Cawley v. Warren

• Decision Date: 13 October 1954
• Docket Number: No. 11160.,11160.
• Citation: 216 F.2d 74
• Parties: Elizabeth CAWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harland WARREN, Wendall Thompson and Harold Wensland, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

216 F.2d 74 (1954)

Elizabeth CAWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harland WARREN, Wendall Thompson and Harold Wensland, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11160.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

October 13, 1954.

Taylor E. Wilhelm, Patrick Cawley, La Salle, Ill., for appellant.

William C. Wines, Lawrence A. Kerns, Morton E. Anderson, Chicago, Ill., Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. of Illinois, for appellees. Raymond S. Sarnow, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Illinois, of counsel.

Before MAJOR, SWAIM and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court sustaining defendants' contention that plaintiff's complaint does not state a cause of action under the civil rights act,¹ and dismissing the complaint.

The complaint, which is brought against defendant Warren, state's attorney of La Salle county, Illinois, defendant Thompson, first assistant state's attorney of said county, and defendant Wensland, who was foreman of the La Salle county grand jury, charges that the defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights under section 1 of article XIV of the federal constitution and that, knowing that plaintiff had committed no violation of law of the state of Illinois, procured indictments against her by said grand jury, without any competent witnesses appearing before said grand jury and without the presentation of any competent evidence of any kind before said grand jury, and did then and there conspire in procuring said indictments; that defendants' acts were wilful and wanton; whereby she was arraigned, incarcerated in jail, and compelled to give bail, and as a result thereof plaintiff was damaged; that the Circuit Court of La Salle county dismissed said indictments; and that the cause of action is pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3) (now 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985).

The motion to dismiss the complaint states, inter alia, that the alleged actions charged against the defendants were done in their official capacities, wherefore they are not amenable to suit under the civil rights act. In this court the defendants likewise contend that they are immune from a suit of this kind.

The law supports this claim of immunity. It extends to and includes judges, prosecuting attorneys and members of a grand jury.

In Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 34 S.Ct. 27, at page 29, 58 L.Ed. 142, involving a judge, at page 144 the court said:

"* * * we regard it as fundamental that the immunity of the defendant from this suit is the same as that of judges in the United States, which is established beyond dispute. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 19 L.Ed. 285."

The reason for this rule of immunity is set forth in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646, at page 649:

"For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.

* * * Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry. * * * If civil actions could be maintained in such cases against the judge, because the losing party should see fit to allege in his complaint that the acts of the judge were done with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial independence would be entirely swept away. Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action."

State's attorneys in Illinois are judicial officers. Sec. 22, art. VI, Illinois Constitution of 1870, S.H.A.

While the constitution of Illinois does...