Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1914,99-1914
• Citation: 217 F.3d 612
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) JODIE HENDERSON, APPELLEE, v. SIMMONS FOODS, INC., APPELLANT. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 612

217 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 2000)

JODIE HENDERSON, APPELLEE, v. SIMMONS FOODS, INC., APPELLANT.

No. 99-1914

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: December 14, 1999

Filed: June 16, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.

Before Richard S. Arnold and Hansen, Circuit Judges, and Melloy, ¹ District Judge.

Hansen, Circuit Judge.

After a trial in district court, ²a jury found that Simmons Foods, Inc. (Simmons) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 by failing to remedy a hostile work environment and constructively discharging its employee, Jodie Henderson. The jury awarded Henderson $60,000 in compensatory damages, $15,000 in lost wages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. In addition, the district court awarded Henderson $28,845 in attorneys' fees. Simmons appeals. We affirm.

I. Facts and Background

We recite the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Serv., 182 F.3d 629, 630 (8th Cir.1999). Henderson began working at Simmons's chicken processing plant in 1981. Her employment at Simmons proceeded without incident until 1994 when she met a male co-worker named Sergio Sanchez. Sanchez persistently and continuously sexually harassed Henderson. Sanchez verbally accosted Henderson with a barrage of crude sexual vulgarities, and he often physically touched her in a sexually offensive manner. Henderson reported Sanchez's conduct to her supervisors, but the sexual harassment continued until 1995 when Simmons transferred Sanchez to a different shift.

About a year and a half later, Sanchez returned to Henderson's shift. In fact, Simmons placed Sanchez on a production line located just four feet away from Henderson. Henderson voiced a complaint to her supervisor. She questioned why Simmons would place Sanchez in such close proximity to her given Sanchez's history of sexual harassment toward her. The supervisor told Henderson that Simmons had no other work area in which it could place Sanchez. Henderson's division, however, consisted of eight food craft lines. (See Appellant's App. at 13-14.) Each line contained more than 20 workers. (See id. at 14.)

A few months after Sanchez returned to Henderson's shift, Sanchez began verbally harassing Henderson, using what can only be described as the crudest of sexual vulgarities. Henderson once again reported the remarks to her supervisor and to Simmons's manager of human resources, Will Higginbotham. Higginbotham informed Henderson that she was making very serious allegations. Higginbotham warned Henderson that if the company determined that her allegations were unfounded, she might be terminated. (See Appellant's App. at 19) ("[I]f you make these allegations and they're not true, you could be subject to losing your job.") In its posttrial order, the district court found these statements to be veiled threats. (Appellant's Add. at 10.)

On April 9, 1997, Henderson visited the company nurse concerning pain in her wrist. One of Henderson's supervisors, Rick Speaks, accompanied Henderson. Henderson told the nurse about Sanchez's harassment and how Simmons had not taken any action. She also indicated that another co-worker, Manuel Garcia, had joined Sanchez in sexually harassing her. Following her visit with the nurse, Henderson met with Speaks and two other supervisors. Henderson informed the supervisors that two co-workers, Nina Hatman and Somlith Dittavong, might have overheard the harassment. The supervisors questioned Hatman and Dittavong, but they denied witnessing sexual harassment. Hatman indicated, however, that the noise level at the plant prevented her from overhearing conversations even at nearby work stations.

Higginbotham interviewed Sanchez and Garcia regarding Henderson's sexual harassment complaint. He also interviewed Dittavong. Sanchez and Garcia denied sexually harassing Henderson. Dittavong once more indicated that he did not overhear anything. Neither Sanchez, Garcia, nor Dittavong speak English as their primary language. Sanchez and Garcia are fluent in Spanish but have difficulty speaking English. Dittavong speaks Laotian and is barely able to communicate in English. Simmons's supervisors did not utilize interpreters when they interviewed Sanchez, Garcia, and Dittavong. Higginbotham did warn Sanchez and Garcia that sexual harassment constituted grounds for termination.

Following the meeting with Higginbotham, Sanchez and Garcia ceased their verbal sexual harassment of Henderson. Sanchez, however, targeted obscene hand gestures at Henderson. Henderson reported Sanchez's actions to Speaks. Simmons, however, took no further action. The company also did not transfer Henderson or Sanchez to a different location.

On July 28, 1997, Henderson contacted Higginbotham and informed him that she could no longer continue her employment at Simmons "[given] the conditions." (Appellant's App. at 24, 125.) Higginbotham asked Henderson what, if anything, he could have done to prevent Henderson from leaving her position at Simmons. Henderson replied that Higginbotham should have "separated me and [Sanchez] - what I've asked millions of times, to separate us. How hard would that have been to do?" (Id. at 25.)

After Henderson left Simmons, she applied for positions with over 30 different employers. Henderson did not have a high school diploma, and she lacked any sort of formal training outside the poultry industry. Nonetheless, she sought employment at nonpoultry-related businesses such as nursing homes, retail establishments, and restaurants, but found none.

Henderson filed a civil rights action against Simmons in which she alleged violations of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. ³ See Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 to 16-123-109 (Michie Supp. 1993). She premised her damages claim upon theories of hostile work environment sexual harassment and constructive discharge. The jury found in Henderson's favor on both claims and awarded her damages. Following the jury's award of damages, Simmons filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and a motion for remittitur. The district court denied all three motions. Henderson filed a motion for attorneys' fees, which the district court granted. Simmons appeals the district court's decision on all four motions.

II. Discussion

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Simmons argues that the district court erred when it denied its posttrial Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. Rule 50 permits a district court to grant judgment as a matter of law to a moving party following a trial if the district court finds that the nonmoving party "has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo. See Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997).

A party seeking to overturn a jury verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence faces an onerous burden. See United States v. Big D Enterprises, Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000). "Judgment as a matter of law is proper '[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached' so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party." Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946)) (alterations in original). In evaluating a Rule 50 motion, the trial court must "assume as proven all facts that the nonmoving party's evidence tended to show, give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in her favor." Id. The absence of a bright line between actionable sexual harassment and non-actionable, unpleasant conduct generally will serve to defeat a Rule 50 motion premised upon the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. at 1221; see also Rorie v. UPS, Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1998) ("While we concede that the facts of this case are on the borderline of those sufficient to support a claim of sexual harassment, we cannot say that a supervisor who pats a female employee on the back, brushes up against her, and tells her that she smells good does not constitute sexual harassment as a matter of law"). In this case, there is more than sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in regard to both the sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims.

1. Sexual Harassment

Henderson argued to the jury that she suffered sexual harassment due to exposure to a hostile work environment. Title VII forbids sexual harassment in the workplace and imposes liability upon employers who tolerate a hostile work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). A plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must show (1) membership in a protected group or class, (2) unwelcome sexual harassment (3) based upon gender (4) resulting in an effect on a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) that the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. See Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1989). In addition, the plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment created an environment that was both objectively and subjectively abusive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

Simmons argues that Sanchez's harassment lacked the frequency or severity required to constitute an objectively hostile work environment. Simmons is mistaken. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that Henderson easily...