Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.

• Citation: 214 F. 685
• Decision Date: 28 May 1914
• Docket Number: 1220.
• Parties: MITCHELL et al. v. HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

214 F. 685

MITCHELL et al. v. HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO.

No. 1220.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

May 28, 1914

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Charles E. Hogg, of Point Pleasant, W.Va. (Charles J. Hogg, of Point Pleasant, W. Va., on the brief), for appellants.

Geo. R E. Gilchrist, of Wheeling, W. Va., for appellee.

Before PRITCHARD, KNAPP, and WOODS, Circuit Judges.

PRITCHARD Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff corporation presented its bill for injunction October 24, 1907, to the Honorable Alston G. Dayton, United States District Judge, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, against John Mitchell and nine others, alleging itself to be a corporation under the laws of West Virginia, and the defendants to be citizens and residents of several different states other than West Virginia; that nine of said defendants first named are presidents, vice presidents, and secretary-treasurers respectively, of the United Mine Workers of America, and of the International Union United Mine Workers of America, of District No. 6, United Mine Workers of America, and of subdistrict 5 of District No. 6, United Mine Workers of America, and the defendant Thomas Hughes, an organizing agent of said organization; that plaintiff is the owner of about 5,000 acres of coal, has a mine and mining plant on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, that is mining and shipping a daily output of about 1,400 tons of coal, largely under contracts, between 500 and 600 tons to the railroad for its daily engine fuel, has large contracts for future delivery; that prior to April 1, 1906, it operated its mine by employment of men affiliated with the United Mine Workers of America, but on that day a strike was ordered by the officers of the union, and on April 16, 1906, the men so employed, in obedience to the demands and orders of defendants, went out and ceased to work. It is charged that this strike was ordered because certain other operators refused to sign the scale demanded by the union, and so far as plaintiff was concerned it was wholly without justification or excuse because it distinctly agreed to pay the scale price and any increased price fixed thereby from April 1, 1906, the date of the strike order, whenever it might be fixed and agreed upon, with which proposition the miners themselves, whose labor was involved, were entirely satisfied; that notwithstanding this, at the instance of defendants, its mine was shut down from April 16 to June 12, 1906, to its great financial loss and embarrassment by reason of its inability to comply with its existing contracts. The bill then sets forth in detail in effect that on the last-named date in order to be able to run said mine it entered into a contract with its men whereby it agreed with them to run its mining operation wholly upon nonunion basis, refusing absolutely to employ any union men, and whereby the men on their part agreed not to join or become members of this union and to work for plaintiff as nonunion men; that plaintiff has since that time been running its mine under this contract with its men to the entire satisfaction of both, paying its men as high wages as paid in any of the union mines. It then charges the officers and agents of the union, with full knowledge of the existence of this contract, to have repeatedly sought to have plaintiff violate it and agree to reunionize its mine, which plaintiff has refused to do, whereupon such union officers and agents are seeking by inducements, threats, and intimidation, to induce plaintiff's employes, bound by said contract with it, to leave its service, break their contract, join the union, and also to prevent other men from engaging in its employ, and this, it is charged, with the unlawful purpose to prevent any but union men to work in its mine, compel it to employ none but union men and to submit its business and its property to the jurisdiction and control of said union and its officers. The bill then proceeds to charge the United Mine Workers of America and its subordinate organizations to be unincorporated organizations, having unlawful purposes and designs to create a monopoly and trust in coal mining labor, and in support of these allegations sets forth in extenso what purports to be excerpts from the constitutions and by-laws of the supreme and subordinate unions, together with the obligation required to be taken by its members and extracts from the proceedings of its national conventions. A distinct conspiracy on the part of defendants as individuals is charged to secure, by reason of their positions as officers of this union, the abandonment by the men of their contract with plaintiff, their joining the union, the inability of plaintiff to employ others, and the entire shutting down of its mine to its irreparable loss and injury.

The answer contains a general denial, which is substantially as follows:

That the United Mine Workers of America and its subordinate associations or branches, by its officers, agents, employes, and servants, have sought, and are seeking, by inducements, threats, and intimidation, but without physical force, 'to cause plaintiff's employes to leave its service and to cause others who have engaged to enter its service to break their engagements of service and not to work for plaintiff, and to prevent others from working for plaintiff, and all with the avowed and actual purpose of compelling plaintiff to recognize said organization, and to force plaintiff to employ none but persons who are members of the United Mine Workers of America.'

They deny that any of the expressed objects of the United Mine Workers of America are unlawful.

They deny that the appellants have entered into a combination or conspiracy under the name of the United Mine Workers of America, unlawfully to persuade, entice, and procure appellee's employes to break, violate, and disregard their several contracts with the appellee, with the avowed purpose of compelling appellee to reunionize its plant without its consent, and deny that they have formed a conspiracy to compel, by threats and intimidation, appellee's employes to join said union.

They deny that Zelenka reported, and caused this report to be circulated among appellee's employes, that Zelenka, Green, and Watkins (appellants), after a conference with appellee's general manager, had agreed with such general manager that appellee's employes were allowed to join the United Mine Workers of America, and deny that they caused the further statement to be circulated among said employes that they must join the union, or else they would be out of a job at an early day; and deny that they caused to be circulated a statement that only union men would be permitted to work at appellee's mine, and that those of appellee's employes who did not join the union would not be permitted to get a job any place else.

And they deny that the appellants are endeavoring to unionize the appellee's mine, and that they threaten to close down appellee's mine and keep it closed until appellee agrees to sign the scale and employ none but union labor; and they deny that the national organization of the United Mine Workers of America and its district and subdistrict organizations are under their constitutions violating either the common or statutory law of the state of West Virginia.

And they deny that the appellants will, unless enjoined, by enticement, persuasion, or coercion, bring about the shutting down of appellee's mine and the ultimate destruction of its business; and deny that they will compel the appellee to recognize the appellants as members of said labor organization, and will compel appellee to contract with its employes through appellants as officers of said organization; and they deny that they are about to indulge in any of the methods of accomplishing their purpose by the use of threats, intimidation, and other unlawful means alleged in said bill.

Presented with this bill were some 28 affidavits in support of its allegations. A temporary restraining order was granted until the next regular term of court to be held at Parkersburg, January 14, 1908, for which date plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction was set down for hearing. This hearing, on motion of defendants, was continued until May 26, 1908, when plaintiff presented more than 20 additional affidavits and argued its motion for temporary injunction; counsel for defense stating they 'did not desire to be heard in opposition to said motion so far as the granting of a temporary injunction at the time was concerned and not consenting but objecting thereto. ' The temporary injunction was on that day granted in exact accord with the terms of the restraining order.

Answers were filed, exceptions entered thereto, motions as to certain unserved defendants to have said bill dismissed as to them were made, and a motion by defendants, disclaiming 'any intention of conceding the truth of the allegations of the plaintiff's bill whereby fraud, coercion, and intimidation or violence in any form whatsoever is imputed to them,' was made to dissolve the injunction, 'on the face of the bill and exhibits,' in so far as said injunction restrained said defendants or any of them from the use of argument, reason, and persuasion, to induce the employes of the plaintiff or any of them to become members of the United Mine Workers of America or any of its subordinate branches; so far as it restrained them from interfering or talking to any person or persons in the employment of the plaintiff, or about to enter the employment of the plaintiff for the purpose of inducing such persons to become members of the United Mine Workers of America or any of its subordinate branches, in a peaceable and law-abiding manner and unaccompanied by...