214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), 11859, Durham v. United States

Docket Nº:11859.
Citation:214 F.2d 862
Party Name:DURHAM v. UNITED STATES.
Case Date:July 01, 1954
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
 
FREE EXCERPT

Page 862

214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)

DURHAM

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 11859.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

July 1, 1954

Argued March 19, 1954.

Petition for Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 10, 1954.

Page 863

Mr. Abe Fortas, Washington, D.C., appointed by this Court, with whom Mr. Abe Krash, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Gerard J. O'Brien, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U.S. Atty., and Lewis A. Carroll and Arthur J. McLaughlin, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. William J. Peck, Asst. U.S. Atty. at time record was filed, Washington, D.C., entered an appearance for appellee.

Page 864

Before EDGERTON, BAZELON and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

BAZELON, Circuit Judge.

Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking, 1 by the District Court sitting without a jury. The only defense asserted at the trial was that Durham was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. We are now urged to reverse the conviction (1) because the trial court did not correctly apply existing rules governing the burden of proof on the defense of insanity, and (2) because existing tests of criminal responsibility are obsolete and should be superseded. 2

I.

Durham has a long history of imprisonment and hospitalization. In 1945, at the age of 17, he was discharged from the Navy after a psychiatric examination had shown that he suffered 'from a profound personality disorder which renders him unfit for Naval service.' In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act 3 and was placed on probation for one to three years. He attempted suicide, was taken to Gallinger Hospital for observation, and was transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, from which he was discharged after two months. In January of 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths, he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' After 15 months of treatment, he was discharged in July 1949 as 'recovered' and was returned to jail to serve the balance of his sentence. In June 1950 he was conditionally released. He violated the conditions by leaving the District. When he learned of a warrant for his arrest as a parole violator, he fled to the 'South and Midwest obtaining money by passing a number of bad checks.' After he was found and returned to the District, the Parole Board referred him to the District Court for a lunacy inquisition, wherein a jury again found him to be of unsound mind. He was readmitted to St. Elizabeths in February 1951. This time the diagnosis was 'without mental disorder, psychopathic personality.' He was discharged for the third time in May 1951. The housebreaking which is the subject of the present appeal took place two months later, on July 13, 1951.

According to his mother and the psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951, he suffered from hallucinations immediately after his May 1951 discharge from St. Elizabeths. Following the present indictment, in October 1951, he was adjudged of unsound mind in proceedings under Sec. 4244 of Title 18 U.S.C., upon the affidavits of two psychiatrists that he suffered from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He was committed to St. Elizabeths for the fourth time and given subshock insulin therapy. This commitment lasted 6 month--until February 1953-- he was released to the custody of the District Jail on the certificate of Dr. Silk, Acting Superintendent of St. Elizabeths, that he was 'mentally competent to stand trial and * * * able to consult

Page 865

with counsel to properly assist in his own defense.'

He was thereupon brought before the court on the charge involved here. The prosecutor told the court:

'So I take this attitude, in view of the fact that he has been over there (St. Elizabeths) a couple of times and these cases that were charged against him were dropped, I don't think I should take the responsibility of dropping these cases against him; then Saint Elizabeths would let him out on the street, and if that man committed a murder next week then it is my responsibility. So we decided to go to trial on one case, that is the case where we found him right in the house, and let him bring in the defense, if he wants to, of unsound mine at the time the crime was committed, and then Your Honor will find him on that, and in your decision send him back to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, and then if they let him out on the street it is their responsibility.'

Shortly thereafter, when the question arose whether Durham could be considered competent to stand trial merely on the basis of Dr. Silk's ex parte statement, the court said to defense counsel:

'Im am going to ask you this, Mr. Ahern: I have taken the position that if once a person has been found of unsound mind after a lunacy hearing, an ex parte certificate of the superintendent of Saint Elizabeths is not sufficient to set aside that finding and I have held another lunacy hearing. That has been my custom. However, if you want to waive that you may do it, if you admit that he is now of sound mind.'

The court accepted counsel's waiver on behalf of Durham, although it had been informed by the prosecutor that a letter from Durham claimed need of further hospitalization, and by defense counsel that ' * * * the defendant does say that even today he thinks he does need hospitalization; he told me this morning.' 4 Upon being so informed, the court said, 'Of course, if I hold he is not mentally competent to stand trial I send him back to Saint Elizabeths Hospital and they will send him back again in two or three months.' 5 In this atmosphere Durham's trial commenced.

His conviction followed the trial court's rejection of the defense of insanity in these words:

'I don't think it has been established that the defendant was of unsound mind as of July 13, 1951, in the sense that he didn't know the difference between right and wrong or that even if he did, he was subject to an irresistible impulse by reason of the derangement of mind.

'While, of course, the burden of proof on the issue of mental capacity to commit a crime is upon the Government, just as it is on every

Page 866

other issue, nevertheless, the Court finds that there is not sufficient to contradict the usual presumption of (sic) the usual inference of sanity.

'There is no testimony concerning the mental state of the defendant as of July 13, 1951, and therefore the usual presumption of sanity governs.

'While if there was some testimony as to his mental state as of that date, the burden of proof would be on the Government to overcome it. There has been no such testimony, and the usual presumption of sanity prevails.

za

'Mr. Ahern, I think you have done very well by your client and defended him very ably, but I think under the circumstances there is nothing that anybody could have done.' [ Emphasis supplied.]

We think this reflects error requiring reversal.

In Tatum v. United States we said, 'when lack of mental capacity is raised as a defense to a charge of crime, the law accepts the general experience of mankind and presumes that all people, including those accused of crime, are sane.' 6 So long as this presumption prevails, the prosecution is not required to prove the defendant's sanity. But "as soon as 'some evidence of mental disorder is introduced, * * * sanity, like any other fact, must be proved as part of the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7 Here it appears that the trial judge recognized this rule but failed to find 'some evidence.' We hold that the court erred and that the requirement of 'some evidence' was satisfied. 8

In Tatum we held that requirement satisfied by considerably less than is present here. Tatum claimed lack of memory concerning the critical events and three lay witnesses testified that he appeared to be in 'more or less of a trance,' or 'abnormal,' but two psychiatrists testified that he was of 'sound mind' both at the time of examination and at the time of the crime. Here, the psychiatric testimony was unequivocal that Durham was of unsound mind at the time of the crime. Dr. Gilbert, the only expert witness heard, 9 so stated at least four times. This crucial testimony is set out in the margin. 10 Intensive questioning by the court failed to produce

Page 867

any retraction of Dr. Gilbert's testimony that the 'period of insanity would have embraced the date July 13, 1951.' And though the prosecution sought unsuccessfully in its cross- and recross-examination of Dr. Gilbert to establish that Durham was a malingerer who feigned insanity whenever he was trapped for his misdeeds, it failed to present any expert testimony to support this theory. In addition to Dr. Gilbert's testimony, there was testimony by Durham's mother to the effect that in the interval between his discharge from St. Eliabeths in May 1951, and the crime 'he seemed afraid of people' and had urged her to put steel bars on his bedroom windows.

Apparently the trial judge regarded this psychiatric testimony as 'no testimony' on two grounds: (1) it did not adequately cover Durham's condition on July 13, 1951, the date of the offense; and (2) it was not directed to Durham's capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. We are unable to agree that for either of these reasons the psychiatric testimony could properly be considered 'no testimony.'

(1) Following Dr. Gilbert's testimony that the condition in which he found Durham on September 3, 1951 was progressive and did not 'arrive overnight,' Dr. Gilbert...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP