Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Board of Edu

• Decision Date: 05 April 2000
• Docket Number: DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT,No. 99-1609,V,99-1609
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) MERIDITH KIRKPATRICK; SUSAN KIRKPATRICK,LENOIR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; DOUG JAMES, DOCTOR, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LENOIR COUNTY SCHOOLS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; J. OLIVER SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF THE LENOIR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LARRY JENKINS, DIRECTOR OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, . Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 380

216 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2000)

MERIDITH KIRKPATRICK; SUSAN KIRKPATRICK, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V.

LENOIR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; DOUG JAMES, DOCTOR, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LENOIR COUNTY SCHOOLS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; J. OLIVER SMITH, CHAIRMAN OF THE LENOIR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LARRY JENKINS, DIRECTOR OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

No. 99-1609.

U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: April 5, 2000.

Decided June 20, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.

Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CA-97-168-4-BO) Counsel Argued: Stacey Bice Bawtinhimer, Law Office OF Stacey B. Bawtinhimer, New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellants. Edwin Maurice Braswell, Jr., Wallace, Morris & Barwick, P.A., Kinston, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before Widener and Traxler, Circuit Judges, and Joseph R. Goodwin, United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Goodwin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Widener and Judge Traxler joined.

OPINION

Goodwin, District Judge

This appeal presents the question of whether an action brought in federal district court pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., by a party aggrieved by a state administrative agency decision is an original civil action or an appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we find that such an action is an original civil action governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision.

I.

In July 1996, Susan Kirpatrick, on behalf of her daughter Meridith, filed a special education due process petition in North Carolina against the Lenoir County Board of Education ("Board") pursuant to the IDEA. She alleged that the Board violated Meridith's rights as a child with a disability by failing to provide her with a free appropriate public education as required by federal and state law. The petition sought the following: a free appropriate public education for Meridith through the development of an individualized education plan ("IEP"), reimbursement for the cost of three independent educational evaluations ("IEEs") performed by private specialists, and reimbursement for the cost of Meridith's private school tuition.

After a hearing, a Lenoir County administrative law judge ("the ALJ") agreed that Meridith was in need of specialized educational services and ordered the Board to develop an IEP for her. The ALJ, however, denied reimbursement for the IEEs and for the private school tuition. On appeal, the state review officer affirmed the ALJ's order for development of an IEP and the ALJ's denial of private school tuition reimbursement. The state review officer, however, reversed the ALJ as to the IEEs and ordered the Board to reimburse the Kirkpatricks $3,388. In that order, the state review officer also notified both parties that "[a]ny party aggrieved by this decision may institute a civil action in State or Federal court as provided by 20 U.S.C. 1415 and G.S. 115C-116 [N.C.] within 30 days after receipt of this decision."

On September 24, 1997, the last day of the thirty-day period, the Kirkpatricks filed a complaint in the Eastern District of North Carolina against the Board and defendants Dr. Doug James, J. Oliver Smith, and Larry Jenkins, who are officers of the Board. The Kirkpatricks sought reimbursement of the private school tuition costs. The Board did not file an action within the thirty day period. Instead, after receiving the Kirkpatricks' complaint, the Board filed a document styled "Answer and Appeal." That pleading sought a judgment denying the Kirkpatricks reimbursement for the IEEs.

The Kirkpatricks moved to dismiss the action filed by the Board on the ground that it was merely an untimely appeal. ¹ On February 4, 1998, the district court denied the motion, characterizing the Board's "Answer and Appeal" as a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that relates back to the date upon which the Kirkpatricks filed the original claim. The district court then considered the merits of the claim and counterclaim. The district court ordered the development of an IEP, but denied the Kirkpatricks reimbursement for the IEEs and private schooling costs. The Kirkpatricks now appeal the district court's decision to reach the merits of the Board's claim.

The Kirkpatricks argue that the district court erred when it characterized the Board's "Answer and Appeal" as a compulsory counterclaim filed pursuant to Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of characterizing it as an untimely appeal. The central issue on appeal is therefore whether an action filed in federal district court pursuant to the IDEA is an original civil action, for which a counterclaim would be permitted, or whether the action is more accurately characterized as an appeal, such that the other party would have to file an additional appeal within the prescribed period in order to preserve its claims. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that actions filed in federal court pursuant to the IDEA are original civil actions.

II.

Congress enacted the IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 942 (4th Cir. 1997). The IDEA requires all states receiving federal funds for education to provide to each child with a disability between the ages of three and twenty-one a free appropriate public education that is designed specifically to meet that child's needs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).

The IDEA provides very little by the way of substantive standards to determine whether a child is receiving a free appropriate public education. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982). However, the statute provides specific procedural safeguards to the parents of a child with a disability. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Under the IDEA, parents who are dissatisfied with a school district's IEP may file a grievance. See id. § 1415(b)(6). Following the filing of a grievance, a state or local educational agency conducts a hearing to evaluate the disabled student's IEP. See id. § 1415(f)(1). Section 1415(g), entitled "Appeal," states that following the hearing, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency. Such agency shall conduct an impartial review of such decision. The officer conducting such review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such review.

Id. § 1415(g) (emphasis added).

A party that is unsatisfied with the state review officer's decision has further recourse in either federal or state court. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The Kirkpatricks, dissatisfied with the state review officer's decision, sought such recourse by initiating this action in the district court.

A.

In determining whether the Kirkpatricks' action pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(A) was an "original action" or an "appeal," we must first look to the language of the statute. See United States v. Sheek, 990 F.2d 150 152-53 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Statutory construction must begin with the language of the statute and the court should not look beyond that language unless there is ambiguity or unless the statute as literally read would contravene the unambiguously expressed legislative intent gleaned from the statute's legislative history."). Section 1415(i)(2)(A) states:

Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of the local or state administrative agency], shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to [section 1415], which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)(emphasis added).

Thus, as an initial matter, the statute makes specific reference to a "civil action," not an "appeal." The drafters clearly knew the distinction between a civil action and an appeal. While the statute explicitly affords an aggrieved party a right to appeal from the local educational agency to a state review officer, see id.§ 1415(g), it explicitly gives an aggrieved party who has exhausted his administrative remedies the right to "bring a civil action" in federal or state court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)A). This distinction appears to have been deliberate. When the House of Representatives first passed the predecessor statute to the IDEA, the language provided for appeals to be taken from both the initial local agency and the state review officer's decision. That language was dropped, however, and replaced with the present statutory language, which grants the aggrieved party the right to "bring a civil action" following the state review officer's decision. See U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1480, 1501, 1503 (1975); see also Tokarick v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981).

B.

Additionally, evidence received by a district court and the remedies available are more akin to an original civil action. From a procedural standpoint, courts hearing a case on appeal are limited to reviewing the record that has been developed below. Conversely, a district court hearing an action brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i)(2)(A) may consider evidence in addition to the record developed in the administrative proceeding. Section 1415(i)(2)(B) provides that in addition to considering such records, the court "shall hear additional evidence at the request of...