State v. Rodrigues

• Decision Date: 25 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 20070741.,20070741.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ronald Richard RODRIGUES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

218 P.3d 610

2009 UT 62

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ronald Richard RODRIGUES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20070741.

Supreme Court of Utah.

September 25, 2009.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Ryan D. Tenney, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Joan C. Watt, Michael Misner, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals.

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Defendant appeals the district court's order amending and increasing its initial order of restitution. This appeal requires us to consider: (1) whether a district court has jurisdiction to amend an order of restitution under rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure where the State mistakenly provided the court with an incorrect figure of restitution at the sentencing hearing; and (2) assuming the court had jurisdiction, whether the amended order of restitution violates protections against double jeopardy or defendant's due process rights to presence and allocution.

¶ 2 We hold that in this case rule 30(b) applies, and the district court had jurisdiction to amend the order of restitution. We further hold that double jeopardy did not attach and that defendant's due process rights were not violated when the district court corrected a clerical error regarding the amount of restitution ordered. We therefore affirm the district court's amended order of restitution.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Ronald Richard Rodrigues was charged with two counts of criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-7-201 (2008). In the first count, the State alleged that Mr. Rodrigues failed to support the child he had with Jennifer Falsone; in the second count, the State alleged that Mr. Rodrigues failed to support the two children that he had with Michele Rodrigues.

¶ 4 In May 2005, Mr. Rodrigues agreed to plead guilty to one count of criminal nonsupport and to pay restitution "in the amount of the total amount of child support arrears owed for the support of [his] children on both counts from May 1999 through the date of sentencing." Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Rodrigues agreed that restitution would be calculated at $617 per month ($289 to Ms. Falsone and $328 to Ms. Rodrigues) plus interest. The plea agreement indicates that at the time it was signed Mr. Rodrigues owed $49,000.46, and that "[a]n updated calculation [of the total amount of child support owed would] be provided the day of Sentencing."

¶ 5 After Mr. Rodrigues signed the plea agreement, the district court scheduled a sentencing hearing for July 11, 2005, but Mr. Rodrigues failed to appear for the hearing and fled the State. The district court issued an arrest warrant, and Mr. Rodrigues was apprehended more than a year and a half later on January 17, 2007.

¶ 6 About a month before Mr. Rodrigues's sentencing, Adult Probation and Parole prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (the "PSR"). The PSR confirmed that Mr. Rodrigues was obligated to pay $289 per month to Ms. Falsone and $328 per month to Ms. Rodrigues for child support. The "Victim Impact Statement and Restitution" section in the PSR indicates that the State sought restitution "owed for both families from May 1, 1999, through the date of sentencing" and that "[a]s of February 2, 2007, that amount total[ed] $63,507.71."

¶ 7 On March 19, 2007, Mr. Rodrigues appeared for sentencing before the district court and "concur[red] with the recommendations in the [PSR]." The district court suggested what it thought was the correct amount of restitution and asked the parties if it was correct. The State responded that pursuant to the plea agreement the actual amount was higher. The court then asked for the total amount of child support owed, and the State indicated that as of "today's date" Mr. Rodrigues owed $30,680.96¹ to one of the mothers and $24,078.76 to the other. Adding those two figures the court came up with a total arrearage of $54,760.

¶ 8 Mr. Rodrigues did not object to the characterization or the amount of restitution that was presented to the district court. At the end of the hearing the district court sentenced Mr. Rodrigues to an "indeterminate term [of] zero to five years in the state penitentiary" and ordered that he "pay the sum of $54,600² in restitution." The sentencing order entered by the district court indicates, in relevant part, that the court awarded "[a] restitution judgment in favor of the State of Utah ... in the amount of $54,600.00 which represents child support arrears for the Defendant's children with Jennifer Falsone and Michele Rodrigues through March 19, 2007."

¶ 9 After the district court entered the sentencing order, the State filed a motion to amend the restitution order under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) on the basis of a clerical error in the judgment. Mr. Rodrigues was not present for the hearing to consider the State's motion. At that hearing, the State indicated it "picked up the wrong computation" at sentencing and provided the court with an incorrect figure for the total restitution owed to Ms. Rodrigues. The State argued that the error was clerical and that the district court should amend the order of restitution pursuant to rule 30(b). Through counsel, Mr. Rodrigues argued that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the restitution order and (2) amending the restitution order would violate due process. The district court granted the State's motion and increased the total amount of restitution from $54,600 to $65,403.66, reasoning that there had been a misstatement of what was actually owed and that the increased restitution conformed to the intent of the parties under the plea agreement.

¶ 10 Mr. Rodrigues appeals the district court's decision to amend and increase the total amount of restitution. This appeal was originally before the court of appeals, which then certified it to us. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 Whether the district court had jurisdiction to amend and increase its initial order of restitution requires us to interpret rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540.

¶ 12 Whether the entry of the district court's amended order of restitution violates protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause presents constitutional issues that are questions of law that we review for correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177.

ANALYSIS

I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO AMEND ITS INITIAL ORDER OF RESTITUTION

¶ 13 Whether the district court had jurisdiction to amend and increase its initial order of restitution hinges on whether the district court was correcting a clerical error pursuant to rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Once a court imposes a valid sentence and final judgment is entered, the court ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991). However, pursuant to rule 30(b), "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time" Utah R.Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added). We hold that rule 30(b) applies, and therefore the district court had jurisdiction to amend its restitution order.

¶ 14 The purpose of rule 30(b) and its civil counterpart, rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,³ is to correct clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually "done or intended." Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ¶ 30, 48 P.3d 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). In our analysis under rule 30(b), we draw a distinction between clerical errors and judicial errors; "[t]he distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered." Id. ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment." Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 1989). "To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment." State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988). Finally, "`[i]n this broad approach to correctability ..., it matters little whether an error was made by the court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge himself;'" rather the court should focus on whether the error "`is clearly a formal error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or other part of the record reflect what was done or intended.'" Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 30, 48 P.3d 218 (quoting Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)). Thus, our clerical error analysis generally focuses on (1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record.⁴

A. The Court Intended to Order Restitution in Accordance with the Plea Agreement

¶ 15 "A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court." Thomas A. Paulsen Co., 770 P.2d at 130. Indeed, "[t]he correction [of a clerical error] must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties." Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 32, 48 P.3d 218 (amending jury verdict...