Lawrence Lines v. Larkins

Citation208 F.3d 153
Parties(3rd Cir. 2000) LAWRENCE LINES, Appellant v. DAVID LARKINS, WARDEN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF BUCKS; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-2050
Decision Date21 March 2000
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-01500 District Judge: Hon. Donald W. VanArtsdalen

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Attorney for Appellant: Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Esq. (Argued) Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis 1600 Market Street Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellees: Stephen B. Harris, Esq. (Argued) Heather A. Castellino, Esq. Office of District Attorney 55 East Court Street Bucks County Courthouse Doylestown, PA 18901

Before: McKee, and Rendell, Circuit Judges, and Debevoise, District Judge1

OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to review the District Court's dismissal of Lawrence Lines' petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The District Court held that Lines had not exhausted his state court remedies, and dismissed the petition without prejudice based upon that court's conclusion that Lines could return to state court to properly present his claims there. We agree that Lines has not exhausted his state court remedies. However, we conclude that returning to state court would be futile and that his claims are all procedurally defaulted. We also conclude that Lines can not establish cause and prejudice for the default and that failing to reach the merits of his petition would not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. We therefore hold that his petition must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm, but modify, the order of the District Court dismissing Lines petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2254.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

The procedural history of this appeal illustrates just how serpentine the path to federal habeas review has become and the unexploded mines awaiting even seasoned practitioners who attempt to navigate under 28 U.S.C. S 2254.2

Lines was tried for murder in state court in 1986. However, he escaped from custody on October 10, 1986, while the jury was deliberating. The jury convicted Lines in absentia, and his trial attorney filed post-verdict motions on his behalf, and in his absence. Lines was apprehended on December 21, 1986, while those post-verdict motions were pending. Thereafter, he retained new counsel who filed additional post-verdict motions on his behalf. The Commonwealth moved to quash the post-verdict motions, arguing that Lines was no longer entitled to seek post verdict relief because he had absconded during his trial. However, the trial court never ruled on the Commonwealth's motion. Instead, the court held numerous evidentiary hearings on the merits of Lines' claims and, by order dated May 23, 1991, the trial court denied the post verdict motions on the merits. On July 19, 1991, Lines was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction.

Following sentencing, Lines filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in which he raised the following questions:

1. Did the attorney for the Commonwealth, in his closing presentation, continuously express his personal opinions of the evidence so as to deprive the appellant of a fair trial?

2. Did the Commonwealth commit prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence concerning its star witness, failing to comply with discovery rules, and failing to correct perjured testimony of the star witness, thus requiring a new trial?

3. Was the Defendant-Appellant denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel allowed the admittance of hearsay statements without objection, failed to properly prepare for trial and conduct an independent defense investigation, failed to utilize character witness testimony, and failed to develop and present a coherent and cogent theory of defense?

Brief of Appellant at 2.3 The Commonwealth responded by asking the Superior Court to dismiss Lines' appeal based upon his flight. The Commonwealth argued that the trial court had erred in not quashing Lines' post-verdict motions because he had been a fugitive when his post-trial motions were filed.

The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth, and held that the trial court had erred in failing to quash Lines' post-verdict motions. The court stated: "Pennsylvania law indicates that a trial court is without discretion and, therefore, must dismiss a defendant's post-trial motions as long as a defendant is a fugitive." Commonwealth v. Lines, 415 Pa. Super. 438, 440, 609 A.2d 832, 833, allocatur denied, 532 Pa. 662, 618 A.2d 983 (1992). The court held that "appellant has forever forfeited his right to appeal by electing to become a fugitive after post-trial procedures have begun." Id., 415 Pa. Super. at 443, 609 A.2d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court's holding was partially based upon a then-recent decision wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had stated:

A defendant's voluntary escape acts as a per se forfeiture of his rights of appeal, where the defendant is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence. Such a forfeiture is irrevocable and continues despite the defendant's capture or voluntary return to custody. Thus, by choosing to flee from justice, appellant has forever forfeited his right to appeal.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 541, 610 A.2d 439, 441 (1992). In its opinion, the court listed Lines' substantive claims but did not address them.4

Thereafter, Lines filed a timely Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In his Petition, Lines challenged only the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule; he did not include the substantive claims he had raised in his brief to the Superior Court. On October 28, 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition.

On March 31, 1993, Lines filed a petition for collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S. SS 9501 et seq. He raised the following issues in that petition:

1. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to submit to the appellate courts that their retroactive application of Commonwealth v. Jones to the appellant's case would be a violation of the appellant's due process rights.

2. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to submit to the appellate courts that a retroactive application of Commonwealth v. Jones violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to submit to the appellate courts that a five year delay in the appellant's sentencing on the above captioned matter violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise whether trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the trial court's jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony.

5. Whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence.

The PCRA court began its discussion of Lines' petition by declaring: "it is the opinion of this court that this entire petition is improper." The court's view of the impropriety of Lines' PCRA petition was based, in part, upon the court's belief that "appellant is using this petition in an attempt to attack a Superior Court decision in which that court refused to adjudicate appellant's claims on the basis that appellant waived his appeal right because appellant absconded." The court concluded: "This collateral attack is impermissible." Opinion at 3. Nevertheless, the court assumed arguendo that Lines could "maintain such an appeal," id., and denied the petition on the merits without a hearing.

Lines appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the denial on the merits of the PCRA petition as to all but one of the issues Lines had raised. The court found that Lines' challenge to appellate counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to raise a claim concerning trial counsel's ineffectiveness had been waived because Lines absconded. The court stated:

Since appellant's voluntary escape resulted not in a waiver of those issues addressed in the quashed appeal, but a complete forfeiture of his right to appeal, appellate counsel was effectively barred from raising the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and, thus, cannot be deemed ineffective for having failed to include certain issues in the direct appeal.

Opinion at 3-4. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Lines' Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Superior Court's decision.

On February 28, 1997, Lines filed the instant habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, raising the following claims:

1. Lines' Due Process Rights were violated (1) when the prosecutor refused, despite demand, to disclose that John Gabriele had been immunized and (2) when the prosecutor permitted John Gabriele to perjure himself throughout his assertions of non involvement in drug activity.

2. Lines was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of competent counsel at his trial and his right to confront the witnesses against him.

3. Lines' counsel's performance at trial fell below the standard of competence required and deprived Lines of his Sixth Amendment rights because:

(a) counsel failed to ask for severance of counts;

(b) counsel failed to object to hearsay testimony;

(c) counsel failed to adopt any theory of defense; and

(d) counsel failed to call character witnesses.

4. The prosecutor's closing arguments constituted a violation of due process by offering his personal opinions concerning certain testimony.

The Commonwealth asked the District Court to dismiss the petition based upon Lines' purported failure to exhaust remedies in state court. The...

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