King v. Ford Motor Co.

Citation209 F.3d 886
Decision Date06 August 1999
Docket NumberPLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,V,No. 98-5960,98-5960
Parties(6th Cir. 2000) CHARLES KING, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATTI ANN KING, PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE, AMANDA SUE KING, BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT FRIEND CHARLES KING; ASSOCIATED INSURANCE COMPANIES, INTERVENINGFORD MOTOR COMPANY; MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION, Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London. No. 95-00117--Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Samuel E. Davies, Barbourville, Kentucky, for Appellees.

Todd R. Seaver, Distler & Seaver, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rosewell Page, III, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Mcguire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Richmond, Virginia, Bryan Todd Thompson, Dinsmore & Shohl, London, Kentucky, for Appellants.

Before: Batchelder and Cole, Circuit Judges; Marbley, District Judge*

OPINION

R. Guy Cole, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Charles King, administrator of the estate of Patti Ann King; Amanda King, the Kings' daughter; and the Associated Insurance Companies (collectively "plaintiffs"), filed this suit against the Ford Motor Company and Mazda Motor Corporation (collectively "Ford"). Plaintiffs alleged that the passenger restraint system in the 1992 Ford Escort in which Patti Ann King was riding on August 21, 1994 was defective, causing her death. Following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Ford raised several grounds for appeal. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

On August 21, 1994, Patti Ann King, Ginger Brockman, and Erica Brockman were in Ginger Brockman's 1992 Ford Escort, approaching McKee, Kentucky at about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. King was in the front passenger's seat, Ginger Brockman was driving, and Erica Brockman was in the back seat. A pickup truck traveling in the opposite direction, driven by sixteen-year-old Brian Coyle, unwisely attempted to turn in front of Brockman's car, into the driveway of a Dairy Freeze restaurant. The front of the Escort clipped the truck, causing a Delta V, or change in velocity, in the car on the order of twenty-seven miles per hour.

The Escort employed a "passive" or "automatic belt" restraint system in its front seats. The system consisted of a two-point motorized shoulder belt that automatically locked in place when the occupant closed her door; a knee bolster designed to restrain the lower torso;1 and a manual lap belt. For a period of about six months, King had owned an Eagle Talon with a similar system, and she was described as an "avid seatbelt user." At the time of the accident, however, King was wearing only the automatic shoulder belt and not the manual lap belt. She apparently had the lap belt on earlier in the trip, but after her party stopped at the Gray Hawk store to buy a newspaper, she failed to re-engage it.

King suffered massive injuries in the accident - several fractured ribs and a fractured collar bone; lacerations to both lungs; and a tear to the left auricle of her heart. She ultimately died of a lack of oxygen to her brain as a result of her heart and lung injuries. King's estate alleged that her injuries were the result of defects in the Escort's restraint system and filed suit against Ford in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on April 14, 1995.2 It asserted diversity jurisdiction and brought state-law claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties. Associated Insurance Companies intervened to assert subrogation claims for medical expenses, and Amanda Sue King, King's daughter, intervened to assert loss of consortium claims.

Before the case proceeded to trial, Ford filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that, to the extent plaintiffs asserted that the Escort was defective because it failed to contain an air bag, those claims were preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Safety Act"), now codified3 at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1999) ("Standard 208"). The district court granted this motion and plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiffs' proofs, Ford filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, asserting that plaintiffs' claims were preempted in their entirety. The district court denied this motion. The case went to the jury on two distinct theories: that the "automatic seat belt restraint system was defective and unreasonably dangerous to the consumer" and that Ford failed to warn consumers of the potential dangers associated with the restraint system. After first being sent back for further deliberations after returning inconsistent answers to interrogatories, the jury found Ford liable on both claims and awarded damages in the amount of $1,848,109.84.4 Ford renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and filed a motion for a new trial, both to no avail. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Ford first argues that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by federal law. This court generally reviews a district court's decision with regard to preemption de novo. See GTE Mobilnet v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1997).

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of and State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI. Thus, as has been clear since the Supreme Court's decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), any state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).

In applying the Supremacy Clause, courts "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Therefore, "'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516). The Supreme Court has stated that Congress may make its intent to preempt clear either expressly or implicitly. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). Implied preemption, in turn, takes two forms. "We have found implied conflict pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). In summary, then, there are three types of preemption - express preemption, implied conflict preemption, and implied field preemption.

Ford's argument revolves around the Safety Act, and Standard 208 promulgated thereunder. The Safety Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS"). See 49 U.S.C. § 30101. When an FMVSS is in effect, "a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b). However, the act also contains a savings clause, which provides that "[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e).

The Secretary's Standard 208, promulgated pursuant to the Safety Act, requires passenger cars manufactured after September 1, 1989 but before September 1, 1993, like the Escort in this case, to comply with one of three front-seat-occupant crash-protection options: (1) a complete passive restraint system; (2) a passive system (automatic seat belts or air bags) for frontal crash protection, manual belts for lateral crashes and rollovers, and a warning system; or (3) manual front seat belts with a warning system. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.4-S4.1.4.2.2. Ford used option 2 -- an automatic shoulder belt and knee bolster to protect against frontal collisions, a manual lap belt to protect against lateral crashes and rollovers, and a warning system.

Ford's position is that implied conflict preemption applies in this case. It argues that "[b]ecause federal policy [i.e. the Safety Act and Standard 208] affirmatively required that these three options be available to manufacturers, a state rule which found civil liability for using one of the equipment options rather than another would be preempted." State tort law removing one option would obviously be "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," namely the objective that manufacturers have flexibility in choosing a restraint system. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Ford contends that plaintiffs' suit would limit this flexibility, as the company characterizes plaintiffs' suit as one claiming that two-point, automatic seatbelts with manual lap belts are inherently defective. See Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 768-69 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding such a claim preempted).

We agree with plaintiffs, however, that Ford has misconstrued their case. As plaintiffs note:

In the case at bar . . . plaintiffs' position was not that the design choice made by defendants for protecting against frontal collisions - an automatic shoulder belt and knee bolster - was inherently defective but that the specific design was defective due to failure to use load limiters and/or change the location of the knee...

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