State v. Orear

Citation277 Mo. 303,210 S.W. 392
Decision Date15 March 1919
Docket NumberNo. 21322.,21322.
PartiesSTATE ex rel. KANSAS CITY v. OREAR, City Comptroller.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

E. M. Harber, M. A. Fyke, and A. F. Smith, all of Kansas City, for relator.

Charles M. Howell and Lathrop, Morrow, Fox & Moore, all of Kansas City, for respondent.

FARIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Two contentions affecting the validity of the elections at which the issuance of the bonds was attempted to be authorized are made by respondent as excusing in law his refusal to act in the premises. These two contentions as stated affect the fire-protection bond issue as well as the ice-plant bond issue. The third contention made by respondent affects the validity of the ice-plant bonds only, and is, to wit, that the purpose for which the proceeds of the ice-plant bonds are to be used is not a public purpose, and therefore there is lacking both legislative and constitutional authority to use therefor public moneys raised by public taxation.

I. The first point urged is that two-thirds of all voters of Kansas City "voting at an election to be held for that purpose" (Const. 1875, § 12, art. 10) failed and neglected to vote in favor of the issuance of the bonds. As forecast in our recital of the facts, this contention is bottomed upon the conceded fact that, while 43,405 votes were cast at the general election held in Kansas City at the same time and places, only 34,902 of these were voted at all upon the question of the bond issues. (The number of those voting upon the two proposed issues of bonds differs slightly, but the result and the principle are identical in both, and so we consider them together.) Of these 34,902, so registering their will positively, 26,988 voted in favor of issuing the bonds, and 7,914 voted against such issuance. Therefore, while far more than two-thirds of those voting at all on the proposition to issue the bonds voted in favor thereof, yet two-thirds of all persons who voted at the general election, held at the same time and places did not vote to issue the bonds. Was such a vote a sufficient authorization under the provisions of section 12 of article 10 of the Constitution? We are of the opinion that it was.

So much of said section 12 of the Constitution as affects and rules the point presented for consideration reads thus:

"No county, city, town, township, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the state, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting at as election to be held for that purpose." (Italics ours.)

Obviously the decision of the question presented involves only a construction of the above-quoted language of the Constitution. This language we are required to construe in its plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Section 8057, R. S. 1909. Such plain, ordinary, and usual sense is that meaning which is given to words and language by the recognized and standard dictionaries of the English language. From these we find that the word "voting" (the same being the present participle of the intransitive verb "to vote") means "expressing the will, mind, or preference; casting or giving a vote" (Webster's Dictionary); "casting a vote, as a formal or an authoritative expression of opinion; exercising the right of suffrage" (Standard Diet; Century Diet.) Turning, as the point does, solely upon the meaning of the words employed in our Constitution, it is manifest that the cases ruled in other jurisdictions are of negligible value, because of the fact that it is almost, if not quite, impossible to find words used in the organic laws of other states which are even substantially like the language of our own Constitution. Upon situations which are analogous even, there is much contrariety of opinion in the cases from other jurisdictions. There are apparently conflicts in our own decisions. These conflicts Kennish, J., in the case of State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, 134 S. W. 1007, undertook to reconcile by logical classification. Whether he successfully did so or not is, however, beside the question; for Division 2 of this court, construing this identical language in a case precisely upon all fours with this held that the words. "two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose," mean two-thirds of those who actually vote for or against the given proposition, whether such two-thirds be two-thirds or not of all the voters taking part in the election otherwise, and voting upon other propositions, matters, and things presented thereat and up for decision by vote. Franklin v. School District, 271 Mo. loc. cit. 593, 197 S. W. 346. In the latter case, at the page cited, Roy, C., said:

"It is claimed that...

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