Ridley v. State, 28943

• Citation: 208 S.E.2d 466,232 Ga. 646
• Decision Date: 03 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 28943,28943
• Parties: Joseph RIDLEY v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 466

208 S.E.2d 466

232 Ga. 646

Joseph RIDLEY v. The STATE.

No. 28943.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 3, 1974.

Richard W. Watkins, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.

Edward E. McGarity, Dist. Atty., McDonough, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John B. Ballard, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

INGRAM, Justice.

Defendant's conviction, in the Superior Court of Butts County, under the provisions of Code Ann. § 77-361, ¹ for possession of a deadly weapon while serving as an inmate of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, is here for review.

A number of enumerated trial errors are insisted upon in this appeal, but only two of them will be discussed in this opinion. The first contention we address is defendant's argument that the statute under which he was convicted violates the 'due process' clauses of both State and Federal Constitutions and denies him equal protection of the law. We find no merit in this argument but agree with defendant's contention that a new trial should have been granted because the evidence was circumstantial and it failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except guilt.

The language of this statute prohibits a prisoner, without authorization to do so, from possessing, carrying on his person, or having under his custody and control, various deadly weapons and instruments described in the statute, which might endanger the security of a Georgia correctional institution or the persons therein. The statute includes in the prohibited list a sharp instrument. The indictment in this case was stated in the language of the statute and we believe fairly apprised the defendant of the contemplated conduct forbidden by the statute with which he was charged in this case. 'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1953). The Supreme Court of the United States restated this principle 18 years later in these words: '. . . we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Measured by this standard, we believe the present statute is sufficiently definite to protect any prisoner who desires to obey it. Prior decisions of this court are also supportive of this determination. See Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970); and Stull v. State, 230 Ga. 99, 100, 196 S.E.2d 7 (1973). Therefore, we hold that the statute, published as Code Ann. § 77-361, is not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite and is consistent with due process requirements of both State and Federal Constitutions.

Defendant also argues that 'to class all inmates together and then to put restrictions on them (i.e., with respect to having weapons) which are not put on citizens generally' denies prisoners equal protection of the law guaranteed by 'the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' There is no merit in this contention. A statute which prohibits prison inmates from having deadly weapons does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 'The equal protection clause . . . does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.' Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1349, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485. What more reasonable basis can be found than to classify prisoners as a definable group not permitted to have dangerous or deadly weapons? It is inconceivable that any correctional institution for prisoners could even exist, if inmates were permitted to have weapons of the character prohibited by this statute. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1069, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948).' Pell v. Procunier, -- U.S. --, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495, decided June 24, 1974. We hold the present statute is reasonable and necessary for the security and protection of correctional institutions and the people who reside and work in such institutions.

The final argument made by defendant to be discussed in this opinion relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. It appears that defendant and other prisoners were subjected to a warrantless search of their persons and their cells. The search resulted from a fight between two inmates, neither of whom was the defendant in this case. Officers of the institution testified that during the search of defendant's cell, they found a sharp instrument, fabricated to resemble a knife, hidden in a groove beside a drawer in a wall cabinet. It was not visible to a person in the cell unless he knew where it had been placed. There was no evidence that defendant had placed it there or at any time had the instrument in his possession. Thus the strength of the State's case is dependent solely upon the instrument being discovered in defendant's cell. A similar search 17 days earlier of defendant's cell produced no weapon. Testimony at the trial established that prisoners had the option to lock their cells when they went out or leave the unlocked and that it was not unusual for one inmate to go into another inmate's cell. The defendant also testified without dispute that other prisoners always had access to his cell. Three inmates, other than defendant, testified that inmates often hid weapons in the cells of others or in empty cells. At the time the weapon was found in defendant's cell, he had 50 days remaining to be served on a burglary charge. His uncontradicted testimony at the trial...