Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Ivers

• Decision Date: 21 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 20080287.,20080287.
• Citation: 218 P.3d 583,2009 UT 56
• Parties: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James IVERS, Katherine G. Havas, P and F Food Services (Tenant), and Zions Credit Corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

218 P.3d 583

2009 UT 56

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James IVERS, Katherine G. Havas, P and F Food Services (Tenant), and Zions Credit Corporation, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20080287.

Supreme Court of Utah.

August 21, 2009.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Randy S. Hunter, Asst. Atty's Gen., for plaintiff.

Donald J. Winder, John W. Holt, Lance F. Sorensen, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 We review for a second time the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) taking of property owned by the Appellants, James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, and P & F Food Services (collectively, Arby's). In Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, we addressed whether damages were awardable for Arby's loss of view where the view-impairing structure was not built on the condemned property but was part of the project for which the property was condemned. We held that if the condemned property was essential to the project, Arby's would be entitled to severance damages. We remanded to the district court to determine the factual question of whether Arby's condemned property was essential to the project and, if so, directed the district court to award Arby's appropriate damages. On remand, the district court allowed UDOT to amend its complaint pursuant to statute to exclude Arby's right of view. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In addressing this case once more, we do not repeat the entire factual background contained in Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007 UT 19, ¶¶ 2-6, 154 P.3d 802 (Ivers I). Instead, we recount only those facts relevant to this appeal.

¶ 3 In 2002, UDOT filed a complaint to condemn a 0.048-acre portion of private property belonging to Arby's. The condemnation helped eliminate the intersection of Shepard Lane and Highway 89 in Farmington, Utah, in order to elevate the highway and build a one-way frontage road. Although Arby's condemned property was used for a portion of the frontage road, none of the elevated highway was constructed upon it.

¶ 4 UDOT paid Arby's $48,250 for the condemned property, and the district court entered the Final Order of Condemnation on March 7, 2005. Arby's, however, also sought severance damages on the grounds that the loss of visibility of the restaurant from the highway and the loss of view from Arby's property diminished the market value of its remaining land. UDOT filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the loss of visibility and view. The district court granted the motion. The parties entered into a Stipulation for Judgment that "no triable issues remain in this matter," the district court entered judgment, and Arby's appealed the court's grant of the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. Arby's petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

¶ 5 In Ivers I, we addressed two questions: (1) "whether a landowner has a protectable property interest in the visibility of his land" and (2) whether severance damages are awardable for the loss of view where "land was condemned as part of a single project to build a structure that would impair the view from the remaining property, but in which that structure was not built on the severed land." Id. ¶¶ 11, 17. We answered the first question in the negative and affirmed the court of appeals on that point. Id. ¶ 15. On the second issue, however, we reversed, finding that a right of view is a protectable property interest and adopting the rule that "if the use of the condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages." Id. ¶¶ 16, 21. Because of the remaining factual question of whether "Arby's land was, or was not, essential to the project," we remanded to the district court for that factual determination and instructed the district court that if Arby's condemned land was essential to the project, the court should award Arby's appropriate damages. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.

¶ 6 On remand, UDOT admitted that Arby's condemned land was essential to the project. Nonetheless, the district court failed to determine the amount of appropriate damages and award such damages to Arby's pursuant to our remand order. Instead, before any hearing on the amount of damages, UDOT filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony that Defendant Owns a Right of View, arguing, for the first time, that Arby's had no right of view entitling it to recover severance damages because Arby's predecessors in interest executed deeds in 1961 and 1992 that relinquished any and all appurtenant rights, including the right of view, to UDOT. The district court denied the motion in limine as an untimely motion to amend the complaint.

¶ 7 Undaunted, UDOT filed a Request to Alter or Amend Order pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-512(2).¹ UDOT argued, for the first time, that the statute granted it the right to amend its taking at any time during the course of the proceedings. The district court agreed and concluded that it no longer had jurisdiction because UDOT no longer claimed to take Arby's right of view. Thus the district court never awarded Arby's the appropriate damages. Arby's appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 The mandate of an appellate court binds the district court and the parties and affords the district court no discretion whether to comply with that mandate. IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588. Consequently, because the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing whether a district court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. See Amax Magnesium Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994); Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct.App.1995).

¶ 9 The interpretation of a statute also presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2007 UT 19, ¶ 7, 154 P.3d 802. In reviewing for correctness, we afford no deference to the legal conclusions of the district court. Id.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 This appeal presents three issues for our consideration: (1) whether the district court violated our mandate in Ivers I to determine whether Arby's condemned land was essential to the project and if so, award appropriate damages; (2) whether the district court misinterpreted Utah Code section 78B-6-512(2) to allow UDOT to amend its complaint at any time in order to exclude a property right from the original scope of its taking; and (3) whether UDOT's strategy of shifting theories warrants a change in the date of valuation. We hold that the district court violated the mandate in Ivers I by exceeding the scope of remand and that it misinterpreted the statute to allow for amendment following entry of the Final Order of Condemnation and remand. We do not reach the merits of the valuation question because Arby's failed to preserve the issue, and no exception applies. We address each issue in turn.

I. THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF REMAND

¶ 11 Arby's argues that the district court violated our mandate in Ivers I when it failed to award appropriate severance damages for the taking of Arby's property, which UDOT admitted was essential to its project, and instead granted UDOT's so-called motion in limine to amend its complaint pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-512(2). We agree.

¶ 12 This court has long recognized that branch of the law of the case doctrine known as the mandate rule. See Street v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948). The mandate rule "dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995). "The mandate rule ... binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court." IHC Health Servs., Inc., v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588. "[T]he lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038. Consequently, "where a judgment or decree is affirmed or reversed and remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights already settled." Street, 191 P.2d at 158. However, "where certain issues are left open by [the appellate court's] judgment or decree, the trial court ordinarily has discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as to those matters." Id.

¶ 13 The mandate rule is justified. Without it, "considerable inefficiencies would result if parties were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of this court." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 543. The rule is also "not only reasonable, but necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end." Street, 191 P.2d at 158.

¶ 14 Turning to the scope of remand in Ivers I, we conclude that the district court violated our mandate. In Ivers I, we adopted the rule that severance damages are awardable for the loss of view-even if the view — impairing structure is not built on the condemned land—if the "condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole." 2007 UT 19, ¶ 21, 154 P.3d 802. Because we could not determine from the record whether Arby's condemned land was essential to the project, we "remand[ed] to the [district] court for that [necessary] factual determination." Id. ¶ 23. If Arby's condemned land was "essential" to the project, we directed the district court to award appropriate damages. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. This was the scope of remand.

¶ 15 Following remand and pursuant to a request for admission by Arby's, UDOT admitted ...