U.S. v. Fuchs, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE

Decision Date06 July 2000
Docket Number98-10174,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT,V,98-10214,Nos. 98-10173,CROSS-APPELLAN,PLAINTIFF-APPELLE,CROSS-APPELLEES,s. 98-10173
Citation218 F.3d 957
Parties(9th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,FRED FUCHS AND ROY D. REAGAN,
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 957

218 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2000)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT,
V.
FRED FUCHS AND ROY D. REAGAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, CROSS-APPELLEES.
Nos. 98-10173, 98-10174, 98-10214
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Argued June 14, 1999
Submitted July 2, 1999
Submission Vacated December 22, 1999
Resubmitted June 26, 2000
July 6, 2000

Page 958

Copyrighted Material Omitted

Page 959

Richard A. Friedman, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.

Gerald Cunningham and Richard D. Biggs, Atlanta, Georgia, for the defendants-appellants/cross-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona William D. Browning, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CR-96-00427-WDB

Before: Thomas G. Nelson, Michael Daly Hawkins and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge T.G. Nelson; Dissent by Judge Graber

Page 960

T.G. Nelson, Circuit Judge

Fred Albano Fuchs and Roy Reagan appeal their convictions and sentences for conspiring to commit offenses against the laws of the United States. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and reverse.

I.

The United States Forest Service has traditionally relied on contracting with private parties to provide airtanker services for fighting forest fires. In the 1980s, the airtanker fleet consisted of C-119 twin engine, propeller-driven aircraft obtained from the military. After several crashes of C-119s due to structural defects, the C-119 fleet was grounded in 1987. Because the available airtanker fleet was substantially diminished, the Forest Service needed to obtain additional aircraft for use in firefighting operations.

In December 1987, Lawrence Amicarella, Director of Fire and Aviation Management for the Forest Service, directed defendant Fred Albano Fuchs, Deputy Director of Fire and Aviation, to send a letter to the Department of Defense ("DOD"), requesting that it cooperate with civilian contractors in obtaining military aircraft that could be converted to airtankers. Defendant Roy Reagan was a private aircraft broker representing Hemet Valley Flying Service ("Hemet Valley "), which was one of the companies that contracted with the Forest Service to provide airtankers. At a meeting on December 23, 1987, attended by both Fuchs and Reagan, the Air Force was presented with the idea of transferring Air Force C-130As to the Air Force Museum and then exchanging the C-130As with Hemet Valley's grounded C-119s. However, at a subsequent meeting with representatives of the Air Force Museum, Air Force officials reacted negatively to the idea of conducting such an exchange.

Fuchs and Reagan later met with Mr. Duda of the General Services Administration ("GSA") who introduced them to his assistant, Mr. Albee. Apparently, Albee suggested that exchanges be conducted without going through the Air Force Museum and instead have the Forest Service become directly involved. The Air Force would declare that the aircraft were excess property and transfer the aircraft to GSA, thereby making the aircraft available to other government agencies. Apparently, Albee stated that the government agencies that received excess aircraft were required to retain ownership of the aircraft.

Fuchs was given responsibility for coordinating the Forest Service's exchange program. He did some research into the regulations and also obtained copies of exchange agreements that Reagan had used in previous transfers involving the military. Fuchs did not discuss the exchange program with the Forest Service Office of General Counsel. Each exchange agreement was prepared by Fuchs, who presented them to Amicarella who signed for the Forest Service. Fuchs signed as a witness.

Although the exchange agreements contained language stating that the exchange was made under authority of 41 C.F.R. S 101-46.203, the exchanges were not authorized by that regulation because the items being exchanged were not "historical items" as defined by 41 C.F.R.S 101-46.001-4, and the C-130As and P-3s that were part of the program were obtained by the Forest Service solely for the purpose of exchange, a violation of 41 C.F.R. S 101-46.202(b)(6).

The exchange agreements did not contain a bill of sale. Instead, Fuchs provided separate bills of sale to the contractors who were acquiring the C-130s and P-3s, thereby transferring title from the Government to the contractors in violation of the regulations. At trial, Fuchs admitted that he told his superiors that the transfer of ownership of the aircraft to the airtanker contractors had been approved by GSA

Page 961

when, in fact, GSA had not approved such transfers. Neither the Air Force personnel nor the GSA personnel involved with the exchange program were aware that ownership of the aircraft was being transferred to the contractors. Rather, they assumed that the Forest Service was retaining ownership of the aircraft.

Reagan received commissions from those contractors whom he assisted in acquiring updated aircraft. The commissions came in the form of title to four C-130s, which Reagan subsequently sold. Fuchs received flight time in the C-130s and P-3s, which he testified would cost from $2,000 to $3,000 an hour in the civilian world, but indicated that he believed the flight time was conducted for business purposes as part of his position with the Fire and Aviation Division of the Forest Service.

The exchange program was terminated in January 1990 after the Assistant General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") reviewed the program and concluded that the Forest Service did not have authority to conduct the exchange program. More than six years later, on June 25, 1996, a grand jury indicted Fuchs and Reagan, charging the two men with one count of conspiring to commit offenses against the laws of the United States, a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, and one count of converting United States property to the use of another, a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 641.

Prior to trial, the defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations. The district court denied that motion and stated, "[t]he Court will closely monitor the relevant conduct and will deal with this motion if it has merit at the time of a Rule 29 Motion." At trial, however, the defendants did not request a statute of limitations jury instruction, and none was given.

After five weeks of trial and fifty hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both defendants on the conspiracy count and not guilty as to the conversion count. Fuchs was sentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Reagan was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

II.

The indictment was returned on June 25, 1996. The five-year general statute of limitations for non-capital offenses, see 18 U.S.C. S 3282, which applies to the conspiracy count, was tolled for 143 days from January 2, 1996, to May 24, 1996, while the Government sought information from the government of France. Therefore, the Government was required to show that the conspiracy continued until at least February 3, 1991, in order for the indictment to fall within the statute of limitations.

Reagan contends that Supreme Court precedent requires us to set aside the jury's general verdict because only some of the overt acts alleged in the indictment could have occurred within the applicable statute of limitations, see Appendix to the Opinion, and the jury could have convicted on a legally inadequate ground. We agree.

First, we note that this defect in the indictment could have been cured simply by instructing the jury that it had to find that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred within the statute of limitations. Here, however, there was no such instruction. Although defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired, neither defendant proposed a jury instruction regarding the statute of limitations, nor objected to the absence of such an instruction. The defendants therefore failed to object properly to the district court's jury instructions.

"Where a defendant fails properly to object to a jury instruction or to an omission from a jury instruction, we review for plain error." United States v.

Page 962

Klinger, 128 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997). A trial court commits plain error when (1) there is error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error affects substantial rights. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). We may exercise our discretion to notice such error, but only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id.

The Supreme Court has held that when a general verdict may be based on a legally inadequate ground, such as because of a statutory time bar, the verdict should be set aside. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)1. This is because:

Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law --whether, for example, the action in question... is time barred.... When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error.

Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991). Since the trial court did not instruct the jury it must find that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy had occurred after February 3, 1991, the jury could have based its general verdict on acts alleged in the indictment that occurred outside the limitations period. Therefore, the district court erred when it failed to provide a statute of limitations instruction to the jury.

Second, the error was plain. Error is plain when it...

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