State v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 06 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 57,57
• Citation: 287 N.C. 408,215 S.E.2d 80
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Claude BUCHANAN.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 80

215 S.E.2d 80

287 N.C. 408

STATE of North Carolina v. Claude BUCHANAN.

No. 57.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 6, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Attys. Gen. William B. Ray and William W. Melvin, Raleigh, for the State.

W. R. Francis, Waynesville, for defendant-appellant.

COPELAND, Justice.

Defendant brings forward three assignments of error based on a total of three exceptions duly noted in the record.

Defendant first assigns error (Nos. 1 & 2) to the action of the trial court in denying his motion for 'a directed verdict of not guilty' at the close of the State's evidence and in denying his motion for 'nonsuit' at the close of all the evidence. The question presented by these assignments is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant its submission to the jury and to support a verdict of guilty of the offense charged in the first-degree murder indictment. See, e.g., State v. McCall, 286 N.C. 472, 212 S.E.2d 132 (1975); State v. Sparks, 285 N.C. 631, 207 S.E.2d 712 (1974); State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974). Both of these motions have the same legal effect as a motion for judgment as in cause of nonsuit. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975); State v. Britt, Supra; State v. Glover, 270 N.C. 319, 154 S.E.2d 305 (1967).

When an indictment charges a defendant with first-degree murder, a motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit requires the trial court to determine whether the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to raise a legitimate inference, and to permit the jury to find that a defendant, after Premeditation and Deliberation, formed a fixed purpose to kill and thereafter accomplished this purpose. State v. Britt, Supra, 285 N.C. at 262, 204 S.E.2d at 822. Accord, State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975); State v. Cooper, Supra; State v. Sparks, Supra; State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 197 S.E.2d 539 (1973); State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E.2d 429 (1971); State v. Perry, 276 N.C. 339, 172 S.E.2d 541 (1970).

All the evidence in the instant case discloses that defendant intentionally shot the deceased with a .12 gauge shotgun and that his death was proximately caused by a shotgun would to the chest and the chest cavity. Hence, the only remaining question is whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find that defendant acted after due premeditation and deliberation.

G.S. § 14--17, as presently written, provides in pertinent part as follows:

'A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, Or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793 (1970), an opinion by Justice Sharp (now Chief Justice), this Court documented the history of G.S. § 14--17 as follows:

'Prior to 1893 there were no degrees of murder in North Carolina. Any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, express or implied, was murder and punishable by death. State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649; State v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 101 S.E. 548; State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. 847, 33 S.E. 128; State v. Boon, 1 N.C. 191. 'Malice aforethought was a term used in defining murder prior to the time of the adoption of the statute dividing murder into degrees. As then used it did not mean an actual, express or Preconceived disposition; but imported an intent, at the moment, to do without lawful authority, and without the pressure of necessity, that which the law forbade. S. v. Crawford, 13 N.C. 425. As used in C.S., 4200, now G.S. 14--17, the term Premeditation and Deliberation is more comprehensive and embraces all that is meant by Aforethought, and more'. State v. Hightower, 226 N.C. 62, 64, 36 S.E.2d 649, 650 (emphasis added); Accord, State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 278, 20 S.E.2d 313; State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 6 Am.Rep. 533.' Id. at 657, 174 S.E.2d at 803--04.

The Act of 1893 was based on what has frequently been referred to as the 'Pennsylvania pattern.' See, e.g., R. Perkins, Criminal Law 89 (2d ed. 1969) (hereinafter Perkins); Keedy, history of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U.Pa.L.Rev. 759 (1949). 'The Pennsylvania statute (was) substantially the same as ours, and by that statute the first classification of criminal homicides into two degrees of murder and manslaughter was made in this country.' State v. Fuller, 114 N.c. 885, 899, 19 S.E. 797, 801 (1894). The Pennsylvania Act was first adopted in 1794 and at the time of the ratification of Chapter 85, 1893 Public Laws, every other State had previously divided the common law crime of murder into two degrees. State v. Fuller, Supra, at 902, 19 S.E. at 802. See also Perkins, Supra, at 88. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 562--68 (West 1972) (hereinafter cited as LaFave & Scott).

