Estate of Roxas v. Marcos

Decision Date10 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 28702.,28702.
Citation214 P.3d 598
PartiesESTATE OF Roger ROXAS; and the Golden Budha Corporation, a foreign corporation, Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Imelda MARCOS, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant, and Ferdinand MARCOS, Defendant.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Joseph A. Stewart (Lex R. Smith and Maria Y. Wang of Kobayashi, Sugita & Goda, Honolulu, and James P. Linn, Oklahoma City, OK, and D. Patrick Long, Dallas, TX (special counsel to the firm) of James P. Linn Law Firm, Oklahoma City, OK, with him on the response and briefs) for respondent/defendant-appellant.

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, and DUFFY, JJ., Circuit Judge DEL ROSARIO, in Place of ACOBA, J., Recused, and Circuit Judge POLLACK, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

Opinion of the Court by NAKAYAMA, J.

Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellees The Estate of Roger Roxas and The Golden Budha Corporation ("GBC") (collectively, "Petitioners") petition this court to review the Intermediate Court of Appeals' ("ICA's") March 5, 2009 judgment on appeal. The ICA's judgment was entered pursuant to its February 12, 2009 published opinion,1 Estate of Roxas v. Marcos ("Roxas II"), 120 Hawai`i 123, 126, 202 P.3d 584, 587 (App.2009), which reversed the first circuit court's ("circuit court's")2 July 24, 2007 order granting Petitioners' two May 8, 2007 motions to extend the second and fourth amended judgments. The ICA held that the circuit court erred in extending the Plaintiffs' second and fourth amended judgments because, under Hawai`i Revised Statute ("HRS") § 657-5 (2006),3 "the August 28, 1996 [j]udgment is the `original judgment' for purposes of this case and the limitation period for an extension commenced on its August 28, 1996 entry date." Roxas II, 120 Hawai`i at 126, 202 P.3d at 587. We accepted Petitioners' application for a writ of certiorari, and oral argument was held on June 4, 2009.

Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred by interpreting "original judgment" of HRS § 657-5 as the "first judgment rendered by a court." Id. at 126, 202 P.3d at 587. They argue that this construction creates "an unreasonable result in cases in which more than one judgment is entered between different parties or as to different claims." Petitioners maintain that the limitations period on extending a judgment is ten years from the date that the judgment to be extended was first entered.

We hold that the "original judgment" of HRS § 657-5 refers to the judgment that creates the rights and responsibilities seeking to be extended, and, therefore, the circuit court did not err in extending the second and fourth amended judgments. Nevertheless, the circuit court erred when it extended the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021, because that date is beyond twenty years of the "original judgment," entered on June 26, 2000. Accordingly, we (1) vacate the ICA's March 5, 2009 judgment, (2) vacate the circuit court's July 24, 2007 order, to the extent that it granted Petitioners' motion to extend the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021, and (3) remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History

On January 24, 1971, Roger Roxas ("Roxas") discovered the legendary "Yamashita Treasure," which, among other things, consisted of a gold-colored buddha statue and bars of gold. Roxas v. Marcos ("Roxas I"), 89 Hawai`i 91, 100-1, 969 P.2d 1209, 1218-19 (1998).4 Subsequently, on April 5, 1971, under the direction of Ferdinand Marcos, individuals claiming to be from two Philippine national security agencies, knocked on Roxas's door, claiming to have a search warrant for his house. Id. at 102, 969 P.2d at 1220. The men broke Roxas's windows, pointed the barrels of their rifles inside, and threatened to shoot him if he did not open the door. Id. Roxas opened the door, and the men beat Roxas's brother and ordered his family and two bodyguards to lie down on the floor. Id. The men stole the buddha, the diamonds, seventeen bars of gold, samurai swords, a piggy bank belonging to Roxas's children, and his wife's coin collection. Id.

Subsequently, on May 18, 1971, Roxas was arrested and tortured for information about his treasure. Id. at 103, 969 P.2d at 1221. He was kept in a room for two weeks, and he was forced to sign an affidavit declaring that the raid in his house had been performed "in a peaceful manner." Id. Roxas eventually escaped. Id.

In late 1974, Ferdinand Marcos and his aides and generals, as well as Imelda Marcos' personal security, sought the services of Robert Curtis, an American who owned a mining company. Id. at 105-06, 969 P.2d at 1223-24. They asked Curtis to resmelt gold bars that Ferdinand Marcos claimed were from the Yamashita Treasure. Id. Curtis testified that he entered a room "`about roughly 40 by 40,' stacked to the ceiling with bars of gold," and also saw the solid gold buddha statue that Roxas had discovered. Id.

