Sutler v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 03 March 1891
• Citation: 21 A. 419,60 Conn. 170
• Parties: SUTLER v. BARNES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

21 A. 419

60 Conn. 170

SUTLER

v. BARNES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 3, 1891.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hartford county; E. B. Bennett, Judge.

N. A. Pierce and E. Peck, for appellant.

J. J. Jennings, for appellee.

SEYMOUR. J. In this case the appellee claims at the outset, and as conclusive of the question before us, that the court below has decided as a question of fact that no mistake occurred between the parties to the original deed which the plaintiff seeks to have reformed, but that it accurately expresses the contract which was made, and correctly describes the land which was sold. Is this claim well founded? The finding states that in 1872 the defendant sold to one Riggs a piece of land, which he described and bounded in the deed as follows: "Northerly, on land of the heirs of Mrs. Ann O'Connor, one hundred feet; easterly, on highway called 'North Main Street,' thirty-three feet; southerly, on grantor, one hundred and sixteen feet and ten inches; westerly, on grantor, thirty feet two and a quarter inches;" and the deed contained the usual covenants of warranty and seisin. At the time of the purchase both Barnes and Riggs went upon the land, and Barnes then pointed out four stakes which he had previously placed at the corners, one at each corner, as designating the boundaries of the lot. Both supposed that the lot described in the deed and the lot staked out were identical, and that the lines indicated by the stakes correctly designated the boundaries of the piece of land purchased. There were no buildings on the land, and no fence marked any of the boundaries. Barnes and Riggs, and Butler, the plaintiff, who afterwards purchased the land of Riggs, all supposed that the lot staked out correctly designated the land described in the deeds from Barnes to Riggs and from Riggs to Butler, and that the northerly line of the lot indicated by the stakes correctly marked the boundary line on the land of the heirs of Mrs O'Connor. The court finds "that the land actually sold and conveyed by Barnes to Riggs, and by Riggs sold and conveyed to the plaintiff, was the piece as described in their deeds; and that all three supposed the land described in the deeds was identical with the lot staked out by Barnes. But Barnes did not undertake to sell and convey to Riggs any other land than a piece bounded northerly on the land of the heirs of Mrs. Ann O'Connor, and extending southerly on North Main street from the line of the land of Mrs. O'Connor thirty-three feet; and Riggs sold to the plaintiff the same land, having the same northerly line, and the same frontage on North Main street. Barnes had attempted to locate such a piece by placing stakes at its corners, but he had mistaken the correct northerly line. Butler had occupied the lot staked out, supposing it to be the land described in his deed. The decision of the court had ejected him from a portion of the land he was occupying, but not from any part of the land described in his deed. He has lost no land which he actually bought of Riggs. The substance of the whole matter is that Barnes, Riggs, and Butler all were mistaken as to the correct location of the northerly line of the piece of land bought and sold by them." From this finding it is evident that the court did not decide, as matter either of law or of fact, that no mistake occurred between the parties to the original deed. A mistake is clearly stated, namely, "that both parties supposed that the lot described in the deed and the lot staked out were identical, and that the lines indicated by the stakes correctly designated the boundaries of the piece of land purchased;" that is to say, both parties supposed that the deed accurately described the lot which was staked out, and which the defendant pointed out as the subject of the sale. This supposition was incorrect. The deed did not accurately describe the northern boundary of the lot so designated and pointed out by the grantor. Here the mistake arose. This was the mistake. The reasoning of the court in coming to its conclusion seems to have been substantially this: The line pointed out as the correct line for the northern boundary, when the sale was made, was indicated by two stakes. The parties supposed that the line so indicated was identical with the O'Connor line, and would be correctly described by bounding the lot sold northerly on land of the heirs of Mrs. O'Connor. The deed did bound the lot northerly on the land of said heirs. Therefore I find that the lot actually sold was the piece described in the deed, and not the piece pointed out and contained within the four stakes, and that the defendant did not undertake to sell and convey to Riggs any other land than a piece bounded northerly on the land of the heirs of Mrs. O'Connor. The conclusion is manifestly a conclusion of law, based upon the idea that the description of the boundaries in the deed must prevail over the boundaries actually pointed out upon the premises, and that the parties must be taken to have intended to contract according to the boundaries named in the deed, although they were mutually mistaken in supposing these were identical with the boundaries pointed out as above stated. The claim which the court overruled, as stated in the finding, was the claim of the plaintiff "that, as matter of law, the pointing out by the defendant to his grantee, while the negotiations were in progress, of a lot exactly located and staked, which lot all the parties supposed to be the lot which was to be sold and conveyed, and the mutual mistake between them by which they gave and received the deeds as correctly describing the staked lot, entitled the plaintiff to a reformation of the deed so as to make it describe the staked lot, and to damages upon the covenants as reformed." In overruling this claim the court manifestly decided that, upon the facts stated, the law was that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought. Was this decision correct? That is the question now presented. As between the original parties, would the grantee have been entitled to a reformation of his deed?

