Town of Milford v. Commissioners of Worcester County

• Decision Date: 27 November 1912
• Citation: 100 N.E. 60,213 Mass. 162
• Parties: TOWN OF MILFORD v. COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

213 Mass. 162

100 N.E. 60

TOWN OF MILFORD v. COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

November 27, 1912

COUNSEL

John C. Lynch, of Milford, and Wm. A. Murray, of Boston, for petitioner.

Rufus B. Dodge and Wm. J. Taft, both of Worcester, and Wendell Williams and Shelley D. Vincent, both of Milford, for respondents.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari. It brings under review the record of the county commissioners of Worcester county in granting an abatement of taxes assessed upon certain personal property of the Proprietors of the Pine Grove Cemetery of Milford.

1. The person assessed was not required to pay the tax and sue to recover it back, but might seek an abatement in the first instance. Ingram v. Cowles, 150 Mass. 155, 23 N.E 48; Milford Water Co. v. Hopkinton, 192 Mass. 491 498, 78 N.E. 451.

2. The commissioners found, under St. 1909, c. 490, part 1, § 76, that there was good cause for delay on the part of the corporation in filing the list required by law. This was a fact, and there is nothing to show that any error was committed in ascertaining it. No question of law touching it appears in the record.

3. The same observation applies to the contention that the failure to bring in the list required by St. 1909, c. 490, part 1, § 5, cl. 3, was fatal to the right of the corporation to an abatement. Masonic Education & Charity Trust v. Boston, 201 Mass. 320, 326, 87 N.E. 602.

4. The real issue is whether the personal property of the Proprietors of the Oak Grove Cemetery is exempt, under St. 1909, c. 490, part 1, § 5, cl. 3, which relieves from taxation the personal property of 'benevolent' and of 'charitable' institutions. The facts stated in the return of the county commissioners in substance are that the corporation was organized under St. 1841, c. 114, in 1850, and about that time acquired a considerable tract of land which has been dedicated to cemetery purposes, and which is well and carefully kept to this end. There is no limitation in the charter or by-laws as to the persons who may purchase lots, and the right to purchase has been open to the public, and each purchaser has become a member of the corporation. For many years the cemetery was maintained largely by contributions and by the profits from fairs and entertainments. But recently the sales of lots and gifts have supplied funds sufficient for its maintenance. Lots have been sold on condition that a part of the purchase price shall be added to a fund to provide for their perpetual care, and for the support of paths and drives and other parts of the cemetery of common benefit to all lot owners. None of the officers receive compensation. The cemetery is a great benefit to the public, and has been and is maintained solely for that purpose. It is not required by law to maintain a burial place for the public or for any general class other than those to whom lots are sold, and its power is unrestricted to limit its membership. It has been held that there is no ground for calling a cemetery corporation, such as the one here in question, a charitable corporation. Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Association, 146 Mass. 163, 15 N.E. 505. See. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342, 352, 353, 17 S.Ct. 401, 41 L.Ed. 739. But without placing the decision upon this ground, we are of opinion that a general view of the tax exemption laws manifests a legislative purpose not to include cemetery corporations under the designation of charitable or benevolent institutions.

An exemption from taxation is an extraordinary grace of the sovereign power, and is to be strictly construed. It must be made to appear plainly, either by the express words or necessary intendment of the statute. The constitutional limitations upon the legislative power in this direction have not been discussed much by this court. Day v Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371, 45 N.E. 751; Opinion of Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N.E. 499. It is beyond doubt that exemption of land set apart for the burial of the dead and of the property of literary, benevolent and charitable institutions encounter no constitutional objection. It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that acts of the legislative department of government are to be construed as a whole. This is especially true of a comprehensive statutory scheme covering in detail an entire subject and designed to express a general and complete legislative purpose such as our law relating to taxation. Clause 8, § 5, pt. 1, c. 490, St. 1909, expressly exempts from taxation 'cemeteries, tombs and rights of burial so long as they shall be dedicated to the burial of the dead.' The same section exempts various other classes of property, including the real and personal estate of incorporated agricultural societies and portions of that belonging to horticultural societies, the real and personal estate to a limited amount of incorporated Grand Army and veteran associations, houses of religious worship, with pews and furniture, as well as the personal property of literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions and of incorporated...