On June 3, 1986, Roxas assigned all of his rights to the Yamashita Treasure to GBC, in exchange for a minority holding of non-voting shares. Id. at 107, 969 P.2d at 1225.

B. Judgment And Amended Judgment

On February 19, 1988, Roxas and GBC filed a lawsuit against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Id. at 109, 969 P.2d at 1227. Roxas asserted claims of false imprisonment and battery against Ferdinand Marcos. Id. GBC asserted claims against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for conversion, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyances. Id.

During the litigation, on September 29, 1989, Ferdinand Marcos died, and the parties subsequently stipulated to substitute Imelda Marcos as his estate's personal representative. Id. In 1993, during the litigation, Roxas also died, and the circuit court granted a motion to substitute Felix Dacanay ("Dacanay"), personal representative of the Roxas Estate, for Roxas as a party plaintiff. Id.

Pursuant to a July 19, 1996 jury verdict, the circuit court filed a judgment on August 28, 1996 ("first-in-time judgment") (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal representative of the Estate of Roger Roxas and against Ferdinand Marcos on the battery and false imprisonment claims, (2) in favor of GBC and against Ferdinand Marcos on the conversion claim, and (3) in favor of Imelda Marcos, in her individual capacity, and against Petitioners on all claims they asserted against her. Id. at 114, 969 P.2d at 1232.

The circuit court filed an amended judgment on October 21, 1996 ("Amended Judgment"), pursuant to Petitioners' request to correct the first-in-time judgment by "add[ing] the `Estate of Ferdinand Marcos' as a proper party defendant." Id. at 114-15, 969 P.2d at 1232-33. Pursuant to the circuit court's prior substitution of Imelda Marcos as a representative for the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, the court filed an Amended Judgment against "Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos," (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal representative of the Estate of Roger Roxas, in the amount of $6 million in damages for battery and false imprisonment, and (2) in favor of GBC, in the amount of over $22 billion for conversion.

C. The 1998 Roxas I Decision

Imelda Marcos, "in her alleged capacity as personal representative of the Marcos Estate," appealed from the Amended Judgment, arguing that the court erred by amending the judgment against her as "personal representative" of the Marcos Estate where she was substituted as "the representative of Defendant Ferdinand Marcos deceased." Id. at 99, 117, 969 P.2d at 1217, 1235. Petitioners cross-appealed. Id. at 99, 969 P.2d at 1217.

This court issued Roxas I on November 17, 1998, affirming, reversing, and vacating and remanding parts of the Amended Judgment. Id. at 157, 969 P.2d at 1275. We held, among other things, that generally, "an heir of an undistributed estate, who has not been judicially appointed as the personal representative of a decedent's estate, is not a `proper party' for substitution pursuant to [Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure ("HRCP")] Rule 25(a)(1)." Id. at 122, 969 P.2d at 1240. We noted that Petitioners did not establish that Imelda Marcos was appointed as the personal representative of the Marcos Estate, and, therefore, Imelda Marcos did not bind the Marcos Estate to the judgment. Id. at 122 n. 18, 126, 969 P.2d at 1240 n. 18, 1244. We ruled, however, that Imelda Marcos deceived the court into permitting her to represent Ferdinand Marcos, and, that

in order to achieve justice consistent with the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the equities of this case require us to hold Imelda [Marcos] personally liable, at least to the extent of her interest in the assets of the Marcos Estate, for the amount of the plaintiffs-appellees' judgment against Ferdinand [Marcos], as that amount has been modified according to this opinion.

Id. at 126, 969 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added). We vacated the portion of the circuit court's Amended Judgment entered against "Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos" with respect to the [Petitioners'] battery, false imprisonment, and conversion claims, and remanded for entry of judgment as to those claims against "Imelda [Marcos], in her personal capacity, to the extent of her interest in the Marcos Estate." Id. at 126-27, 969 P.2d at 1244-45.

Further, Roxas I (1) reversed that part of the Amended Judgment awarding GBC $22 billion for one storage area of gold bullion, (2) vacated the portion of the Amended Judgment awarding GBC $1.4 million in damages for conversion of the golden buddha statue and the seventeen gold bars, and entering judgment in favor of Imelda Marcos and against Petitioners on GBC's claim for constructive trust, and (3) remanded for

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