On February 22, 1962 the Court of Appeals denied a further motion for reargument and for a stay of execution pending the filing of a new petition for certiorari. People v. Jackson, 11 N.Y.2d 798, 227 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 181 N.E.2d 854. An application to Mr. Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court for a similar stay was denied by him on March 7, 1962. Jackson v. State, 82 S.Ct. 541, 7 L.Ed.2d 766. The instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus then followed. It would seem that petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to him.

The Court, in compliance with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1952), has examined the transcript of the state proceedings to determine whether the state processes had given full consideration to the issues and had resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. Where the record affords an adequate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and the evidence, and such consideration is given to the entire state record, there is no necessity for having a hearing on the application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 344 U.S. at p. 463, 73 S.Ct. 397. The Court has examined the entire record of the proceedings in the state court, consisting of 823 pages of printed transcript.

It appears from the transcript that petitioner Jackson entered a Brooklyn hotel accompanied by Nora Elliott at about 1:00 A.M. on June 14, 1960. They registered at the hotel. As the clerk was about to show them a room, Jackson at the point of a gun robbed the clerk. He told Elliott to leave the hotel, which she did. The petitioner forced the clerk and several other people to an upstairs room and warned them to make no outcry after his departure. They, however, broke a window and began to shout. The police officer Ramos, hearing the alarm, intercepted Jackson as he was escaping from the hotel. Ramos endeavored to arrest Jackson. A fight ensued in the course of which Jackson shot Ramos twice, inflicting fatal wounds. Ramos, in turn, shot Jackson who was wounded but not killed. Jackson attempted to flee but was captured and taken to a hospital. While at the hospital he was interviewed by a detective. He said to the detective: "I shot the colored cop. I got the drop on him." (R. 1272.) This statement was made about 2:00 A.M. in the hospital. At about 3:55 A.M., in the hospital, Jackson was questioned by representatives of the District Attorney. There he made a statement which was taken down by a reporter of the District Attorney's office. The statement was transcribed and offered in evidence at the trial. When it was offered in evidence the court asked Jackson's attorney whether he had any objection to it. Jackson's attorney stated that he had no objection. (R. 1381.)

Jackson took the stand in his own behalf. He admitted commission of the robbery and the fact of the shooting of Ramos. He contended, however, that the robbery was all over at the time he left the hotel and the shooting was not in connection with the robbery. He tried to excuse the shooting by the assertion of intoxication. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree against Jackson, indicating that it rejected his defense.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus raises merely questions relating to the voluntariness of the confession. It is hard to tell from the moving papers and the briefs submitted in support of the petition what confession petitioner is referring to. There was one confession made by Jackson at 2 o'clock in the morning when he stated to Detective Kaile as follows: `I shot the colored cop. I got the drop on him." No objection was made to the introduction of this testimony. There was the other more detailed confession which was taken down in transcription by a stenographer of the District Attorney's office and which was introduced in evidence without objection by Jackson's attorney. This was taken at about 3:55 A.M. at the hospital. The important part of this confession was the following:

"Q. How many shots did you fire at the officer?

"A. I don't know.

"Q. Was it more than one?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Who fired first, you or the police officer?

"A. I beat him to it.

"Q. How many times did you fire at him?

"A. I don't know; twice probably."

It is the contention of the petitioner that the confession was involuntary. It is urged that Jackson, at the time he made the statement to the representatives of the District Attorney's office, was suffering from loss of blood, thirst, severe pain of bullet wounds and the effects of certain drugs which had been administered to him to relieve the pain from which he was suffering.

The issue of the voluntariness of the confession was submitted to the jury by the trial court. There was certainly no clear indication that the confession was involuntary. The Court reaches this conclusion not merely upon the conclusion reached by the state courts of New York but by appropriate examination of the entire record of the trial. See People ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276, 277, 79 S.Ct. 321, 3 L.Ed.2d 296 (1959).

Although defendant's counsel made no objection to the admission of the confession at the time it was offered in evidence, the trial court nevertheless carefully instructed the jury as follows:

"I shall now give you the applicable law concerning such statement which the District Attorney claims is a confession on the part of Jackson, or an admission of Jackson.

"Jackson testified he was shot. He was under a sedative. He said he was refused water unless he answered the questions as they wanted him to answer them. He said he remembers some questions and answers, and denied others. He had no recollection as to some questions and answers. He said that the statement which the District Attorney claims to be a confession was obtained from him in violation of law. You have heard all the testimony on that point, as well as on every other point. Now let me give you the law.

"A confession of a defendant, says the law, whether in the course of a judicial proceeding, or to a private person, can be given in evidence against him unless made under influence of fear, produced by threats, or unless made on a stipulation of the District Attorney that he shall not be prosecuted therefor. Of course, in this case, there is no claim that the District Attorney made any such stipulation, so do not be concerned with that part of it.

"Under our law, a confession is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without additional proof that

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