Hunter v. Namanny, 99-1618

Citation219 F.3d 825
Decision Date17 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99-1618,99-1618
Parties(8th Cir. 2000) CHARMAINE HUNTER; CHARMAINE HUNTER, AS PARENT AND NEXT BEST FRIEND OF CHARLES FRANKS, APPELLEES, v. LONNIE NAMANNY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER, APPELLANT, CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA; UNNAMED OFFICERS, DEFENDANTS. Submitted:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Beam, Heaney and Hansen, Circuit Judges.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.

Lonnie Namanny appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Background

On June 20, 1996, an anonymous caller contacted the Department of Housing Services for the City of Des Moines, Iowa, complaining of drug activity at the residence of Charmaine Hunter. The caller reported "lots of traffic coming and staying for short periods at a time. This goes on every day of the week at all times of the day. Traffic really picks up at 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m." On the basis of the complaint, Namanny and another police officer were assigned to conduct surveillance of Hunter's residence. On July 1, the officers conducted surveillance of Hunter's home from 8:00 p.m. to midnight, and observed only two vehicles registered to Hunter parked outside.

Namanny and another officer conducted additional surveillance on July 2 between 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. At approximately 11:00 p.m., a vehicle pulled into Hunter's driveway, and the driver entered Hunter's residence. After "a couple minutes," the driver left Hunter's home. As the vehicle passed, Namanny observed that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. Namanny requested a check on the vehicle's license plates, and learned that the vehicle was registered to Carla F. Davis, and that Davis' driver's license was expired. Namanny requested assistance, and he and other officers stopped the car. Davis was driving the car; a search of the vehicle turned up crack cocaine. Davis was not charged with any criminal offense despite the discovery of crack.

Namanny then prepared an affidavit in support of a warrant for a search of Hunter's home. In relevant part, the affidavit stated:

[A] formal complaint concerning narcotic activity was received through Des Moines Police Vice/Narcotics Control Section on 20 JUNE 96 . . . . The complaint described heavy, short-term traffic to and from the residence. This traffic is consistent with traffic to and from a house involved in the sale of illegal drugs based on my experience and training.

Surveillance was then conducted . . . between the hours of 2100 hours to approximately 2300 hours, at which time a small silver vehicle was observed . . . . Shortly after observing the vehicle at the address, officers then observed the vehicle pull away from the address . . . .

A traffic stop was conducted . . . on the small silver vehicle. Driver of vehicle was Carla Faye Davis . . . . Davis was asked to step out of her vehicle after officers observed her digging down by the driver's door upon approaching her vehicle. During search incident to arrest on Davis, a small bag of crack cocaine was found in her purse . . . .

Davis was asked if she wanted to cooperate with our investigation by providing information regarding where the crack in her purse was obtained. Davis stated she had just purchased the crack . . . from a Charmine [sic] Hunter for $50.00. Davis stated she has bought crack from Hunter approximately three to four times at the same address . . . . Davis' description of the house from where she bought the crack cocaine matches [Hunter's] house.

Based on my training and experience, the information provided is consistent with drug dealing and individuals who deal on this level are known to keep other tools of their trade at their place of residence. Some of the tools include additional drugs, scales, money, drug notes and weapons.

(App. at 47-48.)

Namanny's affidavit was presented to a judge, and a warrant was issued. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 3, the warrant was executed. Namanny and other officers knocked and announced their presence; they received no response and used a battering ram to enter. Upon entering, the officers drew their weapons and identified themselves as Des Moines narcotics officers. Hunter had been asleep on the couch in her underclothes, and asked to be allowed to put on some more clothing. The officers initially refused, but then permitted Hunter to dress herself. Hunter also asked to be allowed to use the toilet, explaining that she was disabled and taking medication that caused her to urinate frequently. The officers refused Hunter's repeated requests until she urinated and defecated on herself. At the time the officers entered Hunter's house, Hunter's fifteen-year-old son Charles Franks was in bed in his second-floor bedroom. Franks was handcuffed at gunpoint and led downstairs while his room was searched. No evidence of criminal conduct was found at Hunter's home, and the officers left the residence at approximately 3:30 a.m.

Hunter filed suit against Namanny in Iowa state court, claiming that Namanny's actions violated her and Franks' Fourth Amendment and Due Process rights, and constituted an excessive use of force and various torts under Iowa law. After Namanny removed the action to the district court in July 1997, Davis was deposed. At her deposition, Davis contradicted portions of the warrant affidavit. Specifically, Davis denied telling the officers who questioned her that she had purchased cocaine from Hunter. Instead, Davis testified that she told the officers that between the time she left Hunter's house and when she was pulled over, she had stopped at a local convenience store where an individual whom she could identify only as Charles gave her the cocaine.

Namanny moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, contending that even if the warrant affidavit were reconstructed to exclude allegedly false information and include critical information allegedly omitted with the intention to mislead, it would still support probable cause. Namanny also argued that Davis' statements should not be included in a reconstructed affidavit. He maintained that the inclusion of omitted information supplied by one who, like Davis, also provides the basis for the plaintiff's claim that the affidavit included false information would give undue weight to that person's account. Namanny argued that a plaintiff could easily defeat probable cause and avoid summary judgment merely by convincing a witness to recant. Namanny further argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on any constitutional claim arising out of his denial of Hunter's request to use the toilet, as no clearly-established constitutional law required him to grant such a request. Namanny contended that Hunter's excessive-force claim failed because his actions in executing the search warrant were reasonable as a matter of law. Finally, Namanny argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on Hunter's state-law claims.

After hearing argument, the district court delivered an oral ruling denying Namanny's summary judgment motion. Addressing Hunter's Fourth Amendment claim, the court rejected Namanny's argument concerning the addition of alleged omissions and reconstructed the affidavit consistent with our decisions in United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 791 (8th Cir. 1980), by removing from the affidavit allegedly false statements and including omissions allegedly made with the intent to mislead. The affidavit so reconstructed omitted Namanny's account of his encounter with Davis and substituted Davis' account. The reconstructed affidavit also recounted that surveillance of Hunter's home on July 1 from 8:00 p.m. to midnight detected no traffic to or from the home except two vehicles registered to Hunter, and that Davis was not charged with any criminal offense as a result of the discovery of crack in her possession.

The court determined that although the anonymous complaint regarding drug activity at Hunter's residence might have provoked a reasonable suspicion, no reasonable officer or magistrate would have issued a warrant based on the facts recited in the reconstructed affidavit. Although the question of qualified immunity for Hunter's remaining constitutional claims was raised in the parties' arguments, the court did not specifically address those arguments in its ruling denying Namanny's motion. Namanny appeals, renewing his argument that Davis' account of events should not form the basis for both an omission from and an addition to the reconstructed affidavit. Namanny also contends the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity with respect to Hunter's remaining constitutional claims.

II. Discussion

The district court's denial of Namanny's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity is an immediately appealable final order because it turns on a legal determination whether certain facts show a violation of clearly established law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996); Pendleton v. St. Louis County, 178 F.3d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999). Our review is de novo. See Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1998).

Qualified immunity shields Namanny from personal liability if his actions, though unlawful, were "nevertheless objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the events in question." Rogers v. Carter, 133 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987)). We analyze Namanny's claim of qualified immunity using a three-part inquiry: (1) whether Hunter has asserted a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation; and (3)...

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