People v. Sanchez
| Citation | 208 Cal.App.3d 721,256 Cal.Rptr. 446 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. D006245,D006245 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Vincente Bretato SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Rudolf Corona, Jr., and Roy W. Hewitt, Deputys Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
A jury found Vicente Bretato Sanchez guilty of ten counts of child molesting under PENAL CODE SECTION 2881, subdivision (a) (counts 1-6, 9, 12, 15 and 18), five counts of child molesting with duress under section 288, subdivision (b) (counts 7, 10, 13, 16 and 19), 2 and five counts of oral copulation with a person under 14 and more than 10 years younger than the defendant under section 288a, subdivision (c) (counts 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20). As to all of the counts under section 288, subdivision (a), it was alleged and the jury found true that Sanchez occupied a position of special trust and engaged in substantial sexual conduct within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(9), relating to ineligibility for probation. As to the first two counts under section 288, subdivision (a), it was alleged and the jury found true that Sanchez had substantial sexual contact with a child under 11 within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8), also relating to ineligibility for probation.
The trial court sentenced Sanchez to 40 years in prison. He appeals, asserting 11 major points of error on several subjects including jury selection, admission of evidence, particularly evidence pertaining to the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and the hysterical response syndrome, effectiveness of counsel, instructions included or omitted and his motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Sanchez's granddaughter, C, who was born in 1974, is the victim. The information charges Sanchez with offenses occurring during various time periods commencing September 16, 1982, the last of which ended December 31, 1985. Generally, the time periods correspond to school semesters and intervening summer vacations while C was attending the second, third, fourth and fifth grades. The allegations speak in the singular when describing the particular violation alleged for each period. The place of the crimes was Sanchez's home where C, her mother and numerous other relatives lived during the relevant time periods.
Describing the allegations in more detail, as we have mentioned, the case was presented in a context of each violation of a statute having been committed during a specified time period. For example, the child molesting charges under section 288, subdivision (a), in the first five counts were alleged to have been committed "[o]n or about and between," respectively, September 16, 1982, and January 15, 1983; January 16, 1983, and June 15, 1983; and in similarly described later time periods up to June 15, 1984.
Beginning with count six, each of the three statutory violations, i.e., section 288, subdivision (a), section 288, subdivision (b), and section 288a, subdivision (c), was alleged in a separate count to have occurred in the same described time period. For example, in counts six, seven and eight, respectively, each of the three statutory violations was alleged to have occurred "[o]n or about and between" June 16, 1984, and September 15, 1984. A similar charging pattern followed, with the last time period in which the three violations were alleged to have been committed being "[o]n or about and between the dates of September 16, 1985, and December 31, 1985." (Counts 18, 19 and 20.)
C's testimony included estimates of the number of times she was molested. In her Using terminology defined for the jury by the use of anatomically correct male and female dolls, C's testimony described the acts of molestations in sufficient terms to bring those acts within the violations charged. Generally, her testimony was the acts were carried out in the garage or a bedroom of Sanchez's house usually after she returned home from school and before Sanchez went to work. She said there always was a blanket covering a window on the garage door facing a neighbor's house and the doors in the garage could be locked from inside the garage. Sanchez always locked the doors when he molested her in the garage.
direct testimony, C described the frequency the acts occurred during the various time periods in general terms such as "many times" or "lots of times." During cross-examination, she estimated Sanchez molested her 50 to 60 times between January and June 1983; more than one hundred times during her third grade school year from September 1983 to June 1984; 60 times in July and August 1984; 60 times during her fourth grade school year from September 1984 to June 1985; 60 times during the summer of 1985; and 60 times from September through December 1985
Normally when the crimes were committed, C would be standing by the sofa bed in the garage, either he or she would remove her clothes and he would lower his pants before molesting her. When Sanchez finished he gave C 25 cents or a dollar. More than once Sanchez told C if she told anyone her mother was going to hit her and he would go to jail. C never told anyone about the molestations because she was afraid her mother was going to hit her.
Sanchez's defense consisted primarily of attacking C's credibility. He denied committing any of the offenses. He sought to establish he had left for work before C returned from school and thus could not have committed the offenses at the times she indicated. Further, his defense contradicted details of C's testimony concerning such things as the presence of a blanket over a garage window through which the interior could be viewed from a neighbor's home and the presence of a lock that could be latched from inside the garage to prevent entry to the garage from the house.
Sanchez contends the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant his challenge for cause of prospective juror Wilkinson and in not adequately examining the prospective jurors to insure selection of a fair and impartial jury. The argument is without merit.
After answering "no" to a question in a questionnaire asking whether she had anything in her mind that would make it difficult or impossible to act fairly and impartially both as to the defendant and the People, prospective juror Wilkinson stated during voir dire that she had never been a juror "and I probably would be partial in this case." In chambers the following colloquy occurred:
Ms. Avery: Do you feel that a child who is the victim of an alleged crime of this nature deserves to have someone like yourself seated on a jury?
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People v. McAlpin
...finding that the proposed expert testimony of Officer Miller was relevant at the time it was offered. (Cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735-736, 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 [evidence on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome admissible in People'scase-in-chief-in-chief because iss......
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People v. Senior
...control during later molestations, as ample evidence the later molestations were accomplished by duress. 9 (People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 747-748, 256 Cal.Rptr. 446; People v. Bergschneider, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 154, 259 Cal.Rptr. B. Adequacy of instructions Defendant ......
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State v. Altgilbers
... ... State, 19 Ark.App. 9, 715 S.W.2d 883 (1986) (admitting child's identification of perpetrators under equivalent of Rule 11-803(4)); People v. Oldsen, 697 P.2d 787 (Colo.App.1984) (same); State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734, 289 N.W.2d 768 (1980) (same); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, ... Slaughter, 211 Cal.App.3d 577, 259 Cal.Rptr. 437 (3d Dist.), cert. granted, 261 Cal.Rptr. 704, 777 P.2d 1138 (1989); People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 (4th Dist.1989). But see People v. Jones, 209 Cal.App.3d 89, 257 Cal.Rptr. 342 (4th Dist.), cert. granted, ... ...
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Duckett v. State
...syndrome evidence assumes the presence of abuse, and explains the sexually abused child's reactions to it. See People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 256 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1989); In re Sarah M., 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 239 Cal.Rptr. 605 (1987). This is not to say that syndrome evidence is not of v......
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Table of Cases null
...People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1012, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111 (2d Dist. 1994)—Ch. 4-C, §3.2.4(2)(b); §4.2.2(4)(b) People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal. App. 3d 721, 256 Cal. Rptr. 446 (4th Dist. 1989)—Ch. 4-A, §7; §7.1.2 People v. Sanchez, 174 Cal. App. 3d 343, 220 Cal. Rptr. 53 (6th Dist. 1985)—Ch.......
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Chapter 4 - §7. Syndrome evidence offered to explain behavior
...syndromes. See Evid. C. §§1107, 1107.5; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905-06; People v. Sanchez (4th Dist.1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735. Syndrome evidence can be introduced by the prosecution or the defendant. See Evid. C. §1107(a); Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th at 1087-88; Sanchez, 208 Cal......
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Appendix A. The district attorney's manual
...juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal. App.3d 721. A juror who expresses an opinion that the type of case at issue would be too emotional and who, consequently, expresses a desire not to ......