Weber v. Cranston School Committee

• Decision Date: 03 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1086,99-1086
• Citation: 212 F.3d 41
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2000) MELISSA F. WEBER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SAMUEL M. WEBER, A MINOR CHILD PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT, v. CRANSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL. DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 41

212 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2000)

MELISSA F. WEBER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SAMUEL M. WEBER, A MINOR CHILD PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT, v. CRANSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL. DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES.

No. 99-1086

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard November 3, 1999

Decided May 8, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Richard J. Savage, for appellant.

Keith B. Kyle, with whom Hodosh, Spinella, & Angelone was on brief, for appellees.

Before Boudin, Circuit Judge, Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Melissa Weber, mother of Samuel M. Weber, filed a seven-count complaint in the district court for the District of Rhode Island against the Cranston School Committee, committee members, and Cranston city officials in their individual and official capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants as to all counts in Weber's complaint.

Weber limited her appeal from the district court's decision to Count IV, a claim of illegal retaliation pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count IV of the complaint charges that the defendants retaliated against Weber for her complaints about the school district's failure to implement her son's Individualized Education Plan by denying her access to her son's school records, restricting her communications with his teachers, and threatening to report her to the state child welfare agency. The district court found that Weber's illegal retaliation claim merely rephrased prior claims that the district court had already rejected, namely her Count II claim that the defendants' retaliation infringed on her First Amendment rights and her Count III claim that she was denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because other parents could access their children's records and teachers. Alternatively, the district court ruled that Weber's Count IV claim was barred because of her failure to exhaust administrative remedies specified by IDEA. IDEA requires such exhaustion prior to bringing a civil action pursuant to other federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities if the relief sought is available under subchapter II of IDEA, entitled "Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities." See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Such relief is sought through the administrative due process hearing provided in subchapter II of IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Agreeing with this alternative ruling on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

This case has a complicated and contentious history. Samuel Weber entered the Cranston public school system ("CPS") on January 6, 1993, identified as a disabled child in need of special education services under IDEA. ¹ Samuel received an Individualized Education Plan (the "Plan") pursuant to IDEA that described his educational objectives for the school year and the services necessary to achieve these objectives. ² One of the services specified in Samuel's Plan was phonics instruction. After Weber approved Samuel's 1993-94 Plan, Principal Margaret Day told Weber that the school system planned to "mainstream" Samuel by removing him from his special education classroom and integrating him into a standard curriculum class. In addition, Weber learned that CPS was instituting a new language curriculum which did not include phonics. Shortly after Samuel was moved into a standard curriculum class, Weber met again with Principal Day and Samuel's teachers to discuss her concern about his phonics instruction under his Plan and the effects of mainstreaming.

After the conference, Weber remained dissatisfied with Samuel's phonics instruction. She contacted the Director of the Cranston School Committee's Special Education Services who assured her that CPS would schedule a meeting to discuss her concerns following the series of three meetings required to complete Samuel's education evaluation and Plan. On February 10, 1994, after attending the initial meeting to evaluate Samuel's test results, Weber filed a complaint pursuant to the federal complaint resolution procedure ("CRP") with the Office of Special Needs at the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. ³ The complaint alleged that CPS had not followed Samuel's Individualized Education Plan with regard to phonics instruction or the provision of quarterly progress reports. Following an investigation, the Department found that CPS had complied with federal and state law. Weber did not appeal this decision to the Rhode Island Secretary of Education or pursue a due process hearing pursuant to IDEA. See infra Part III.

Weber next met with Principal Day, Cheryl Calvano, Director of the Cranston School Committee's Special Education Services, and Samuel's teachers. Pursuant to an agreement reached at that meeting that Samuel would transfer to the Norwood Avenue School, he entered a standard curriculum third-grade class in September 1994. In October, Weber met with Calvano and other school staff to review Samuel's progress. Following this meeting, Weber filed a second CRP complaint alleging that CPS had denied her access to Samuel's educational records. The Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education once again found CPS to be in compliance with the relevant state and federal regulations.

Shortly after Weber filed the second complaint, officials at the Norwood Avenue School allowed her to inspect Samuel's cumulative record file and a confidential file. In the confidential file, Weber found a handwritten note dated March 24, 1994, stating, "Agenda - Put parent on defensive," "shut her down," and a reference to a "restraining order." Weber responded to this note with a third CRP complaint seeking permanent removal of the handwritten note from Samuel's file.

Defendants contended that the note was the product of a meeting held to discuss "legal avenues or other relief" to address the "mounting burden of time imposed [by Weber's] telephone calls, letters, threats, harassment, and administrative litigation." Weber alleged that the defendants adopted a "secret agenda" of intimidation and retaliation. She specifically alleged that on March 28, 1994, a few days after the date of the handwritten note, Cranston's Assistant City Solicitor threatened to report her to the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families in an off-the-record discussion during a due process hearing for her disabled daughter, D.W. The Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education ordered the removal of the note, as well as the provision of a good faith hearing for Weber to express her grievances.

Following the third complaint, Weber decided that she wanted Samuel "declassified" as a disabled student and requested mediation to accomplish this action. ⁴ One day prior to the scheduled mediation, Weber went to the Norwood Avenue School to see Principal Laura Albanese. Albanese's secretary directed Weber to a meeting room, where she found Calvano, Albanese, and Samuel's teachers. Weber believed that this was an Individualized Education Plan meeting to which she had not been invited, and that this action indicated that CPS did not intend to provide a good faith hearing on her grievances. The next day at the mediation, Weber offered to allow Cranston to provide any services that they felt were necessary if they would agree to declassify Samuel as a disabled student. CPS refused.

After the mediation, Weber alleged that Principal Albanese denied her access to Samuel's records. She filed one complaint with the Rhode Island Office of Equity and Access regarding access to Samuel's records, the refusal to terminate Samuel's Individualized Education Plan, and CPS's lack of good faith; she also filed a second complaint on behalf of her daughter. ⁵ The Office of Equity and Access issued a written decision finding that CPS's actions with regard to Samuel constituted prohibited retaliation. ⁶ CPS appealed. At the time that the parties' filed their briefs before us, this appeal was still pending.

In April 1995, Weber requested an independent evaluation of Samuel, who was now in third grade. The testing revealed that Samuel read at an eighth-grade level, spelled at a seventh-grade level, and did arithmetic at a third-grade level. In September 1995, Samuel's parents placed him in a private school. Subsequently, Weber requested that CPS declassify Samuel. In March 1996, CPS concluded that Samuel was not disabled under IDEA.

In July 1996, Weber filed her complaint in the district court for the District of Rhode Island, including her Count IV claim that CPS retaliated against her for enforcing her disabled child's rights under IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The disposition of Count IV is the only issue on appeal. The defendants challenge Weber's standing under Section 504 to pursue a claim of retaliation on her own behalf rather than on behalf of her disabled son. If Weber does have standing under Section 504, the defendants argue that she still cannot prevail because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by IDEA, which specifies that a party seeking relief under the Rehabilitation Act must exhaust the administrative remedies provided by IDEA if the relief sought in the Rehabilitation Act claim is available under subchapter II of IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Weber maintains that she has standing to bring her retaliation claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. She further argues that her suit is not barred by the IDEA requirement of exhaustion...