Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan

Citation217 F.Supp.2d 384
Decision Date31 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-CV-6596L.,00-CV-6596L.
PartiesSally J. BURKE, Plaintiff, v. KODAK RETIREMENT INCOME PLAN, and Kodak Retirement Income Plan Committee, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

George A. Schell, Jr., Schell & Schell, Fairport, NY, for Plaintiff.

Eric J. Ward, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, Chief Judge.

Introduction

In this action, plaintiff Sally J. Burke (hereinafter "plaintiff") claims that the Kodak Retirement Income Plan (hereinafter "KRIP") and the Kodak Retirement Income Plan Committee (hereinafter "KRIPCO") (collectively "defendants") wrongfully denied her application for pre-retirement survivor income benefits (hereinafter "SIB"), which she claimed when her husband died in November, 1999.

Both plaintiff and defendants now move, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion is denied, defendants' cross-motion is granted, and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Factual Background

At the time of his death, plaintiff's husband, Kenneth Burke (hereinafter "Burke"), had been employed by Eastman Kodak ("Kodak") for twenty-seven years. Deposition of Sally J. Burke, May 23, 2001, pp. 64 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Deposition"). In 1991, Burke and plaintiff began living together, and thereafter maintained joint bank accounts and made joint purchases. Affidavit of Sally J. Burke, sworn to on 21st of February, 2002, ¶ 5-11 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Affidavit"). They also shared expenses and were responsible for the support and maintenance of their children from prior marriages. Id.

Burke was diagnosed with lung cancer in March, 1999. Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 46. Following his diagnosis, he began receiving short-term disability benefits from Kodak, but did not retire. Burke and plaintiff were married on May 17, 1999. Id. at pp. 44. Burke died of cancer on November 9, 1999. Id. at pp. 50.

Shortly after Burke's death, Diane Fagan, Kodak's Benefits Administrator, sent a letter to plaintiff detailing the benefits that she might be eligible to receive. Dkt. # 18, Exhibit B. In the letter, Fagan instructed plaintiff that SIB would begin after plaintiff provided Kodak with a "Dependent Verification Form," a copy of her marriage certificate, a copy of her birth certificate and a copy of Burke's death certificate. Id. The letter stated "You are eligible to receive [SIB] ... as long as you have been married to Kenneth for at least one year." Id. Upon discovering that plaintiff had been married to Burke for less than one year, on November 23, 1999, Fagan sent a second letter to plaintiff indicating that she was not eligible for SIB. Ms. Fagan did advise, however, that survivor benefits would be payable to Burke's dependent children. Dkt. # 18, Exhibit E Included with this letter was a copy of a booklet entitled, You & Kodak.1

According to the booklet, which was, as discussed infra, the SPD, an appeal from a denial of benefits, must be filed within ninety (90) days of the denial.

If you remain dissatisfied and wish to appeal, you should, within 90 days of the date the claim was denied (or within 90 days of the date the claim is assumed to be denied), write a letter to the plan administrator asking for a review.

You & Kodak, pp. 334.

Plaintiff's attorney appealed the denial of SIB in a letter dated July 20, 2000. Dkt. # 18, Exhibit G. In the letter, he acknowledged the tardiness of the appeal, citing that the "emotional state of Ms. Burke upon the death of her husband" delayed her application for appeal. Id. He also claimed, for the first time, that plaintiff qualified for SIB as a "domestic partner." Id.

Plan Administrator Pamela Cromp reviewed plaintiff's appeal. Cromp's Deposition, pp. 6. She denied plaintiff's appeal on August 7, 2000, citing both the untimeliness of plaintiff's appeal, and the fact that plaintiff did not meet the eligibility requirements to receive SIB as either a spouse or a domestic partner. Dkt. # 18, Exhibit G.

