Robinson v. Solano County

• Decision Date: 15 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-15225,99-15225
• Citation: 218 F.3d 1030
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2000) JAMES F. ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOLANO COUNTY; BRIAN CAUWELLS, Solano County Sheriff's Deputy Officer; GARY FAULKNER, Solano County Sheriff's Deputy Officer, Defendants-Appellees. Office of the Circuit Executive
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1030

218 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000)

JAMES F. ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOLANO COUNTY; BRIAN CAUWELLS, Solano County Sheriff's Deputy Officer; GARY FAULKNER, Solano County Sheriff's Deputy Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-15225

Office of the Circuit Executive

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2000--San Francisco, California

Filed July 12, 2000

Amended September 19, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] William M. Simpich, Oakland, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Terrence J. Cassidy, Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Sacramento, California, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Peter A. Nowinski, Magistrate Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CV 96-01362-PAN

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, William C. Canby, Jr. and Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge FLETCHER; Dissent by Judge O'SCANNLAIN.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

James F. Robinson brought suit against Solano County and Officers Brian Cauwells and Gary Faulkner alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and the use of excessive force in arresting him. Robinson appeals from the district court's pretrial grant of summary judgment for the defendants-appellees on the state law claims and the magistrate judge's post-trial grant of judgment as a matter of law on the federal excessive force claim. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff-Appellant James F. Robinson, an African American, is a retired San Francisco police officer. When the events at issue in this case took place, he was 64 years old.

Robinson lives in a farmhouse set on a five acre parcel in the semi-rural area of Fairfield, California, where he raises livestock including cattle, ducks, turkeys, geese, and chickens. He has fenced his property and keeps a shotgun to protect his livestock. One morning he saw two dogs attacking and killing his livestock. He took out his shotgun and shot both dogs, killing one and wounding the other. Robinson then went looking for the wounded dog. His search took him to the public road fronting his property, and he walked approximately 50 feet along the road carrying the shotgun.

While Robinson was on the road looking for the dog, his neighbor Sarah Reyes, the owner of the dogs, came out of her house. According to Robinson, he was standing approximately 160 feet from Ms. Reyes when she yelled to him about the dogs. She was angry that he had shot her dogs, and he tried to explain that he did not know the dogs were hers. The two had a heated conversation, after which Robinson returned home.

Ms. Reyes went back into her house and phoned the police. The police sent out a radio dispatch regarding a man carrying a shotgun who had just shot two dogs and "is in the middle of the street yelling at this time." The appellee officers, as well as a number of other police officers, responded to the calland parked on the public road in front of Robinson's property.

Robinson, who was apparently at that moment discussing with his wife the need to call the authorities, saw six police vehicles pull up outside his home. He decided to go explain the incident to them. Wearing an unbuttoned shirt and a pair of jeans, Robinson walked the 135 feet from his front door to the street. He asserts that the officers were able to see him approach, and that they observed that his demeanor was calm. He also states that the officers kept their guns holstered as he approached. Officers Cauwells and Faulkner, however, contend that Robinson appeared agitated, and that they unholstered their guns upon first seeing him.

As Robinson neared the street, Officer Cauwells, who had been with the police force approximately nine months at that time, walked forward to meet him. Robinson said,"My name is Robinson and I'm the man that was involved with the dogs." At that point, officer Cauwells pointed his gun at Robinson's head from a distance of about six feet. Officer Faulkner also took out his gun and pointed it at Robinson. Cauwells told Robinson to put his hands over his head. As Robinson was putting his hands up, he asked the officers "What's going on?" Without answering the question, Cauwells repeated his command and stepped forward, and according to Robinson, thrust his gun three or four feet from Robinson's head. As a former police officer, Robinson was aware of the immediate physical danger posed by a gun pointed at his head from point blank range; he testified that he feared for his life.

Two police officers not named in this suit handcuffed Robinson and shoved him into the back seat of their patrol car.¹ Robinson was confined in the police car while the officers talked to Ms. Reyes and other neighbors. The interval was approximately 15-30 minutes. Both sides agree that Robinson attempted to explain the situation to the officers, but that they refused to listen to him. The officers released Robinson after they ascertained that Robinson had not violated the law.

Robinson asserts that at no time -from the original detention to release -did the officers search him for any weapons, and he was carrying none. The officers, on the other hand, testified that they searched Robinson. However, the parties agree that the officers failed to notice that Robinson was wearing a utility knife attached to his belt, and they never removed the knife from his person. The parties also agree that none of the officers ever asked Robinson for a statement of his version of the events.

Robinson was never charged with any crime for the events that happened that day. He filed a complaint in federal courtalleging both state and federal claims against the individual officers and Solano County. Chief District Judge Karlton granted partial summary judgment with respect to all claims against Solano County and all state law claims against the individual defendants. However, the district court declined to grant summary judgment on the S 1983 claims against the police officers. The parties then stipulated to jury trial on the federal claims before Magistrate Judge Nowinski.

The jury found that the length of Robinson's detention was reasonable, but divided four to four on the question of whether the force employed to seize Robinson was reasonable. After the jury had deadlocked and was dismissed, Magistrate Judge Nowinski granted the appellees' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the federal excessive force claim, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Robinson appeals the grant of summary judgment on the state law claims and the grant of judgment as a matter of law on the federal excessive force claim.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review a district court's post trial grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Marcy v. Delta Airlines, 166 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1999). We also review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 375 (1999).

III. Qualified Immunity

Magistrate Judge Nowinski found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from Robinson's excessive force claim because they "have no dependable guidance upon the constitutional limitations, if any, upon a mere threat or display of force to effect a seizure."

Qualified immunity " `shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To evaluate a qualified immunity claim, we follow a two-step analysis: 1) we ask whether the law governing the official's conduct was clearly established; 2) if so, we ask whether, under that law, a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful. See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1997) and Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993)).

A. Clearly Established Law

In order for a right to be " `clearly established' " its "contours must be sufficiently clear that [at the time of the alleged conduct] a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

The contours of the right at issue in this case were sufficiently clear at the time of the alleged conduct, December 7, 1995. Robinson had a right to be free from excessive force.

The law is clear in this circuit that holding a gun to a suspect's head may constitute excessive force.² See McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff had a claim for excessive force where officers handcuffed suspects, threw them to the floor and pressed service revolvers against their heads); see also McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding gun to head of 9-year old child and threatening to pull the trigger may be excessive force); Petta, supra; Stevens, supra.³

It is true that the facts in McKenzie are different. There, in addition to pointing their guns at the appellants, the police forced them against a wall, handcuffed them, and threw them down. Here, Robinson does not claim that he was thrown down, but he does assert that the officers' actions demonstrate that they knew that he posed no risk of harm prior to their use of force. These different circumstances do not change our analysis of whether McKenzie put officers on notice that putting a gun to a suspects head in point blank range can constitute excessive force. "If new weapons or tactics are sufficiently similar in design, purpose, effect, or otherwise to weapons or procedures...