United States v. Ryan

Citation213 F. Supp. 763
Decision Date11 February 1963
Docket NumberCr. A. No. 16972.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Donald Dennis RYAN, Robert Robbins, also known as Robin R. Roberts, and Eugene Louis Smaldone, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado

Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty. for the District of Colorado, James A. Clark, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Winner, Berge & Martin, Fred M. Winner, and Roland E. Camfield, Jr., Denver, Colo., for defendant Ryan.

Albert A. Norbont, Denver, Colo., for defendant Robbins.

Cristiano & Bugdanowitz, Vincent Cristiano, and Robert Bugdanowitz, Denver, Colo., for defendant Smaldone.

CHILSON, District Judge.

The defendants attack the constitutionality of Title 18 United States Code, § 1952, upon which the indictment in this case is based. The Court has considered the briefs filed in support of and in opposition to said motions, has heard oral argument and is now duly advised.

§ 1952 reads in its essential parts as follows:

"(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to—
* * * * * *
"(3) * * * promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
"and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined * * *.
"(b) As used in this section `unlawful activity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal Excise tax has not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States * * *."

The defendants attack the statute on three constitutional grounds. First, the statute exceeds the power of Congress under the commerce clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3, Federal Constitution) in that the activity which is the subject of the statute has no substantial relation to interstate commerce. Second, the statute usurps powers reserved to the states in violation of Amendment Article X of the Constitution in that it attempts to substitute federal enforcement of state criminal laws for state enforcement of those laws. Third, the statute deprives the defendant of due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, in that the prohibition of travel to a state in which gambling is unlawful and permitting travel to a state where gambling is not unlawful is an arbitrary discrimination and bears no reasonable relation to the regulation of interstate commerce.

We first consider the commerce clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3).

Defendants read Section 1952 to mean that the "unlawful activity" mentioned in that section must take place after the interstate travel. Defendants' interpretation appears to be correct. To constitute a violation of Section 1952, the travel in interstate commerce must be followed by the performance of acts or an attempt to perform acts to promote, manage, et cetera, a business enterprise involving gambling, et cetera, in violation of state law.

The defendants recognize the power of Congress to prohibit the use of interstate commerce in furtherance of violation of state law after the state law has been violated.

But defendants contend "speculative future activity is an invalid criterion by which to regulate commerce * * *."

Defendants further contend "this statute is a regulation of interstate commerce for the purpose of reaching a local activity which could not possibly affect that commerce because the use of that commerce has, by the express wording of the statute, stopped before the regulated local activity commences."

That Congress may use its powers under the commerce clause to implement state policy by the exercise of police power over interstate commerce is admitted by the defendants. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699.

However, counsel have cited no case and we have found none which is decisive of the contention here made by the defendants, namely that the "unlawful activity" must precede the use of interstate commerce.

In Clark Distilling Company v. Western Maryland Railway Company, 242 U. S. 311, 37 S.Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326, the court held constitutional an act where the interstate commerce preceded the "unlawful activity", but the question here raised was not considered by the court.1

Since the Congress has the power to implement state policy by denying the use of interstate commerce in furtherance of activities unlawful by state law, there appears to be no compelling reason why the "unlawful activity" must precede the use of interstate commerce. This, of course, is not to say that there need be no relation between the use of interstate commerce and the "unlawful activity". The act itself requires that the use of interstate commerce be with the intent to engage in the "unlawful activity" and that thereafter that intent is carried out by engaging or attempting to engage in the "unlawful activity".

The Court concludes that the act is within the power of Congress under the commerce clause.

We next consider whether or not this act is an invasion of the powers reserved to the states in violation of Article X of the Federal Constitution.

That the states have the power to legislate concerning gambling, liquor, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, and bribery is without question.

As we have previously noted, the Congress, by the exercise of its powers under the commerce clause, may implement state policy so long as the Congress does not invade or attempt to usurp the powers of the state.

A reading of Section 1952 discloses no attempt to restrict, invade or interfere with the powers of the state to legislate and control the "unlawful activity" mentioned in Section 1952. Should there be any doubts in this respect, they are allayed by the legislative history. The Judiciary Committee, in reporting on the bill, stated in part:

"Your committee wishes to clearly point out that this bill, because of the very nature of the definition of the crime, will not preempt the area covered by it. Those violations of State law involving narcotics, gambling, liquor, and prostitution * * * will be subject to State and local prosecution by state and local authorities. Nothing in this bill is to be construed as immunizing any violator of State law from state prosecution." (See Legislative History, 87th Congress, First Session, 1961, U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, Volume 2, pages 2664 and 2667.)

In considering a similar attack upon the White Slave Act, the Supreme Court said:

"Plaintiffs in error admit that the States may control the immoralities of its citizens. Indeed, this is their chief insistence, and they especially condemn the act under review as a subterfuge and an attempt to
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  • United States v. Gerhart
    • United States
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    ... ... 1963) ...         In like fashion, defendant's argument of unconstitutional discrimination must also fail. Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Borgese, 235 F.Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y.1964); United States v. Ryan, 213 F.Supp. 763 (D.Colo.1963) are but a few of the many cases which hold unequivocally that legislation which constitutes an exercise by Congress of its plenary power over commerce is not repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment merely because variation in state laws produces ... ...
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