21 F. 433 (W.D.N.C. 1884), Reynolds v. Palmer
|Citation:||21 F. 433|
|Party Name:||REYNOLDS v. PALMER.|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit|
C. B. Watson, J. T. Morehead, and J. H. Dillard, for plaintiff.
John N. Staples and J. C. Buxton, for defendant.
DICK, J., (charging jury.)
This is an important case to the parties on account of the amount of money involved. It is an interesting one to the persons who have heard the trial, as the evidence and the
legal questions presented are connected with the cultivation, curing, handling, the preparation for market, the sale, and manufacture of tobacco, a very important staple commodity in this section of country. The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages which he alleges he has sustained in a transaction in regard to the sale and delivery of a large crop of tobacco. In the pleadings he presents several causes of action. Under the flexible and liberal system of pleading and procedure adopted in the Code of this state, actions on contract and tort may be united in the same case, provided they arise out of transactions connected with the same subject-matter, and affect only the same parties.
The plaintiff alleges that he has sustained damages by reason of a deceit on the part of the defendants, in that the tobacco was 'frost-bitten,' and assurances were made to the contrary before the sale; that inferior grades of tobacco were designedly placed in the upper part of the barns, where they could not be easily seen, and fraudulent representations as to quality were made, well calculated to deceive. Deceit in business transactions consists in fraudulent representations or contrivances by which one man deceives another who has a right to rely upon representations, or has no means of detecting such fraud. Fraudulent representations in the sale of goods will not of themselves always constitute deceit which will be the subject of an action for damages. In cases like this, where parties deal with each other on a footing of equality, there must be some existing circumstances, or some means used, calculated to prevent the detection of falsehood or fraud, and impose upon a purchaser of ordinary prudence and circumspection. If a purchaser has full opportunity of examining the goods, and can easily and readily ascertain their quality and value by inspection, and he neglects to do so, then any injury which he may sustain by such negligence is the result of his own folly, and he can have no relief at law. The evidence on both sides shows that the plaintiff visited the barns before the sale, saw the tobacco, and, with some little inconvenience, could have made full examination, and no obstructions were placed in his way, and no objections were made by the agent of the defendant. A written contract was afterwards entered into by the parties, the terms of which had no reference to the representations made as to the quality or condition of the tobacco in previous negotiations. I am of opinion that this cause of action for deceit cannot be sustained, and the issue upon that subject is withdrawn from your further consideration.
The plaintiff further says that, when he visited the barns, he found the tobacco in three barns so much crowded and in such dry condition that he could not make an examination without serious injury to the commodity. He carefully inspected the tobacco on the lower tiers of the barns, and was assured by the agent that it fairly represented the quality of the whole crop, and trusting to such assurances he made no request for further examination. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff insists that the subsequent sale may be regarded
as a sale by sample, and that the law implies a warranty as to the quality of the entire crop. A sale by sample is where a small quantity of any commodity is exhibited by the vendor as a fair specimen of a larger quantity, called the bulk, which is not present, and there is no opportunity for a personal examination. To constitute such sale, it must appear that the parties contracted solely with reference to the sample, and mutually understood that they were so dealing in regard to the quality of the bulk. Such sales are commonly made when it is not convenient for the purchaser to see the bulk of the commodity, and one of the main reasons why the law implies a warranty is because there is not an opportunity for a personal examination of the article which the sample is shown to represent. It is conceded that, when the plaintiff proposed to purchase, the defendant offered him the means of reaching the barns, which were three miles distant, and told him that the agent would give him information and facilities for personal examination. A thorough examination was not made on account of the condition of the tobacco in the barns, as stated by the plaintiff in his testimony. At that time the tobacco was the property of the defendant, and any injury produced would have been his loss, and he made no objection to a full examination, and furnished facilities for such purpose. It is well established as a general principle that, on the sale or exchange of goods, a warranty as to the quality is not implied in law. There are some exceptions to this general rule, but it is unnecessary for me to refer to them, as the evidence does not bring this case within any of such exceptions. In most sales the law wisely and justly presumes that a purchaser will take care of his own interests, and that, when he distrusts his own shrewdness and judgment, he will protect himself from imposition by requiring an express warranty. In all cases where he has an opportunity of inspecting the goods, and fails to do so, he cannot properly complain if the goods do not come up to his own expectations, and the representations of the vendor. If an opportunity is afforded by the vendor, and an inspection is practicable, it must be made by the purchaser, no matter how disagreeable and inconvenient it may be. It is well known that, in the course of trade, vendors will speak in terms of high commendation of the commodities which they offer for sale. Such 'dealing talk' is not regarded in law as fraudulent, unless accompanied with some artifice to deceive the purchaser and throw him off of his guard, or some concealment of intrinsic defects not easily discoverable by reasonable care and diligence. If a purchaser has an opportunity of seeing and examining for himself, he should rely upon his own judgment, and accept the consequences of mistake; or he should protect himself by express warranty.
As I am of opinion, from the evidence on both sides, that none of the elements of an implied warranty arise in this case, I will withdraw this issue from your further consideration. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the question presented in the argument
of counsel of defendant, whether the contract of sale subsequently made in writing and containing no warranty as to quality, and having an express warranty as to the condition of the tobacco at the time of delivery, can be enlarged or varied by parol evidence of previous declarations and circumstances. The general rule of law was correctly stated by counsel, that all previous stipulations between parties to a transaction are presumed to be embraced in a subsequent written contract about the subject-matter. There are some apparent exceptions to this rule, where it is manifest that it was not the intention of the parties to a written contract to include all the terms of a previous parol contract about the same subject-matter. Such questions, although learnedly discussed in the argument, are not now involved in the case, as they applied to the issue which I have withdrawn from your consideration.
The only issue submitted for your determination is whether there was a breach of the express warranty contained in the written contract between the parties as to the 'sound order' of the tobacco at the time of delivery at Saltville, and, if there was such breach, what are the damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover? The counsel of plaintiff, in the concluding argument, insists that the counsel of defendant, who preceded him, admitted that there was such a breach. I did not so understand the defendant's counsel. He only expressed an opinion as to the weight of evidence. That evidence you must weigh and consider for yourselves in determining the rights of parties. It is admitted that the tobacco was delivered in a reasonable time at Saltville to the railroad agent, and was duly shipped, and reached its destination at Winston in eight or ten days. There is no evidence as to the state of the weather during the transportation, or in what manner the tobacco was carried by the railroad company,-- whether upon open platform or in closed box cars. There is some evidence tending to show that the hogsheads containing the tobacco exhibited no marks or appearances of injury by exposure to the weather. There is no warranty in the written contract as to the quality of the tobacco, and if the defendant delivered the tobacco as it was when purchased, and delivered it in sound order, then he complied with his agreement. If more of the tobacco was of an inferior quality than was expected by the plaintiff, and some of it was 'frost-bitten,' that would not constitute a breach of warranty, as that condition of things existed before the sale, and the plaintiff might have discovered such defects by careful examination.
The written contract of sale contains an express warranty as to the condition in which the tobacco was to be packed in hogsheads at the time of delivery at Saltville. It was to be in 'sound order;' and we will now proceed to construe the meaning of that term as used by the parties. It is a fundamental rule that in the construction of contracts the courts may look not only at the language employed, but to the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances,
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