Discussion

On a motion for summary judgment, a court's responsibility is to determine whether there are issues to be tried. See Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 171 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.1999); see also Larsen v. NMU Pension Trust, 902 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir.1990). Summary judgment will be granted if the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Larsen, 902 F.2d at 1073. A genuine issue of material fact exists only if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the non-movant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Standard of Review

Plaintiff's suit for benefits was commenced pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). This section permits a plan participant or beneficiary to sue to recover benefits due under the terms of the applicable plan.

In this case, the administrator of the applicable plan denied plaintiff's claim for benefits and, therefore, the issue before the district court is whether that denial was proper under ERISA. The parties do not dispute that under the terms of the plan at issue here, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies. See Kinstler v. First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243 (2d. Cir.1999) (holding that where a benefit plan reserves to the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, denials of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) are subject to the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard); see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989).

"The arbitrary and capricious standard of review is highly deferential to a plan administrator. The question before a reviewing court under this standard is whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." See Jordan v. Retirement Committee of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 46 F.3d 1264, 1271 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). Under this standard, a Plan Administrator's decision to deny benefits "may be overturned only if the decision is `without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.'" See Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 249 (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1995)). A district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Plan Administrator, and a court's review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record. See Wojciechowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 F.Supp.2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y.1999).

Eligibility for Survivor Income Benefits

Under the plan at issue, there are several categories of survivors who are entitled to receive SIB benefits. Two of those— surviving spouse or surviving domestic partner—are at issue here. There are certain conditions, though, that must be met in order to establish entitlement to the SIB benefit. Unfortunately for plaintiff, she failed to meet the requirements to receive benefits as a surviving spouse or as a domestic partner.

In 1997, Kodak distributed an employee handbook entitled You & Kodak Employee Handbook (hereinafter "You & Kodak") to all its employees as the summary plan document (hereinafter "SPD") for all benefit plans offered by Kodak, including KRIP. Deposition of Pamela Cromp, October 10, 2001, pp. 23 (hereinafter "Cromp's Deposition"). At all times relevant to this suit, this SPD was in effect. Cromp's Deposition, pp. 16.

One of the benefits offered to KRIP participants was SIB, which provided a percentage of an employee's retirement income benefit to "an eligible spouse, domestic partner, dependent child or dependent parent" at the time of the employee's death. You & Kodak, pp. 271-272. Kodak extended SIB eligibility to domestic partners effective January 1, 1997, citing Kodak's equal employment opportunity policy which "promotes equal treatment of employees regardless of marital status or sexual orientation." You & Kodak News, Dkt. # 18, Exhibit I, pp. 4.

Under KRIP, a spouse becomes eligible for SIB after being married to a plan participant for one year or more prior to that participant's death. You & Kodak, pp. 272. Those regarded as eligible domestic partners under KRIP are two people of the same or opposite sex in a spouse-like relationship who have met all of the following requirements for at least one year prior to collecting benefits. The requirements are that the parties:

(1) intend to remain each other's domestic partner indefinitely;

(2) reside together in the same permanent residence;

(3) are emotionally committed to one another and are jointly responsible for the common welfare and financial obligations of the household, or the domestic partner is chiefly dependent upon the employee for care and financial assistance (4) are not legally married to anyone else and are not the domestic partner of anyone else;

(5) are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage under applicable law; and

(6) are both at least 18 years of age and mentally competent to enter into a legal contract.

You and Kodak, pp. 200 et seq. Additionally, KRIP requires that an affidavit of domestic partnership be signed by both the plan participant and his/her domestic partner and that affidavit must be filed with Kodak. Id.; Dkt. # 18, Exhibit L, pp. 19.

In addition to the revised SPD issued in 1997, the decision to extended SIB to domestic partners was publicized in two separate...

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1 cases
  • Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 17 Julio 2003
    ...if the SPD was deficient, Mrs. Burke failed to demonstrate that she relied to her detriment on the SPD. See Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 217 F.Supp.2d 384, 389-91 (W.D.N.Y.2002). Mrs. Burke now Preliminarily, the Plan Administrators argue that: (1) Mrs. Burke's claims were barred by her......

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