211 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1968), 36601, Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.
|Citation:||211 So.2d 161|
|Opinion Judge:||Author: Roberts|
|Party Name:||Petsonella MORAGNE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Edward Moragne, Sr., Deceased, and Petsonella Moragne, Individually, Appellants, v. STATE MARINE LINES, INC., et al., Appellees.|
|Attorney:||C. J. Hardee, Jr., of Hardee, Ott & Hamilton, Tampa, for appellants.|
|Case Date:||May 29, 1968|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Florida|
Rehearing Denied July 3, 1968.
C. J. Hardee, Jr., of Hardee, Ott & Hamilton, Tampa, for appellants.
John W. Boult, Dewey R. Villareal, Jr. and Fowler, White, Collins, Gillen, Humkey & Trenam, Tampa, for State Marine Lines, Inc.
David C. G. Kerr, Daniel E. Gallagher and Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for Gulf Florida Terminal Co.
This cause is before the court for determination of a question of law certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pursuant to § 25.031, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and Rule 4.61, Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., et al., opinion and certificate filed August 11, 1967. The question certified reads as follows:
'Does the Florida Death by Wrongful Act Statute give rise to a cause of action under principles of the maritime law of unseaworthiness for the wrongful death of a longshoreman caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel on the navigable waters of the State of Florida?'
Plaintiff-appellant's decedent was employed as a longshoreman by Gulf Florida Terminal Company, a stevedore of Tampa, Florida. While performing his regular duties as an employee of this company on board the vessel S. S. Palmetto State, a hatch beam became disengaged from its position, allegedly because of a defective locking arrangement, and fell into the hold striking the deceased in the head, killing him instantly.
Suit was filed by his widow, individually, under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, § 768.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and as personal representative of her deceased husband's estate, under the Florida Survival Statute, § 45.11, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., against the defendant-appellee State Marine Lines, Inc., owner of the vessel S. S. Palmetto State, seeking the damages recoverable under these statutes by those entitled thereto. Originally filed in the appropriate state court, the cause was on motion of the defendant removed to the federal court on diversity-of-citizenship grounds.
The plaintiff's complaint was framed in two aspects: one based on the alleged negligence of the defendant-shipowner in failing to keep and maintain the vessel, its equipment and appurtenances, in a safe, sound and proper condition; and another based on the maritime concept of 'unseaworthiness.'
The trial judge dismissed the unseaworthiness count as to the cause of action brought by the plaintiff, individually, under the Florida Wrongful Death Act for the reason that such a cause of action was not within the contemplation of the Wrongful Death Act. Leave to appeal this interlocutory order was granted by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the question of law quoted above was thereafter certified to this court for decision.
As we understand it, 'unseaworthiness' as a basis for liability under maritime law has to do with the absolute non-delegable duty of a shipowner to provide members of the vessel's crew, including longshoremen when engaged in loading, unloading, or stowing the cargo, with a vessel 'sufficient in all respects for the trade in which it is employed,' Lowe v. Vessel Madrid, D.C.Fla.1962, 210 F.Supp. 826, and to prevent their injury by any part of the vessel or equipment used in the ordinary course of their employment. Clark v. Symonette Shipyards, Ltd., 330 F.2d 554 (C.A.5 1964). It contemplates 'liability without fault', Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944), and has been said to be 'a duty likened to implied contractual warranty.' Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099.
It is conceded that, had he lived, the plaintiff's decedent could have filed suit against the defendant-shipowner, in Admiralty, on a cause of action based on unseaworthiness. But this cause of action died with his death under maritime law. Neither the maritime law nor the common law recognized a cause of action for wrongful death. By statute, Congress has provided a remedy for wrongful death on the high seas (the Death on the High Seas Act, enacted in 1920, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 761), and for the death of a seaman (the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688). But the death of the plaintiff, a non-seaman within the territorial waters of the State of Florida, is not covered by either of these federal statutes. (We note, parenthetically, that even under the Jones Act the plaintiff could not have recovered for the wrongful death of her husband under her cause of action based on unseaworthiness. See Gillespie, Admx. v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), re-affirming Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 50 S.Ct. 207, 74 L.Ed.2d 686, decided in 1930.)
It appears that the plaintiff, as the widow of the decedent, is entitled to the benefits prescribed by the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Title 33, U.S.C.A., Chapter 18, for the death of her husband; however, any additional remedy to that provided by the federal compensation act must be found, if at all, under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, § 768.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
This Act, § 768.01, provides as follows:
'(1) Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual or individuals, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any corporation, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any agent of any corporation, acting in his capacity of agent of such corporation (or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any ship, vessel or boat or persons employed thereon), and the act, negligence, carelessness or default, is such as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action...
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