The Act of 1893 was first construed by this Court in State v. Fuller, Supra. However, the term 'premeditation and deliberation' was not construed until State v. Thomas, 118 N.C. 1113, 24 S.E. 431 (1896), the fourth decision of this Court interpreting the 1893 Act. In that case, this Court made the following pertinent observations:

'. . . In State v. Norwood, 115 N.C. (789), 790, 20 S.E. 712 . . . it was settled that if the prisoner once formed 'the fixed design to take life' it was immaterial how soon after deliberately determining to do so the purpose was carried into execution. . . .

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'. . . But this Court has never as yet ventured to give a more specific definition of the mental process which the Legislature intended to describe by the use of these words (premeditation and deliberation) than the general one given in Fuller's case. It is inaccurate to say that, whenever there is an intent to kill, the homicide belongs to the class of murders in the first degree; . . .

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'. . . The word which marks distinctly the two degrees is 'premeditated' . . .. 'To say that murder was of the first degree, simply because it was intended at the moment . . . would be to construe the words 'deliberate and premediated' out of the statute.' . . . 'An intent to kill may exist in other degrees of unjustifiable homicide, but in no other degree is that intent formed into a Fixed purpose by deliberation and premeditation.' (Citation omitted.) This intent is defined by others as a steadfast resolve and deep-rooted purpose, or a design formed after carefully considering the consequences. (Citations omitted.)

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'. . . In order to constitute deliberation and premeditation, something more must appear than the prior existence of actual malice or the presumption of malice which arises from the use of a deadly weapon. Though the mental process may require but a moment of thought, it must be shown, so as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner weighed and balanced the subject of killing in his mind long enough to consider the reason or motive which impelled him to the act, and to form a fixed design to kill in furtherance of such purpose or motive. (Citations omitted.)' (Emphasis supplied.) See also State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. 847, 33 S.E 128 (1899).

In analyzing the Act of 1893 (now G.S. § 14--17) it is clear that neither the statute nor the early court decisions interpreting it undertook to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time would naturally vary with different individuals and under differing circumstances. Therefore, as this Court has stated on countless occasions, 'premeditation means 'thought beforehand for some length of time, however short. '' See, e.g., State v. Britt, Supra; State v. Fountain, 282 N.C. 58, 191 S.E.2d 674 (1972); State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E.2d 429 (1971); State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Perry, 276 N.C. 339, 172 S.E.2d 541 (1970); State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769 (1961); State v. Lamm, 232 N.C. 402, 61 S.E.2d 188 (1950); State v. Wise, 225 N.C. 746, 36 S.E.2d 230 (1946); State v. Hammonds 216 N.C. 67, 3 S.E.2d 439 (1939); State v. Lewis, 209 N.C. 191, 183 S.E. 357 (1936); State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506, 130 S.E. 308 (1925); State v. Walker, 173 N.C. 780, 92 S.E. 327 (1917); State v. Roberson, 150 N.C. 837, 64 S.E. 182 (1909); State v. Daniel, 139 N.C. 549, 51 S.E. 858 (1905); State v. Hunt, 134 N.C. 684, 47 S.E. 49 (1904); State v. Cole, 132 N.C. 1069, 44 S.E. 391 (1903); State v. Caldwell, 129 N.C. 682, 40 S.E. 85 (1901); State v. Norwood, 115 N.C. 789, 20 S.E. 712 (1894). However, since the proscribed intent to kill must be turned over in the mind in order for the mental process of premeditation and deliberation to transpire, it is clear that some period of time must necessarily elapse. The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7 (1945). One commentator has suggested that for the premeditation the killer asks himself the question, 'Shall I kill him?'. The intent to kill aspect of the crime is found in the answer, 'Yes, I shall.' The deliberation part of the crime requires a thought like, 'Wait, what about the consequences? Well, I'll do it anyway.' LaFave & Scott, Supra, at 563 fn. 5. We believe this analogy is in accord with the sound interpretation placed upon the Act of 1893 (now G.S. § 14--17) in State v. Thomas, Supra.

Applying these rules to the case Sub judice, we must determine if there was sufficient evidence of...