The mistake which the parties made was, as we have seen, that both supposed that the lot described in the deed and the lot staked out were identical. Both supposed that the description in the deed covered the land which was staked off and bad been pointed out by the defendant as the lot sold. Notwithstanding this, the court held that the land actually sold and conveyed by the terms of the deed is self-evident. That it was the piece sold is the conclusion upon which the court bases its refusal to reform the deed so as to embrace the lot contained between the lines staked. Notwithstanding also the mistake set forth, the court further finds that the defendant did not undertake to sell and convey to Riggs any other land than a piece bounded northerly on the land of the heirs of Mrs. O'Connor. If by the word "undertake" the court means that, taking all the facts together, it must be held that the defendant only agreed to sell what the deed specifies, which is the natural meaning of the word as here used, then the issue is plainly before us. It is clear that, while on the premises, the defendant undertook, both in the sense of offered and agreed, to sell the lot he pointed out. The deed, through the mistake of the parties, did not express that undertaking. What would have prevented the grantee from having it so corrected that it should express the undertaking? It may be suggested that it is evident that the defendant did not intend to sell any land which he did not own, and therefore it was no mistake on his part to bound the land in the deed as he did. But the suggestion is specious. It has reference to the general intent which every honest man has within himself not to sell what is not his own. And yet he may fully intend, as between himself and another, to sell what he mistakenly supposes to be his own. It may, no doubt, be truly said, in one sense, that the grantor in this case did not intend to sell, nor the grantee to buy, land belonging to the O'Connor heirs. At the same time it is true that the grantor intended to sell, and the grantee to buy, exactly the lot which was pointed out as for sale between the lines indicated by the stakes. The mistake was in supposing that the line between the north stakes was identical with the O'Connor line. If the grantor had known where that line was, he would have made his stakes conform to R. The bargain was made before the deed was executed. There was no misunderstanding as to the shape or dimensions of the land which was the actual subject of the sale. If the parties had united in fencing it after the execution and delivery of the deed, they would have built the fence from stake to stake. The true statement of the case would be that the defendant had no intention of encroaching on the O'Connor land when he marked out for sale and sold a lot which in fact so encroached, though described in the deed, in accordance with the parties' belief, as bounded north on the O'Connor heirs' land. If the court had found that, though the lot was pointed out, yet the parties intended to bound it north on the O'Connor land, whether the stakes correctly indicated that line or not, such finding would present a very different case, and would have been conclusive. If, also, the question had arisen in a court of law as to what land the defendant had sold, then the deed, upon well-known principles, would have been held to express the contract, and to exclude parol testimony to vary or contradict its terms. The very reason for coming into a court of chancery is to avoid the application of those principles, and, in a proceeding brought for that purpose, to make the deed conform to the contract of which it purports to be the evidence. It seems to a majority of us that here was a mistake of...