People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 16 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39922,39922
• Citation: 217 N.E.2d 803,34 Ill.2d 623
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Marvin GENDRON et al., Petitioners, v. Henry J. INGRAM, Judge, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 803

217 N.E.2d 803

34 Ill.2d 623

The PEOPLE ex rel. Marvin GENDRON et al., Petitioners, v. Henry J. INGRAM, Judge, et al., Respondents.

No. 39922.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1966.

Julius Lucius Echeles and Mitchell H. Caplan, Chicago, and Robert H. Jones, Peoria, for petitioner.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield (K. T. Hubler, State's Atty., and Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

HOUSE, Justice.

The primary issue in this original Habeas corpus action is whether the effect of section 110-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 110-8) which requires a person making bail for another to deposit cash or stock and bonds equal in value to the amount of the bail or unencumbered real estate in value to twice the amount of the bail, violates section 7 of article II of the constitution, S.H.A. That section provides: 'All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; * * *.'

Sections 110-7 and 110-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are, by a 1965 amendment to section 110-15, stated to be exclusive of other provisions of law for the giving, taking and enforcement of bail. No issue is raised as to the Rule of this court relating to procedures in traffic cases, quasi-criminal cases, and certain misdemeanors. Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, pp. 1571-1573.

Section 110-7 provides in part: 'The person for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail bond and deposit with the clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money equal to 10% Of the bail, * * *. Upon depositing this sum the person shall be released from custody subject to the conditions of the bail bond.' This provision is commonly referred to as the ten per cent bail-deposit provision. The section further provides: 'When the conditions of the bail bond have been performed and the accused has been discharged from all obligations in the cause the clerk of the court shall return to the accused 90% Of the sum which had been deposited and shall retain as bail bond costs 10% Of the amount deposited.'

Section 110-8 provides that a bail bond with or without sureties may be used in lieu of the ten per cent cash deposit provided for in section 110-7. However, the bail bond must be secured by a deposit of cash or stocks and bonds equal in value to the amount of the bail or unencumbered real estate equal in value to twice the amount of bail.

The petitioner, Marvin Gendron, was indicted in the circuit court of Peoria County in January 1966 for the crime of burglary and his bail was fixed at $5,000. Gendron does not have $500 (10% Of the amount of bail) to deposit as security as required by section 110-7 nor does he have any stocks and bonds or real estate to deposit as security under section 110-8. A bail bond in the amount of $5,000 with the Summit Fidelity and Surety Company as surety, was tendered to the court. No cash, stocks and bonds ore real estate were deposited with the clerk of court as security for the bond as required by section 110-8 and the bond was refused for that reason. An original petition for a writ of Habeas corpus was then filed in this court.

The surety company is licensed under the Bail Bond Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 16, pars. 51-65.) It has on deposit with the Director of Insurance securities in the amount of $15,000 and has capital stock and surplus in excess of $1,000,000. It is argued that the surety company is a sufficient surety within the meaning of section 7 of article II of our constitution, and that it need not deposit security for the full amount of the bail.

We do not decide questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the practical effect of the statute and the constitution. In considering the constitutionality of the statutes regarding bail, it is important that we consider the principle underlying the granting of bail; that is, that a person accused of a crime is...