United States Ex Pel Attorney General of the United States v. Delaware Hudson Company Same v. Erie Railroad Company Same v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey Same v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Company Same v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company Same v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company United States v. Delaware Hudson Company Same v. Erie Railroad Company Same v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey Same v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Company Same v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company Same v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company

Citation29 S.Ct. 527,213 U.S. 366,53 L.Ed. 836
Decision Date03 May 1909
Docket Number569,563,565,561,566,564,570,Nos. 559,560,568,562,567,s. 559
PartiesUNITED STATES EX PEL. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. DELAWARE & HUDSON COMPANY. SAME v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY. SAME v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA, & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY. UNITED STATES, Appt., v. DELAWARE & HUDSON COMPANY. SAME v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY. SAME v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA, & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY. SAME v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

[Syllabus from pages 366-370 intentionally omitted] Attorney General Bonaparte, Solicitor General Hoyt, and Messrs. L. Allison Wilmer and Thomas C. Spelling for plaintiff in error and appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 370-381 intentionally omitted]

Page 381

Messrs. John C. Johnson and Robert W. de Forest for defendants in error and appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 381-387 intentionally omitted]

Page 387

Messrs. Walker D. Hines, James M. Beck, and William S. Opdyke for the Delaware & Hudson Company.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 387-389 intentionally omitted]

Page 389

Messrs. George F. Brownell and Adelbert Moot for the Erie Railroad company.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 389-392 intentionally omitted]

Page 392

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

We dismiss for the present a contention made by one of the corporations, that it is not a railroad company within the meaning of that term as used in the statute, which we shall have occasion to consider, because it is merely a coal company, whose transporting operations are but incidental to its mining operations. With this contention put aside, it is true to say, speaking in a general sense, that the corporations, parties to this record, by means of railroads owned and operated by them, were engaged in transporating coal from the anthracite coal fields in Pennsylvania to points of market for ultimate delivery in other states. With much of the coal so transported the corporations had been or were connected by some relation distinct from the association which was necessarily engendered by the transportation of the commodity by the corporations as common carriers in interstate commerce. While the business of the corporations, generally speaking, had these characteristics, there were differences between them. Some of the corporations owned and worked mines, and transporated over their own rails in interstate commerce the coal so mined, either for their own account or for the account of those who had acquired title to the coal prior to the beginning of the transportation. Others, while operating railroads, not only owned but also leased and operated coal mines, and carried the coal produced from such mines in the same way. Again, others of the railroad companies, although not operating mines, were the owners of stock in corporations engaged in mining coal, the coal so produced by such corporations being carried in interstate commerce by the railroad companies holding the stock in the producing coal companies, either for account of the producing corporations or for persons to whom the coal had been

In announcing the decision on May 3, 1909, Mr. Justice White read a memorandum giving the gist of the opinion now published.

Page 393

sold at the point of production prior to the beginning of interstate commerce. This, moreover, was, additionally, the case as to some of the railroad companies who, as we have previously stated, were engaged both in the production of coal from mines owned by them and in interstate transportation of such product. All the attributes thus enjoyed by the corporations had been possessed by them for a long time, and were expressly conferred by the laws of Pennsylvania, and, in some instances, also by the laws of other states, in which the companies likewise, in part, carried on their business. We insert in the margin a summary which the court below made concerning the situation of the respective corporations, taken from the answer or return made by each corporation.

It is admitted, generally by the defendants, that the allegations in the bills and petitions, as their corporate existence, are true, and that they own or operate railroads engaged in the interstate transportation of coal from the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. They also admit that this transportation has been carried on by the several defendants long prior to the 8th day of May, 1906, and, in the case of some of them, for a period varying from a quarter to more than half a century prior thereto. In addition to these general admissions, detailed statements are made by the defendants, respectively, of the character and extent of the ownership or other interests possessed by them in the coal so transported, or in the lands or mines from which it is produced. It is only necessary to briefly summarize these statements:

(1) The Delaware & Hudson Company alleges that it directly owns its coal lands as it does its railroad; that it was incorporated by an act of the legislature of the state of New York, April 23, 1823 . . . and was 'authorized to construct a canal or water navigation from the anthracite coal district in Pennsylvania to the Hudson river in New York; to purchase lands in Pennsylvania containing stone or anthracite coal; and to employ its capital in the business of transporting to market coal mined from such lands.' That this authority was also expressly conferred by acts of the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania, between the years 1823 and 1871, and that these acts of the state of Pennsylvania resulted from the desire and policy of said state to create and foster the industry of mining such coal and developing the transportation thereof; that, under the authority of these statutes of Pennsylvania and of New York, the said defendant, beginning as early as the year 1825, invested its capital

Page 394

After the first day of May, 1908, the government of the United States commenced these proceedings by bill in equity against each of the corporations, to enjoin each from carrying

