William Ellis v. United States No 567 Eastern Dredging Company v. United States No 664 Eastern Dredging Company v. United States No 665 Eastern Dredging Company v. United States No 666 Bay State Dredging Company v. United States No 667 Bay State Dredging Company v. United States No 668 Bay State Dredging Company v. United States No 669

• Citation: 27 S.Ct. 600,51 L.Ed. 1047,206 U.S. 246,11 Ann. Cas. 589
• Decision Date: 13 May 1907
• Docket Number: 669,665,667,Nos. 567,664,668,666,s. 567
• Parties: WILLIAM H. ELLIS, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 567. EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 664 EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 665. EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 666. BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 667. BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 668. BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES. NO 669
• Court: United States Supreme Court

206 U.S. 246

27 S.Ct. 600

51 L.Ed. 1047

WILLIAM H. ELLIS, Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES.

NO 567.

EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 664

EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 665.

EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 666.

BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 667.

BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 668.

BAY STATE DREDGING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. UNITED STATES.

NO 669.

Nos. 567, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669.

Argued and submitted April 23, 24, 1907.

Decided May 13, 1907.

Mr. D. T. Watson for plaintiff in error in No. 567.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 246-248 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Edward E. Blodgett and G. Philip Wardner for plaintiff in error in Nos. 664, 665, 666.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 248-250 intentionally omitted] Messrs. W. Orison Underwood, Henry F. Knight, and Johnson, Clapp, & Underwood for plaintiff in error in Nos. 667, 668, 669.

Solicitor General Hoyt, Attorney General Bonaparte, and Mr. Otis J. Carlton for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 250-254 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

These are an indictment and informations under the act of August 1, 1892, chap. 352, 27 Stat. at L. 340, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2521, 'Relating to the Limitation of the Hours of Daily Service of Laborers and Mechanics Employed upon the Public Works of the United States and of the District of Columbia.' They all bring up the question of the constitutionality of the act, and they severally present some subordinate matters, which will be considered under the respective cases.

The act limits the service and employment of all laborers and mechanics employed by the United States, by the District of Columbia, or by any contractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the United States or the District, to eight hours in any one calendar day, and makes it unlawful 'to require or permit any such laborer or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any calendar day except in case of extraordinary emergency.' By § 2 'any officer or agent of the government of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or any contractor or subcontractor whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control any laborer or mechanic employed upon any of the public works of the United States or of the District of Columbia, who shall intentionally violate any provision of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every such offense shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction thereof.' The plaintiffs in error were contractors within the scope of the act, were found guilty, and were fined. They all requested rulings that the act was unconstitutional, excepted to the refusal so to rule, and on that ground brought their cases to this court.

The contention that the act is unconstitutional is not frivolous, since it may be argued that there are relevant distinctions between the power of the United States and that of a state. But the arguments naturally urged against such a statute apply equally for the most part to the two jurisdictions, and are answered, so far as a state is concerned, by Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124. In that case a contractor for work upon a municipal boulevard was sentenced to a fine under a similar law of Kansas, and the statute was upheld. We see no reason to deny to the United States the power thus established for the states. Like the states, it may sanction the requirements made of contractors employed upon its public works by penalties in case those requirements are not fulfilled. It would be a strong thing to say that a legislature that had power to forbid or to authorize and enforce a contract had not also the power to make a breach of it criminal; but, however that may be, Congress, as incident to its power to authorize and enforce contracts for public works, may require that they shall be carried out only in a way consistent with its views of public policy, and may punish a departure from that way. It is true that it has not the general power of legislation possessed by the legislatures of the states, and it may be true that the object of this law is of a kind not subject to its general control. But the power that it has over the mode in which contracts with the United States shall be performed cannot be limited by a speculation as to motives. If the motive be conceded, however, the fact that Congress has not general control over the conditions of labor does not make unconstitutional a law otherwise valid, because the purpose of the law is to secure to it certain advantages, so far as the law goes.

One other argument is put forward, but it hardly needs an answer. A ruling was asked in Ellis's case, and is attempted to be sustained, to the effect that the government waived its sovereignty by making a contract, and that even if the act of 1892 were read into the contract, a breach of its requirements would be only a breach of contract, and could not be made a crime. This is a mere confusion of ideas. The government, purely as contractor, in the absence of special laws, may stand like a private person; but, by making a contract, it does not give up its power to make a law, and it may make a law like the present for the reasons that we have stated. We are of opinion that the act is not contrary to the Constitution of the United States.

We pass to the subordinate matters not common to all the cases. In Ellis's case the plaintiff in error agreed to construct and complete pier No. 2 at the Boston navy yard, within six months, according to certain specifications, and at a certain price. He found more difficulty than he expected, although he expected some trouble, in getting certain oak and pine piles called for by the contract, and, having been delayed by that cause, he permitted his associate in the business to employ men for nine hours, in the hurry to get the work done. The judge instructed the jury that the evidence did not show an 'extraordinary emergency' within the meaning of the act. The judge was right in ruling upon the matter. Even if, as in other instances, a nice case might be left to the jury, what emergencies are within the statute is merely a constituent element of a question of law, since the determination of that element determines the extent of the statutory prohibition and is material only to that end. The ruling was correct. It needs no argument to show that the disappointment of a contractor with regard to obtaining some of his materials—a matter which he knew involved some difficulty, of which he took the risk—does not create such an emergency as is contemplated in the exception to the law. Again, the construction of the pier was desirable for the more convenient repair of war ships, but it was not essential. Vessels had been docked without it since 1835 or 1836, so that there was no hot haste on that account, if, under any circumstances, that kind of need would have been enough.

There is only one other question raised in Ellis's case. It is admitted that he was a contractor within the meaning of the act, and that the workmen permitted to work more than eight hours a day were employed upon 'public works,' and it is not denied that these workmen were 'mechanics.' The jury were instructed, subject to exception, that, if the defendant intended to permit the men to work over eight hours on the calendar day named, he intended to violate the statute. The argument against the instruction is that the word 'intentionally' in the statute requires knowledge of the law; or at least that, to be convicted, Ellis must not have supposed, even mistakenly, that there was an emergency extraordinary enough to justify his conduct. The latter proposition is only the former a little disguised. Both are without foundation. If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent. The judgment in this case must be affirmed.

The three cases against the Eastern Dredging Company were informations for employing certain men alleged to be laborers or mechanics more than eight hours a day upon what was alleged to be one of the public works of the United States; viz., dredging a portion of the 35-foot channel, so called, in Boston harbor. The cases against the Bay State Dredging Company were similar, except that the place was Chelsea creek in Boston harbor. Of the former, No. 664 was in three counts for employing two deck hands and an assistant crane man and deck hand upon a dredge; No. 665 was for employing the master, crane man, and fireman of the dredge; and No. 666 was for employing the captain, mate, engineer, and foreman of a tug that towed a scow, etc., and a man in charge of the scow. Of the Bay State Dredging Company cases, No. 667 was for employing the captain, mate, and fireman of a dredge; No. 668 was for employing a crane man and deck hand on the dredge; and No. 669 was for employing a scow man and the captain and engineer of a tug. The offenses were admitted or proved subject to the questions that already have been considered, and to the further questions whether the dredging was upon one of the public works of the United States, and whether the persons employed were laborers or mechanics within the meaning of the act, with one or two lesser points that will not need to be discussed.

Both of the phrases to be construed admit a broad enough interpretation to cover these cases, but the question is whether that interpretation is reasonable, and, in a penal statute,...