Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, Connecticut

Decision Date18 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 3:98CV01316(GLG).,3:98CV01316(GLG).
Citation208 F.Supp.2d 263
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesBeverly TSOMBANIDIS, Oxford House, Inc., and John Does One Through Seven (Current and prospective residents of 421 Platt Avenue, West Haven, Connecticut), Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, First Fire District of the City of West Haven, Defendants.

Jonathan B. Orleans, Sarah W. Poston, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT, Steven G. Polin, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Michael P. Farrell, West Haven, CT, Martin S. Echter, Office of Corporate Counsel, City of New Haven, New Haven, CT, for City of West Haven.

Thomas R. Gerarde, Melinda P. Frechette, Howd & Ludorf, Hartford, CT, for West Haven Fire Dept., First Fire District.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Following this Court's finding that plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to an award of fees and costs against the City of West Haven and the First Fire District of the City of West Haven, plaintiffs have submitted their application for attorneys' fees in the amount of $262,622.01, and costs in the amount of $20,102.48 [Doc. ## 150, 155, 167, 176, 178].1 Pursuant to this Court's directive that plaintiffs allocate their fees and costs between the two defendants, plaintiffs have asked that the Court award attorneys' fees against the City in the amount of $133,072.63, and against the Fire District in the amount of $129,549.38. Plaintiffs have also allocated their requested costs, $11,435.12 against the City and $8,667.36 against the Fire District.

After due consideration of the memoranda, affidavits, and supporting documents submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs' application to the extent set forth below.

DISCUSSION
I. Attorneys' Fees Award Standard

In determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to a prevailing party under the Fair Housing Act ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), or the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the Court employs the standards developed under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 & n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992); LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 757 (2d Cir.1998). Under § 1988(b), the Court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Further, an award of attorneys' fees under that section may include, in the Court's discretion, expert fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c).

The district court is afforded broad discretion in determining a reasonable fee award based on the circumstances in the case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The "normal starting point for calculating reasonable attorneys' fees to be awarded to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff is the calculation of a so-called `lodestar' figure, which is arrived at by multiplying `the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation ... by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 172 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933). The rates to be used in calculating the § 1988 lodestar are the market rates "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir.1998). "Further, in order to provide adequate compensation where the services were performed many years before the award is made, the rates used by the court to calculate the lodestar should be `current rather than historic hourly rates.'" Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 882 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 764. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable rate. Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.1999). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has cautioned that "attorney's fees are to awarded with an eye to moderation, seeking to avoid either the reality or the appearance of awarding windfall fees." New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1139 (2d Cir.1983) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

"[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. "Applications for fee awards should generally be documented by contemporaneously created time records that specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173. The Court should exclude from the fee calculation hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from the lodestar calculation. Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173. "The task of determining a fair fee requires a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended." Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (remanding award of attorneys' fees and directing the magistrate judge to review critically counsel's time records). The Court must

examine the hours expended by counsel and the value of the work product of the particular expenditures to the client's case. Efforts put into research, briefing and the preparation of a case can expand to fill the time available, and some judgment must be made in the awarding of fees as to diminishing returns from such further efforts.... In making this examination, the district court does not play the role of an uninformed arbiter but may look to its own familiarity with the case and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.

Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 876 (quoting DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.1985)). The Second Circuit has further directed that if the district court determines that certain hours are not deserving of compensation, it must state the reasons for excluding those hours "as specifically as possible." LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 764 (internal quotations omitted); Orchano v. Advanced Recovery, Inc., 107 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1997).

"The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. There are other considerations that may lead a court to adjust the fee upward or downward. Id. The lodestar figure may be adjusted on the basis of the "results obtained." Id. "Indeed, `the most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award `is the degree of success obtained.'" Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933). "This factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed `prevailing' even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. A plaintiff who prevails on some but not all of his claims is not entitled to a fee award for unsuccessful claims that were based on different facts and different legal theories. Id. However, a plaintiff's lack of success on some of his claims does not require the court to reduce the lodestar amount where the successful and unsuccessful claims were interrelated and required essentially the same proof. Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 951 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115, 118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998); Lunday, 42 F.3d at 134; Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 973 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053, 113 S.Ct. 978, 122 L.Ed.2d 132 (1993); DeLeon v. Little, No. 3:94CV902RNC, 2000 WL 435494, at *4 (D.Conn. Mar.2, 2000). The following factors also may be considered: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

This Court has already determined that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of fees and costs against both defendants.2 Thus, we turn to the question of the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested.

II. Plaintiffs' Fee Request
A. Requested Rates

Plaintiffs' attorneys have asked this Court to award fees based on the following hourly rates:

• $ 275/hour for Jonathan B. Orleans, a shareholder with Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, P.C., ("ZNC") in Bridgeport, Connecticut, with 17 years legal experience;

• $ 205/hour for Sarah H. Poston, an associate with ZNC with 8 years legal experience;

• $ 275/hour for Gregory J. Cava, a shareholder with ZNC and a real estate attorney with 18 years legal experience;

• $ 150/hour for Barbara G. Hager, an associate with ZNC with 5 years legal experience;

• $ 105/hour for Diane W. Barrett, a paralegal at ZNC with 10 years paralegal experience;

• $ 225/hour for Steven Polin, a sole practitioner in Washington, D.C., and General Counsel to Oxford House,...

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