Ransom v. CSC Consulting, 99-2967

• Decision Date: 27 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-2967,99-2967
• Citation: 217 F.3d 467
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2000) James H. Ransom, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSC Consulting, Inc., d/b/a CSC Index, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 467

217 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2000)

James H. Ransom, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSC Consulting, Inc., d/b/a CSC Index, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-2967

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued February 8, 2000

Decided June 16, 2000

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied July 27, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 98 0244--David H. Coar, Judge.

Before Cudahy, Manion, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

Manion, Circuit Judge.

James Ransom, a highly- paid consultant, sued his former employer, CSC Consulting, Inc., under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, claiming that CSC fired him because of his age. The district court granted CSC summary judgment. Ransom appeals, and we affirm.

I. Factual Background

James Ransom began working for CSC in 1993 as an independent contractor. In 1996, when he was 55, CSC hired Ransom to work in its Chicago office as a vice-president at a base salary of $360,000. In March 1997, CSC's president announced a new turnaround strategy for CSC, and as part of this strategy CSC fired some of its vice presidents and required the remaining officers to both manage and sell CSC's consulting services. A few months later, CSC's management team decided to eliminate poorly performing officers from the company; to evaluate performance, the management team looked at the officers' sales performance targets, progress in achieving those goals, and revenues.

On September 19, 1997, CSC's CEO, Douglas Gray, fired Ransom, who was then 56. Claiming that he was fired because of his age, Ransom sued CSC under the ADEA. CSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that it fired Ransom for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason--his failure to meet performance targets. The district court granted CSC's motion. Ransom appeals.

II. Analysis

We review de novo a decision on summary judgment, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Against this well-established backdrop, we consider Ransom's age discrimination case.

Ransom sued under the ADEA, which prohibits intentional discrimination against persons age 40 or over. 29 U.S.C. sec. 621(b). Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Systems, Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1998). To prove age discrimination, a plaintiff may proceed under either the direct or indirect method. Here, Ransom attempts both--he contends that CEO Gray's deposition testimony directly evidences an age animus, and that that same inference arises under the McDonell Douglas burden-shifting (indirect) approach. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

We begin with the direct case. "Direct evidence 'must not only speak directly to the issue of discriminatory intent, it must also relate to the specific employment decision in question.'" Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989)). Ransom cites the following deposition testimony given by CEO Gray as direct evidence of age discrimination:

Q. Were newly-made officers treated differently by the management committee, when the management committee discussed the October adjustment?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Well, if you're going to promote a principal to officer, you can't perfectly hold them accountable to officer performance for at least a couple of years into their tenure as officers. And we wouldn't have promoted them if we were going to then terminate them. That's sort of inconsistent behavior, management behavior. So by definition in our model, we really had to exempt them from that process. Now, the model is more dynamic than that because we knew we were going to promote certain people, if in fact we did. I don't know whether we did promote certain people in October, but I, we did, the model would have-- we would have--we would have built the economic model and the leverage model assuming those people were going to be officers. And so therefore, other people, less productive people, would have to go. So it was a constant tension, when you're in a declining business, as to how many to promote, how many not to promote, so forth.

Q. But nonetheless, the desire to continue promoting people continues to exist, even in a declining environment?

A. Right, that's correct.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because if the young people in the organization don't see a future, they're going to leave, number one. Number two, the younger people in the organization looked at the officers in the organization in the mess that it was in. So the younger people, right or wrong, the younger people in the organization look at the officers and say, these are the people who put us in the position we're in now. They can't be that good. So a) in order to provide--keep the younger people from leaving, and b) presumably to refresh the officer group, you've got to have people coming in. So that's the reason for it.

Ransom argues that Gray's statements that he sought to "keep the younger people from leaving" and wanted to "refresh the officer group" are direct evidence that CSC discriminated against him because of his age. We disagree. Gray's testimony does not create an inference that it fired Ransom because of his age. Rather, Gray testified about the "promote and eliminate" dynamic that had "always" been in play at the companies where he worked, including CSC, A.T. Kearney and Morgan Stanley. Under this dynamic, companies promote principals to officers and then continuously eliminate the worst performing officers to make room for future officers. These comments may be viewed as general observations about corporate behavior rather than as a direct explanation about Ransom's termination.

Moreover, in this excerpt Gray was not speaking of younger officers, but of younger people in the organization who were not yet in the same high- level, high-salary position as Ransom. Ransom earned well into the six-figure range, and as a highly-paid executive was held to a higher standard--a standard that younger people in the company would someday hope to achieve. He apparently did not meet that standard--see infra at 7--and thus was fired.

While Ransom argues that we should interpret Gray's statements about "younger people" as really meaning "younger officers," it would be unreasonable to do so for two reasons. First of all, Gray did not say "younger officers" or even "younger employees"--he said "younger people in the organization." Because Gray's statement specifically identified the comparative class of employees--those younger people in the organization--it is unreasonable to read it in the contradictory fashion proffered by Ransom--as younger officers. Second, in context, it is unreasonable to interpret "younger people in the organization" as "younger officers" because as the above extensive excerpt demonstrates, albeit inartfully, Gray was juxtaposing officers with non-officers. The officers were supposed to set an example--a standard--that would encourage, not discourage, the younger people about their future in the organization.

Nor does the "refresh the officer pool" comment create a reasonable inference of age discrimination because the word "refresh" does not have an age-based connotation. See, e.g., Beatty v. Wood, 204 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2000) (employer's statement that they needed "new blood," does not in isolation evidence age-based discriminatory animus). Moreover, nothing in the record creates an inference that Gray meant that he wanted to "refresh" the officer pool with "younger" employees but rather with "newer" employees, including lateral hires. In fact, Ransom's own appointment as an officer only one year earlier, when he was 55, demonstrates that refresh meant new officers, not younger. Thus, we conclude that Gray's "refresh" comment does not reasonably create an impression of age-based animus, and therefore, Ransom's direct case fails. See, e.g., Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998) (the term "new blood" in the abstract simply means a change and is not direct evidence of age discrimination).

Ransom also attempts to prove his age discrimination case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. Under this method, Ransom must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If he does, the burden is for CSC to produce evidence of a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for Ransom's termination. Ransom, who still has the burden to prove discrimination, must then present evidence of pretext--that the proffered reason was not genuine. Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1998).

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,...