City of St. Paul v. Myles

Citation298 Minn. 298,218 N.W.2d 697
Decision Date15 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 43459,43459
PartiesCITY OF ST. PAUL, Respondent, v. Leo MYLES, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Syllabus by the Court

Under facts and circumstances in this case, a standard police procedure of inventorying contents of an impounded vehicle for the purpose of safeguarding personal possessions and aiding in preventing false claims which results in discovery of automatic pistol is not an illegal search and seizure rendering that weapon inadmissible as evidence in trial for illegal transportation of a firearm.

O'Neill, Burke & O'Neill and Patrick H. O'Neill, St. Paul, for appellant.

Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick, City Atty., Stephen C. Rathke, Keith Hanzel, Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for respondent.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Minneapolis, Mark W. Peterson, Asst. Public Defender, St. Paul, amicus curiae.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and KELLY, TODD, and OLSON, JJ., and reconsidered and decided by the court en banc.

KELLY, Justice.

Defendant appeals from conviction in St. Paul Municipal Court of operating a vehicle with a noisy muffler, simple assault, and illegal transportation of a firearm. The principal issue on this appeal is whether evidence discovered in a police 'inventory' of the contents of an automobile prior to impounding the car is the product of an unreasonable search and seizure and therefore inadmissible.

On June 1, 1971, at approximately 1:35 a.m., St. Paul police officers Ballis and Robilliard observed an automobile having a noisy exhaust system. After following the car for a few blocks and noticing a passenger in the rear seat who resembled a person wanted in both St. Paul and Minneapolis, the officers stopped the car. Defendant got out of his car and proceeded toward the squad car and put himself in a position to be frisked. He was advised by Officer Robilliard that this was unnecessary because he was stopped only for having a noisy muffler.

Meanwhile, Officer Ballis was looking into defendant's car to determine whether the passenger in the rear seat was the person sought by the authorities. When defendant saw this, he strenuously insisted that the officers had no right to look into his car when he was stopped only for a traffic offense and began shouting obscenities at the officers. The passenger in the rear seat emerged from the car and became similarly abusive toward the officers. During the ensuing discussion, defendant ran toward Officer Ballis, grabbed his arm and swung at him. The swing, which was blocked by one of the officers who had arrived in an assisting squad car, was also observed by Officer Robilliard. Defendant and his two passengers were arrested and placed in the squad cars. Defendant and witnesses testifying for him said that he had not attempted to strike the officer but had merely raised his hands to protect himself.

After the arrests, Officer Ballis inventoried the contents of the automobile, which belonged to defendant's sister who was not present at the scene of the arrest, and gathered the information the city deemed necessary before towing away and impounding any car. The inventory was done according to a standard police procedure before having the car towed away and impounded. The sole purpose of the inventory was to make a record of the car's contents at the time of impoundment. In the course of this inventory, an automatic pistol was found in the glove compartment. Defendant was subsequently convicted of illegal transportation of this pistol.

Defendant questions the constitutional propriety of the warrantless search and seizure of the pistol discovered in the glove compartment. In the instant case it was appropriate that the police impound the car and have it towed off the street. The owner of the car was not present, and the driver and passengers were under arrest. It was 1:35 a.m. Under all of the circumstances, it was a reasonable measure to protect the car and its contents. While it might be argued that a policeman could be posted to guard the vehicle, the cost would be quite staggering if such a policy were carried out in every instance. In any event, we cannot say that the standard procedure was unreasonable. It also might be argued that the police could lock up the car and thus to some extent protect its contents. This procedure would not necessarily protect the police or the city from claims. 1 Furthermore, the city should be permitted to take reasonable measures to protect its public image and that of the police, even if no liability were to ensue. 2

Not all warrantless searches are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, but only those which are unreasonable. We hold that a standard police procedure of inventorying the contents of an impounded vehicle is reasonable and therefore not constitutionally improper if performed without a warrant. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the search was not a probing, exploratory search conducted solely for the purpose of discovering evidence of other crimes. On the contrary, this standard police procedure is conducted to protect the property of the owner of the vehicle from loss or theft during the period of impoundment. Such safeguards taken with the objective of guarding the owner's possessions in his absence are commendable. The procedure also should be a great help in preventing false claims of loss from being successfully pursued in situations similar to those present in this case.

