Chenault v. State

Decision Date09 April 1975
Docket NumberNo. 29662,29662
Citation234 Ga. 216,215 S.E.2d 223
PartiesMarcus Wayne CHENAULT v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Randy Bacote, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Carter Goode, Asst. Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Julius C. Daugherty, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

UNDERCOFLER, Presiding Justice.

This case is before this court by appeal and for mandatory review of the death sentences imposed upon the appellant following his trial by jury. The appellant, Marcus Wayne Chenault, was indicted on July 9, 1974, by a Fulton County Grand Jury for the murders of Mrs. Alberta King and Deacon Edward Boykin, for aggravated assault for the shooting of Mrs. Jimmie Mitchell, for carrying a pistol without a license and for carrying a concealed weapon all on June 30, 1974. Following a jury trial which began on September 9, 1974, the jury found the appellant guilty on all charges on September 12, 1974, and imposed sentences of death on both counts of murder and ten years in the penitentiary for aggravated assault to run consecutively with the death sentences. The trial judge sentenced the appellant to one year in the penitentiary on both misdemeanor pistol counts, to run concurrently with all other sentences imposed.

I. Factual Situation

The State presented evidence to establish the following: About 7:30 a.m. on the morning of June 30, 1974, a taxicab driver picked up Marcus Wayne Chenault, the appellant, at the bus station in Atlanta, Georgia. He asked to be taken to the Ebenezer Baptist Church. He was taken to the church. Chenault asked whether or not Mr. and Mrs. King, mother and father of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, attended Ebenezer Baptist Church every Sunday.

Later that morning, around 9:30 a.m., another taxicab picked up the appellant at a motel and took him to the church.

Appellant was observed seated alone in the main audience section of the Ebenezer Baptist Church and was invited to attend the Men's Adult Bible Class of the Sunday School. He introduced himself and stated he was from Ohio. Appellant was later observed seated in the 'Amen' corner next to the organ after church services had begun. Appellant was seated about four feet from the organ. An usher handed the appellant a bulletin and exchanged greetings.

During the worship service a sound resembling an explosion was heard. Mr. Smith, an usher, had his attention drawn in the direction of the organ. He heard one of the victims, Mrs. Alberta King, exclaim, 'Oh!' Appellant was observed standing up with a pistol exclaiming, 'I am taking over this . . .' He was close enough to Mrs. King to touch her. He was also firing more shots. Mrs. Jimmie Mitchell was near the appellant when the shooting began. Earlier appellant had asked whether or not 'Paster King' was in church, and Mrs. Mitchell pointed Reverend King out. A few minutes later, Mrs. Mitchell heard the explosion-like noise. She was also shot.

Derek Barber King, grandson of Mrs. Alberta King, was sitting near his grandmother. While the organist, Mrs. King, was leading the congregation in the singing, the appellant began shooting with two pistols. Mr. King observed his grandmother being shot, screaming, and bleeding. He saw the appellant shoot his grandmother again after she had fallen on the floor. He observed the appellant shoot Deacon Edward Boykin, and randomly shoot into the congregation.

Other witnesses testified substantially the same.

The appellant presented evidence to support a defense of insanity.

Two psychiatrists testified that they diagnosed appellant as a schizophrenic, paranoid type mental condition, who was suffering from 'delusions of grandiosity.' Psychiatric testimony comprised appellant's sole defense.

II. Enumerations of Error
1. Appellant's first enumeration of error is that 'the Court erred after the plea of insanity was filed to have impaneled a trial jury, without first impaneling a special jury.'

Related enumerations of error 3, 6, and 9 will also be resolved by our resolution of the first enumeration.

Appellant filed a 'motion to stay the indictment' for the purpose of presenting evidence of the appellant's sanity to the grand jury before the grand jury returned an indictment of the appellant. Appellant sought psychiatric examination by a competent physician and named the psychiatrist to perform the examination in his proposed order. The trial judge interpreted the 'motion to stay' as a premature plea of insanity and properly rejected it under Code § 27-1501 providing for special pleas and demurrers after an indictment is rendered. Appellant's motion for psychiatric evaluation was granted.

After indictment, appellant filed no special plea of insanity. In the absence of a special plea of insanity the trial court did more than was required by appointing psychiatrists for evaluation of the defendant. Cardin v. Harmon, 217 Ga. 737, 124 S.E.2d 638; Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536(1), 192 S.E.2d 249; Coffee v. State, 230 Ga. 123(1), 195 S.E.2d 897; Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13(1), 205 S.E.2d 247. Code Ann. § 27-1502.

Appellant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity raised only the general issue of the guilt of appellant including his sanity at the time of the acts charged as crimes. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 226, 154 S.E.2d 443. That determination was submitted to the jury under proper instructions.

We note that although the mental condition of the appellant was the principal matter relied on by the defense, the psychiatric experts, one of whom was requested by the defense, testified as follows:

Dr. Lloyd T. Baccus, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Law and Psychiatric Service for Grady Hospital, testified that between July 9, 1974, and July 26, 1974, he examined the appellant five times for a total of seven hours. He also interviewed the appellant's parents for approximately four hours.

Dr. Baccus diagnosed the appellant as having a schizophrenic mental condition, paranoid type. He was said to suffer from 'delusions of grandiosity.' Appellant never indicated that he was 'controlled by any forces.' The prognosis for the appellant was deemed 'good'; meaning that with treatment, the appellant has the capacity to function adequately in society. He testified that there are many people in society that might be classified as paranoid schizophrenics. Dr. Baccus asserted that the appellant in murdering Mrs. Alberta King and Deacon Edward Boykin, had both a cognitive awareness of, and an ability to appreciate the implications of his act. He knew right from wrong. The doctor did not indicate any delusion that compelled the appellant to commit murder. Dr. Baccus also testified that the appellant was competent to stand trial, that he knew what a prosecutor was, what a judge was, what a defense lawyer was, what a trial was and what the consequences were.

Dr. Dewitt Clinton Alfred, Chief Psychiatrist at Grady Hospital and Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Emory University also testified in regard to the sanity of the appellant. Although he examined the appellant on only one occasion, he had, in order to supplement his report, all the data comprisong Dr. Baccus' examination. After defining the difference between a psychosis such as paranoid schizophrenia, and psychotic symptoms which might control and compel a given individual, the doctor classified the appellant as a schizophrenic-paranoid type; i.e., a person having a psychosis. Dr. Alfred also stated that in his opinion, the appellant did not suffer at the time of the crime, under such psychotic symptoms as would render him helpless and lacking in control of himself from delusions and hallucinations. Dr. Alfred's report, read into evidence indicated that appellant: '(a) was suffering from a condition known as paranoid schizophrenia; (b) but was sufficiently free of mental defect, disease, or derangement as to be able to distinguish right from wrong; (c) was sufficiently free from mental defect . . . as to be able to adhere to the right; (d) was not deprived of sufficient will or volition or self-control as to only partially be able to adhere to the right; (e) was not under the influence of an automatic compulsion which he was helpless to control; (f) was able to entertain the requisite intent, willfulness in planning, to commit the alleged offense.' In Dr. Alfred's opinion at the time of examination, the appellant was so far free from mental defect, disease or derangement as to be able to, (a) understand the nature of the charges pending against him; (b) understand the role of the various key participants in the courtroom drama, in other words: judge, jury, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney; and (c) intelligently cooperate and participate with the defense attorney adequately and sufficiently in his own defense.

The court did not err as alleged in enumerations 1, 3, 6, and 9.

2. In enumeration 2 appellant alleges the court erred in allowing the district attorney to orally argue against defendant's pre-trial motions without first filing a written answer.

The defendant shows no injury from the trial court's allowing the state to argue orally on the appellant's discovery motions without responding in writing. In Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 21, 159 S.E.2d 387, 389 we said, 'Harm as well as error must be shown to authorize a reversal by this court. As was held in Brown v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 71, 76: 'When a plaintiff in error brings a case here, he must show error which has hurt him. This court is not an expounder of theoretical law, but it administers practical law, and corrects only such errors as have practically wronged the complaining party.' See also Dill v. State, 222 Ga. 793, 152 S.E.2d 741, and citations.' Also cited in Robinson v. State, 229 Ga. 14, 189 S.E.2d 53. No harmful error is shown by this enumeration of error.

3. It was not error for the...

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