Armour Packing Company v. United States No 467 Swift Company v. United States No 468 Morris Company v. United States No 469 Cudahy Packing Company v. United States No 470
| Decision Date | 16 March 1908 |
| Docket Number | 468,470,Nos. 467,469,s. 467 |
| Parties | ARMOUR PACKING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. NO 467. SWIFT & COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. NO 468. MORRIS & COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. NO 469. CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. NO 470 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from pages 56-58 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Frank Hagerman, John C. Cowin, A. R. Urion, Henry Veeder, and M. W. Borders for petitioners.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 58-63 intentionally omitted] Attorney General Bonaparte, Assistant to the Attorney General Purdy, and Mr. A. S. Van Valkenburgh for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 63-66 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
These cases are here upon writs of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. By stipulation there was a single petition for certiorari, and the cases in the circuit court of appeals were considered together on the record in the Armour Packing Company Case, and, as it is conceded in the brief of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the differences in the cases are unsubstantial, the same course may be followed here.
Each of the petitioners was convicted in the district court of the United States, western district of Missouri, for violation of the so-called Elkins act (32 Stat. at L. 847, chap. 708, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 880), in obtaining from the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Company an unlawful concession of 12 cents per 100 pounds from the published and filed rate on that portion of the route between the Mississippi river and New York, for transportation upon a shipment made August 17, 1905, for carriage by rail of certain packing-house products from Kansas City, Kansas, to New York for export. Upon writs of error from the circuit court of appeals of the eighth circuit the sentences of conviction were affirmed. 82 C. C. A. 135, 153 Fed. 1.
The facts in the Armour Case are briefly these: From May 9 to August 6, 1905, the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Company, with its connecting railroads east of the Mississippi river, under joint traffic arrangements, had filed, published, and posted in accordance with the acts of Congress the rates of shipment of the character in question, and showing that the proportionate part thereof from points on the Mississippi river to New York was 23 cents per 100 pounds. Upon June 16, 1905, the packing company contracted with the Wilson Steamship line for space upon boats sailing in August for certain shipments, and notified the Burlington Company thereof, giving it a copy of the contract. On June 17, 1905, the Burlington Company contracted with the packing company to carry export shipments from Kansas City, Kansas, of products named, until December 31, 1905, at a rate the proportionate part of which from the Mississippi river to New York City was 23 cents per 100 pounds, as aforesaid. Upon August 6, 1905, the tariff was amended and duly published and filed, showing that the proportionate part from the Mississippi river to New York City was 35 cents instead of 23 cents per 100 pounds. One of the connecting railroads then objected to the carrying of the freight at the contract rate hereinbefore stated, and a controversy arose between it and the Burlington Company as to whether such contract should apply, the Burlington Company claiming that it should, the connecting carrier denying this contention. Upon August 17, 1905, the packing company delivered at Kansas City, Kansas, to the Burlington Company, 67 tierces of oleo oil, property of the character covered by the contract, for export to Christiania, Norway, and upon receipt thereof at Kansas City, Kansas, the Burlington Company issued and delivered a bill of lading, agreeing to carry the same to the point of destination for a through rate, which included the carriage by, and the rate of, the steamship line, which bill of lading was, according to the ordinary course of business, delivered to the Traders Despatch, one of the connecting carriers, which took the same up and issued a through bill of lading for the goods at the through rate. The bill was in triplicate, one copy thereof being delivered to and accepted by the steamship company. The packing company paid to the Burlington Company, as the initial carrier, the full through rate for the carriage over the line of the Burlington Company and its connecting carriers and that of the steamship line, and, from the time of the delivery of the freight to the railway company at Kansas City, Kansas, until it was delivered at the export destination, it was exclusively handled by the carriers, rail and steamship, the shipper having nothing to do with it. The Burlington Company did, with connecting lines, transport the property from Kansas City, Kansas, through the western district of Missouri and other states and districts to New York City, where the same was delivered to the steamship line. The full rate for the through carriage thus paid was made up so that the proportional part of the railroad carriage east of the Mississippi river was 23 cents per 100 pounds, instead of 35 cents per 100 pounds, fixed by the amended and published rate. The packing company, at the time of making the shipment and paying the freight, knew of the filing and publishing of the amended tariff of August 5, 1905, but did not know how the rate was apportioned or divided, or made up among the respective carriers or points, except that it knew the steamship rate as named in the contract with the steamship owners.
At the time aforesaid the Burlington Company was a common carrier, engaged in the transportation of property by railway under contract agreements and traffic arrangements with certain other lines, extending from Kansas City, Kansas, east to the city of New York and other seaboard points. There were no fixed contract agreements or traffic arrangements with the steamship lines, which were conducted as hereinafter set forth. The ocean rate is variable, depending upon the season, weather, and other matters. The steamship must sail at a given date and has a certain amount of space to be filled, so that space may be at one time quoted to one person at one price and at another time to another person at a different price. The question of such rates varies from hour to hour, as well as from day to day. For these, among other reasons, there was no contract agreement or traffic arrangements between the railroads and export steamship lines. The reservation of space upon an ocean steamer in advance is an important thing, so that the packing company can be certain that its shipment can go on the boats sailing at specified times. The packing company has houses in different parts of the United States, so that it cannot always, at the time of the contract for space, know from what particular point and over what road the shipments will go.
Before August 6, 1905, shipments were made according to the terms of the contract aforesaid, which were carried under the terms thereof. The Armour Company contended and insisted that the amendment increasing the tariff rate did not and could not abrogate or impair the term of its contract.
These prosecutions were under the Elkins act (32 Stat. at L. 847, chap. 708, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 880), and the first question argued concerns the construction of that act, as to what constitutes a crime on the part of the shippers so far as obtaining a shipment by some manner of device is concerned, it being the contention of the petitioners that, in order to work conviction, the shipper must be guilty of some bad faith or fraudulent conduct in the use of the device, or obtain the rebate by some intentionally dishonest or underhanded method, concession, or discrimination denounced by the act. The history of the act in this feature may be of service in interpreting the meaning of Congress. The act of February 4, 1887, made no provision for criminal offenses against the shippers, but it was provided (§ 2, 24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3155), that if the common carrier should, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, or other device, demand, collect, or receive, through any person or persons, a greater or less compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of property subject to the provisions of the act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives, etc., from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially the same circumstances, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which by the act was prohibited and made unlawful. And it was made unlawful for a common carrier to deviate from the published schedule of rates, fares, and charges. 24 Stat. at L. § 6, p. 381, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3156.
By the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. at L. 857, § 2, chap. 382, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3161), the shipper was brought within certain criminal provisions of the law, and one who should knowingly and wilfully, by false billing, false classifying, false weighing, false representation of the contents of the package, or false report of weight, or by any other device or means, with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier, obtain or dispose of property at less than the regular rate established and in force, should be deemed guilty of fraud.
It will be noticed that, in these statutes, the term 'device' is associated with other words indicative of its meaning, and, in the act of March 2, 1889, the shipper, for falsely acting as to weighing, billing, classifying, or obtaining the transportation of property at less than the regular rate, or by any other device, was deemed guilty of fraud. In this act the term 'device,' as one...
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