The defendant places great reliance on Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), as holding the search of a defendant's car while he is in custody invalid. In Preston, the defendant was arrested for the minor offense of vagrancy. His automobile was driven to a police station and ultimately towed to a garage where it was searched after the defendant was booked. The respondent attempted to justify the search as incidental to a lawful arrest but the Supreme Court did not accept that argument. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 444, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2529, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 717 (1973), the Supreme Court limited Preston to that narrow issue in these words:

'* * * It would be possible to interpret Preston broadly, and to argue that it stands for the proposition that on those facts there could have been no constitutional justification advanced for the search. But we take the opinion as written, and hold that it stands only for the proposition that the search challenged there could not be justified as one incident to an arrest. See, Chambers v. Maroney, Supra; Cooper v. California, Supra. We believe that the instant case is controlled by principles that may be extrapolated from Harris v. United States, Supra, and Cooper v. California, Supra.'

No claim is made in this case that the search was constitutionally valid because it was incidental to an arrest. Thus, Preston, as narrowed and limited by Dombrowski, is not persuasive.

Dombrowski points out that the ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is reasonableness and that there is general agreement that 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.' That case also points out: 'One of the class of cases which constitutes at least a partial exception to this general rule is automobile searches. Although vehicles are 'effects' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, * * * there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.' 413 U.S. 439, 93 S.Ct. 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 713.

This case, then, presents one of the classes of cases referred to in Dombrowski--stripped of any issue as to the search being incident to an arrest. The only issue then is whether the search was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case.

The Dombrowski case, while not factually identical to this instant case, has many similar aspects. The defendant Dombrowski, following a one-car accident, was arrested for drunken driving. The police had the car towed to a garage 7 miles from the police station where it was left unguarded. The next day an officer, looking for a revolver which the defendant was thought to possess, made a warrantless search of the car and found in the trunk several items, some bloodied, which he seized. The Supreme Court held that the search was not unreasonable since the police had exercised a form of custody of the car, which constituted a hazard on the highway, the disposition of which by defendant was precluded by his intoxication and later comatose condition, and the revolver search was standard police procedure to protect the public from a weapon's falling into improper hands. The police in both Dombrowski and the instant case took custody of the car, and in neither case was the owner in a position to exercise control over the car. In both cases, the search was the end product of a standard operating procedure.

While the protection of the contents of the car, and of the city against claims, might in the abstract have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means, we cannot say the standard procedure used was unreasonable. The vehicle here, as in Dombrowski, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals if left on the street. If the city impounded the car, it could be subjected to claims that personal property in the vehicle was stolen while in the city's custody.

In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that police conduct which protected an impounded...

To continue reading

Request your trial
43 cases
  • South Dakota v. Opperman
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 6 d2 Julho d2 1976
    ...an inventory is characterized as a "search," 6 the intrusion is constitutionally permissible. See, E. g., City of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 300-301, 218 N.W.2d 697, 699 (1974); State v. Tully, 166 Conn. 126, 136, 348 A.2d 603, 609 (1974); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 292-297, 51......
  • State v. Briggs
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Nebraska
    • 25 d2 Fevereiro d2 2020
    ...an inventory is characterized as a "search," the intrusion is constitutionally permissible. See, e. g., City of St. Paul v. Myles , 298 Minn. 298, 300-301, 218 N. W. 2d 697, 699 (1974) ; State v. Tully, 166 Conn. 126, 136, 348 A. 2d 603, 609 (1974) ; People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 296-297......
  • State v. Ingram
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 29 d5 Junho d5 2018
    ...under the Fourth Amendment to protect the car and its contents after it was impounded by the police. City of St. Paul v. Myles , 298 Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697, 699, 701 (1974) ; see also State v. Tully , 166 Conn. 126, 348 A.2d 603, 609–10 (1974) (holding warrantless search of motor vehicle......
  • Robinson v. State, 53257
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • 10 d3 Fevereiro d3 1982
    ...... was escalated by the fact that the cars were towed to private lots due to the fact that the city did not have a garage or lot to house impounded cars. .         The inventory of property ... See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 300-301, 218 N.W.2d 697, 699 (1974); State v. Tully, 166 Conn. 126, 136, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT