Michael C., In re, Cr. 19921

Citation579 P.2d 7,146 Cal.Rptr. 358,21 Cal.3d 471
Decision Date30 May 1978
Docket NumberCr. 19921
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 579 P.2d 7 In re MICHAEL C., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. Kenneth F. FARE, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL C., Defendant and Appellant.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, John J. Gibbons, Kenneth I. Clayman, Patricia Rice and Albert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, and Janice L. Feinstein, Deputy State Public Defender, Peter Bull and Robert L. Walker, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Shunji Asari and Mark Alan Hart, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Defendant Michael C., a 16-year-old minor, appeals from juvenile court orders sustaining allegations that he comes within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for having killed Robert Yeager (Pen.Code, § 187), adjudicating him to be a ward of the court, and committing him to the Youth Authority. We concur in defendant's contention that his confession was obtained in violation of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and subsequent cases, and that its admission into evidence constituted reversible error.

On February 4, 1976, police interrogated defendant at the Van Nuys police station. After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, the police interrogating officer continued the conversation as follows:

"Q. . . . Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to you?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us about this murder?

"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.

"Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it.

"A. Yeah, I might talk to you.

"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here while we talk about it?

"A. Can I have my probation officer here ?

"Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an attorney.

"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?

"Q. Huh?

"A. (Repeat of last answer.)

"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good chance we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want to say something, you can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's your right. You understand that right?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?

"A. Yeah I want to talk to you." (Emphasis added.)

Later during the interrogation, defendant confessed.

We shall point out that under the rules established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and further elaborated in this state in People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793; the police unlawfully obtained defendant's confession. Defendant's request to see his probation officer at the commencement of interrogation negated any possible willingness on his part to discuss his case with the police; it thereby invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.

Noting that an environment of incommunicado police-dominated interrogation "is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner," the United States Supreme Court in Miranda, concluded that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) The Supreme Court in Miranda set down four warnings which must be given to persons in "custodial surroundings," and then specified the protections that must be afforded after the rendition of such warnings: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. (Fn. omitted.) At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.)

Recognizing that the suspect may not expressly state that he wants an attorney, we have held in previous cases that any conduct which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time " amounts to an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. (People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 663, 464 P.2d 114, 119.) We have variously held that a suspect's refusal to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights, a suspect's statement, "Call my parents for my attorney," and a suspect's telephone call to his attorney, in and of themselves each invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege. (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580; People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114.)

In this case we must decide whether a minor's request for his probation officer's presence "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness" concurrently to "discuss his case freely and completely with police . . . ." (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 956, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 663, 464 P.2d 114, 119.) In People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793, we held that a minor's request to consult his parents invoked the minor's Fifth Amendment privilege. As we stated there: "It would certainly severely restrict the 'protective devices' required by Miranda in cases where the suspects are minors if the only call for help which is to be deemed an invocation of the privilege is the call for an attorney. It is fatuous to assume that a minor in custody will be in a position to call an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance to his call for help from the only person to whom he normally looks a parent or guardian. It is common knowledge that this is the normal reaction of a youthful suspect who finds himself in trouble with the law." (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 382, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 6, 491 P.2d 793, 798.)

In view of the emphasis which the juvenile court system places upon the close relationship between a minor and his probation officer, 1 and in light of the probation officer's instructions in the present case that his ward contact him immediately in case of trouble, 2 the "normal reaction" of the minor here would be to request consultation with his probation officer. Fearing that the police would take advantage of his ignorance, 3 Michael wanted and needed the advice of someone whom he knew and trusted. He therefore asked for his probation officer a personal advisor who would understand his problems and needs and on whose advice the minor could rely. By analogy to Burton, we hold that the minor's request for his probation officer essentially a "call for help" indicated that the minor intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. By so holding, we recognize the role of the probation officer as a trusted guardian figure who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae and whose duty it is to implement the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court.

The Attorney General contends, however, that the request here for a probation officer can be distinguished from the request in Burton, for, instead of affording the counsel and protection of a parent, the probation officer represents an "arm of the prosecutorial system." That the probation officer serves as a peace officer (Pen.Code, § 830.5) and has been charged with the duty to file a petition alleging that a minor committed the claimed offense (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 650), however, does not alter the fact that the probation officer is frequently the person to whom a minor might turn for help on such matters as to whether or not he should obtain an attorney. When Michael C. asked to see his probation officer, he was not seeking to confide in a prosecutor.

The People assert that once we extend our holding in Burton to include a request to see a probation officer, we cannot reasonably distinguish a request for consultation with one's football coach, music teacher or clergyman. The request for the probation officer, however, is entirely distinguishable; the probation officer is an official appointed pursuant to legislative enactment "to represent the interests" of the juvenile (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 280). Since the inception of the juvenile court system the probation officer has borne the duty to advise and care for the juvenile defendant. Consultation with a probation officer thus acts as a "protective (device) . . . to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 458, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) precisely because the probation officer is particularly well-suited to provide the minor suspect with "help in how to conduct himself with police" (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 383, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 6, 491 P.2d 793, 798).

The People further rely on People v. Lara (...

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