Armindo v. Padlocker Inc., 99-4144
| Decision Date | 20 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-4144,99-4144 |
| Citation | 209 F.3d 1319 |
| Parties | (11th Cir. 2000) Carine ARMINDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PADLOCKER, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 97-07431-CV-WDF), Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr., Judge.
Before COX and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Carine Armindo appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Padlocker, Inc., on Armindo's claim of pregnancy discrimination. The district court held that Armindo failed to establish that Padlocker's asserted reason for her termination-her poor attendance record-was a pretext for unlawful pregnancy discrimination. We affirm, holding, among other things, that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), is not violated by an employer who fires an employee for excessive absences, even if those absences were the result of the pregnancy, unless the employer overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees.
At the outset, we note that only a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is at issue. The suit was not brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, nor could it have been, because Armindo had been employed by Padlocker as a permanent employee for only three months and was therefore not an "eligible employee." See 29 U.S.C. 2611(2).
The PDA provides that the prohibition against sex-based employment discrimination in 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), applies with equal force to discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). Further, the PDA provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). The analysis required for a pregnancy discrimination claim is the same type of analysis used in other Title VII sex discrimination suits. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir.1994).
Armindo argues that she was discriminated against on account of her pregnancy when she was terminated in July 1996 from her job as an entry level clerical employee after three months of probationary employment. Padlocker contends, however, that Armindo was terminated because of her poor attendance record. It is undisputed that Armindo missed at least six days of work during her three months of employment, five of which were due to pregnancy-related illnesses and one because of car trouble. On nine other occasions Armindo either arrived late or left work early. At least some of these occasions of missed work were pregnancy-related.
The district court assumed without deciding that Armindo had established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, but held that Armindo failed to establish that Padlocker's explanation that she was fired because of her poor attendance was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1309.
The district court properly held Armindo failed to demonstrate that she was fired for any reason other than her poor attendance. Armindo did not attempt to show that she was treated differently from similarly situated non-pregnant employees who missed a comparable amount of work. A plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination need not identify specific non-pregnant individuals treated differently from her, if the employer violated its own policy in terminating her. See Byrd v. Lakeshore Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir.1994) (...
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