Page 395

in interstate commerce any coal produced under the circumstances which we have stated. At the same time a petition in mandamus was filed against each corporation, seeking to ac-

Page 396

complish the same result. Both the equity causes and the mandamus proceedings were based upon the assumption that the 1st section of the act to regulate commerce, as amended

Page 397

and re-enacted by the law usually referred to as the Hepburn act, approved June 29, 1906 (34 State. at L. 584, CHAP. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 892), contained a provision, generally known as the commodities clause, which

Page 398

caused it to be Illegal for the corporations after May 1, 1908, to transport in interstate commerce coal with which the railroad companies were or had been connected or associated in any of

Page 399

the modes above stated. Except as we have said, in the particular that one of the corporations claimed that it was not a railroad company within the meaning of the commodities

Page 400

clause, they all defended substantially upon the ground, that, when corrected interpreted, the commodities clause did not forbid the interstate commerce traffic in coal by them carried on. If it did, the clause was assailed as inherently repugnant to the Constitution, because the right to enact it was not embraced within the authority conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce. In addition it was contended that even if, abstractly considered, the clause might be embraced within the grant of power to regulate commerce, nevertheless its provisions were in conflict with the due process clause of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, because of the destructive effect which the enforcement of its provisions would produce on the rights of property which the corporations possessed and had long enjoyed under the sanction of valid state laws. It was besides insisted that, in any event, the clause was repugnant to the Constitution because of the discrimination caused by the exception as to timber and the manufactured products thereof. The cases were submitted on the pleadings, and were heard and decided at one and the same time. Treating the clause as having the meaning which the government contended for, the court came to consider the alleged repugnancy of the enactment to the Constitution. In the principal opinion the subject

Page 401

was at least formally approached, but for the purpose of deciding whether inherently the commodities clause was within the competency of Congress to enact as a regulation of commerce, but whether the provisions of that clause were repugnant to the Constitution because of the destructive effect of its prohibitions upon the vast sum of property rights which the corporations were found to enjoy as a result of valid state laws. In this aspect the issue which the court deemed it was called upon to determine was thus by it epitomized:

'The fundamental and underlying question, however, which presents itself at the threshold of all the cases for our consideration, is whether the so-called 'commodities clause' amendatory of the act to regulate commerce, passed June 29, 1906, so far as its scope applies by the universality of its language to the cases here presented, is in excess of the legislative authority granted to Congress by the Constitution. This question must be considered with reference to the Constitution as a whole, and in relation to the concrete facts of the several cases. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind the situation as presented by these defendants, the facts set forth in their individual answers as above briefly summarized, and the relevant industrial condi-

Page 402

tions, which,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
468 cases
  • State v. Guice, No. COA99-1261.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
    • December 29, 2000
    ...adopt the latter.'" Id. at 239, 119 S.Ct. at 1222, 143 L.Ed.2d at 324 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 468, 29 S.Ct. 527, 536, 53 L.Ed. 836, 849 (1909)). As the construction advocated by the government would "open [the statute] to const......
  • U.S. v. Edelin
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 9, 2001
    ...States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401, 36 S.Ct. 658, 60 L.Ed. 1061 (1916) (citing United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909)). See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2......
  • Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., No. CIV.A. MJG-95-309.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • January 6, 2005
    ...be appropriate to avoid the constitutional issues by analogy to the principle of United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909) (A court should avoid a statutory interpretation raising a Constitutional issue, if 107. Sec......
  • Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • July 24, 1986
    ...e.g., Lynch v. Overholser (1962) 369 U.S. 705, 710-711, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067, 8 L.Ed. 211, United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co. (1909) 213 U.S. 366, 407-408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 535-536, 53 L.Ed.2d 836.) Any other interpretation of the Act's statutory scheme, which would permit the DMV to freely......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Passive Avoidance.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 71 No. 3, March 2019
    • March 1, 2019
    ...to "'cloud' Hawaii's title to its sovereign lands"); see also United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by ......
  • DEAL, NO DEAL: BOSTOCK, OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE, AND THE FATE OF RELIGIOUS HIRING RIGHTS AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.
    • United States
    • Ave Maria Law Review No. 19, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.'" (quoting U.S. ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) ("Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when statutory language is suscep......
  • Papers, please: does the constitution permit the states a role in immigration enforcement?
    • United States
    • Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol. 35 No. 2, March - March 2012
    • March 22, 2012
    ...6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). (76.) 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (citing United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (77.) United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (D. Ariz. 2010). Judge Bolton acknowledged, and apparently did not have any co......
  • CHAPTER 1
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Zalma on Property and Casualty Insurance
    • Invalid date
    ...however prolonged, militates against its legality when it is exercised. United States ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). It is oftener the existence of necessity rather than the prescience of it which dictates legislation. And so with the regulations of the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT