Wright v. Montgomery County, s. 99-1371 and 99-1379
| Citation | 215 F.3d 367 |
| Decision Date | 09 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 99-1371 and 99-1379,s. 99-1371 and 99-1379 |
| Parties | (3rd Cir. 2000) IN RE: MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; MARIO MELE; RICHARD BUCKMAN; JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, III PETITIONERS, NO. 99-1371 ROBERT E. WRIGHT, SR. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; MARIO MELE; RICHARD BUCKMAN; JOSEPH HOEFFEL; MAILLIE FALCONIERO & COMPANY LLP; GEORGE FALCONERO MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; MARIO MELE; RICHARD BUCKMAN, JOSEPH HOEFFEL, APPELLANTS, NO. 99-1379 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. No. 96-cv-04597) District Judge: The Honorable Herbert J. Hutton
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Timothy T. Myers, Esq. (Argued) John M. Elliott, Esq. Eric J. Bronstein, Esq. Krista K. Beatty, Esq. Elliott, Reihner, Siedzikowski & Egan 925 Harvest Drive Union Meeting Corporate Center Blue Bell, PA 19422 Attorneys for Petitioners/ Appellants/Cross Respondent/ Appellee
Theodore Q. Thompson, Esq. (Argued) Theodore Q. Thompson & Associates 10 North Main Street Ambler, PA 19002 Attorney for Respondent/Appellee/ Cross Petitioners/Appellants
Before: Sloviter, Nygaard, and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the District Court's pre-trial denial of the Appellants' claims to absolute and qualified immunity from suit. Although the District Court did not expressly address the Appellants' immunity claims, it denied the motions for summary judgment in which those claims were asserted. We hold that this implicit denial of the Appellants' immunity claims is sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. We will affirm.
In July 1994, Montgomery County's Salary Board promoted Robert Wright to Director of the County's Department of Housing Services. At the time, Wright had been a County employee for approximately 15 years, working first for its Redevelopment Authority, and then for the Department of Housing Services. Beginning in 1993, a number of Montgomery County homeowners contacted the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to lodge complaints against Montgomery County's Department of Housing Services. The complaints accused Department officials of mismanagement, negligence and undue delay in their administration of the County's HUD-funded Home Improvement Program. The complaints specifically mentioned Wright by name, as well as other Department employees and contractors. HUD forwarded the complaints to the County's Board of Commissioners and, ultimately, initiated an audit of the Department.
Beginning in December 1995, HUD forwarded a series of draft audit findings to Wright in his capacity as Department Director. The draft findings identified a number of deficiencies in the Department's administration of HUD-funded programs. In addition to more general shortfalls, the draft findings concluded that Wright, among others, had engaged in a number of transactions with HUD contractors involving impermissible conflicts of interest. HUD forwarded its final draft finding on April 19, 1996.
On April 22, the Salary Board voted to suspend Wright, who is African-American, without pay.1 On May 20, HUD issued its final audit report which, like the draft findings, was highly critical of Wright's management of the Department, and of his personal dealings with HUD contractors. On June 13, the Salary Board voted to terminate Wright's employment. Two other Department employees, both of whom were white, were also terminated. Wright ultimately responded to his termination by filing a civil action against Montgomery County, the county commissioners as a group, and the three commissioners who served on the Salary Board -- Mario Mele, Richard S. Buckman, and Joseph M. Hoeffel, III -- in their individual capacities ("Appellants").2
Wright's complaint included a wide range of claims. In Count One, he alleged that the Appellants discriminated against, retaliated against, and harassed him on account of his race. He based this Count on 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(1-3), 1986, and 1988, but did not invoke Title VII. The remaining counts alleged a litany of state-law claims ranging from defamation to intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as a variety of other tort claims.
In September 1998, the Appellants filed three separate motions for summary judgment based on: (1) claims of absolute and qualified immunity; (2) flaws in Wright's state-law claims; and (3) flaws in Wright's constitutional claims. In a December 22, 1998 Memorandum and Order, the District Court granted the unopposed motion to dismiss the state-law claims. See Wright v. Montgomery County, No. 96-CV-4597 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1998). In the same Memorandum and Order, the court erroneously characterized Count One of Wright's complaint as asserting claims under Title VII. See id., slip op. at 5-8. Finding that Wright had established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the court denied the Appellants' motion for summary judgment on Count One.
Because the District Court had characterized Count One, now the only surviving count, as asserting claims under Title VII, the Appellants filed a fourth motion for summary judgment on January 28, 1999. This time, the Appellants argued that summary judgment was proper because Wright had failed "to exhaust his legally mandated administrative remedies as a condition precedent of commencing suit." App. at 1364a. Thereafter, Wright informed the court that the federal claims asserted in Count One of his complaint were not based on Title VII, but rather on, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. S 1981. See A1389. The Appellants responded by filing yet another motion for summary judgment on February 16, asserting various grounds for summary judgment, and again asserting absolute immunity. See A1393-96 (motion); 1450-51 (Memorandum of Law). Subsequently, on February 19, the Appellants filed a motion to dismiss based on allegations that Wright was refusing to cooperate in discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
On March 15, the District Court filed a second Memorandum and Order. Therein, the court corrected itself, noting that Wright's claims in Count One were not based on Title VII, but rather, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. S 1981. See Wright v. Montgomery County, No. 96-CV-4597, 1999 WL 145205, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1999). In this second order, the court dismissed all claims asserted in Count One except Wright's retaliation claims. In the course of doing so, the District Court purported to address a number of motions, including the Appellants' January 28th motion for summary judgment based on exhaustion. The court did not address the January 28th motion's immunity claims, however, nor did it acknowledge the subsequent February 16th motion reasserting those claims.
On April 29, 1999, the District Court set the case for trial on May 10. Appellants filed their first notice of appeal on May 7. On that day, the District Court entered a number of orders disposing of the parties' remaining motions, including, apparently, Appellants' February 16th motion for summary judgment. Once more, however, the court did not address the Appellants' immunity claims. Instead, the court merely noted in a footnote that it had "already addressed the issues raised in this motion for summary judgment" in its March 15th Memorandum and Order. In response, Appellants filed an amended notice of appeal on May 11, indicating that they were also appealing from the May 7 Order.3
Absolute immunity is a purely legal question over which we exercise plenary review. See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996). Our review of the Appellants' qualified immunity claims is strictly limited to the legal questions involved. Therefore, our review of that issue is also plenary. See Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2393 (1999).
The Appellants raise a number of issues in this appeal. As a threshold matter, we must first determine which of those issues, if any, we have jurisdiction to review. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the Appellants' claims to absolute and qualified immunity, but lack jurisdiction to consider their remaining claims. We next consider whether the District Court erred by implicitly denying the Appellants' immunity claims. We hold that it did not.
Wright contends that we lack jurisdiction to review the Appellants' claims because they failed to file notice of appeal within the 30-day limit established by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). We disagree.
The Rule 4(a) deadline for civil cases applies to "all appealable orders, including collateral orders, specifically orders denying immunity." Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Kenyatta v. Moore , 744 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1984). In Weir, the court held that, Weir, 915 F.2d at 286.
Wright argues that this appeal should be deemed as arising from, at the latest, the District Court's March 15th Order denying the Appellants' various motions for summary judgment. That argument overlooks one critical fact, however. The District Court did not explicitly rule on the Appellants' immunity claims in its March 15th Order, nor at any time before or after. In its December 22, 1998 Order, the court characterized Wright's federal claims as arising under Title VII. This, of course, temporarily took the immunity issues out of contention. Under ...
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