Alvarado v. Westchester Cnty.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 CV 2515 VB.,13 CV 2515 VB. |
| Citation | 22 F.Supp.3d 208 |
| Parties | Jimmy ALVARADO, Guillermo Rosado, Domingo Lopez, Kyle Heady, Andrew Susa, Todd Fraiser, and John Flavin, Plaintiffs, v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY, Correct Care Solutions LLC., New York Correct Care Solutions Medical Services P.C., Sergeant Coletti, Assistant Warden Diaz, Deputy Commissioner Wanda Smithson, and Westchester County Executive Robert P. Astorino, all defendant(s) individually and in their official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Jimmy Alvarado, Valhalla, NY, pro se.
Guillermo Rosado, Yonkers, NY, pro se.
Domingo Lopez, Malone, NY, pro se.
Kyle Heady, Valhalla, NY, pro se.
Andrew Susa, Valhalla, NY, pro se.
Todd Fraiser, Valhalla, NY, pro se.
John Flavin, Valhalla, NY, pro se.
John Martin Murtagh, Jr., Gaines, Novick, Ponzini, Cossu & Venditti, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Jimmy Alvarado, Guillermo Rosado, Domingo Lopez, Kyle Heady, Andrew Susa, Todd Fraiser, and John Flavin, proceeding pro se, bring this Section 1983 prisoner civil rights action alleging defendants violated their constitutional rights.
Now pending is defendants' motion to dismiss.1 (Doc. # 22). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For purposes of ruling on this motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are present and former inmates who were incarcerated at Westchester County Jail (“WCJ”) between June 2012 and February 2013. Before being taken into custody, each was addicted to heroin. Defendants Correct Care Solutions, LLC, and New York Correct Care Solutions Medical Services, P.C. (collectively, the “Correct Care Defendants”), provide on-site medical services at WCJ pursuant to a contract with Westchester County (the “County”).
Upon arrival at WCJ, plaintiffs informed its “intake medical staff” they were regular heroin users who had begun to experience withdrawal symptoms. Plaintiff Susa, for example, told medical personnel he used five to ten bags of heroin daily, and “displayed needle marks on his arms as verification of drug abuse.” And plaintiffs Flavin, Rosado, and Lopez informed medical staff they had been “participating in a Methadone Clinic” before their incarceration.
Among other symptoms, plaintiffs reported “vomiting yellow stomach bile,” “[n]ausea,” “fatigue,” “dia[rrh]ea,” “insomnia,” “loss of appetite,” “anxiety,” “shakes,” and “aching bones.” Flavin reported he had “suffered a seizure” while in police custody. Plaintiffs requested treatment with methadone2 or Suboxone,3 but their requests were uniformly denied. Although plaintiffs allege they were forced to withdraw from heroin “cold turkey,” most claim they were given over-the-counter analgesics (such as Tylenol or Advil ) and antacids (such as Tums or Maalox ).4 However, plaintiffs allege, these medications were “not effective” in controlling their symptoms.
On June 25, 2012, Flavin wrote to Diaz and Smithson complaining of “withdraw [a]l sy[mp]toms.” Flavin stated he “notified intake staff” he used heroin and was “in a methadone program prior to [his] arrest,” but complained “[C]orrect [C]are [S]olutions is not issuing no inmates methadone that were using heroin.” Plaintiffs allege Smithson denied the grievance in writing on June 27, 2012.5 Elsewhere, however, plaintiffs claim Diaz and Smithson refused to accept the grievance.
Flavin also mailed a copy of his grievance to Astorino and Westchester County Attorney Robert F. Meehan, but plaintiffs allege the County “did not respond.”
Plaintiffs subsequently brought this Section 1983 action, alleging (i) defendants' refusal to accept Flavin's grievance deprived them of their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress, (ii) defendants' deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,6 and (iii) the County was deliberately indifferent to the risk the Correct Care Defendants were providing constitutionally inadequate medical care at WCJ, or acquiesced in the provision of such treatment.7
Defendants now move to dismiss, arguing plaintiffs (i) cannot base a constitutional claim on defendants' alleged violation of a prison grievance procedure, (ii) have failed to allege the personal involvement of individual defendants Diaz, Smithson, and Astorino in the alleged constitutional violations, and (iii) fail to plead a claim against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
The function of a motion to dismiss is “merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc.,
748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the “two-pronged approach” announced by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Because plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court must construe their submissions liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the pleading rules permissively is particularly appropriate when, as here, pro se plaintiffs allege civil rights violations. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008). “Even in a pro se case, however ... threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor may the Court “invent factual allegations” plaintiffs have not pleaded. Id.
In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), the Supreme Court identified two kinds of suits in which government officials are named as defendants. “The first kind, official-capacity suits, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ” Ortiz v. Court Officers of Westchester Cnty., 1996 WL 531877, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1996) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) )8 . “The second kind, personal-capacity suits, seek to impose individual liability for actions taken by a government officer under color of state law.” Id.
“Based upon the understanding that it is duplicative to name both a government entity and the entity's employees in their official capacity, courts have routinely dismissed corresponding claims against individuals named in their official capacity as redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Castanza v. Town of Brookhaven, 700 F.Supp.2d 277, 284 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Escobar v. City of New York,
2007 WL 1827414, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007) ).
Here, plaintiffs' claims against Diaz, Smithson, and Astorino in their official capacities are duplicative of their claims against the County and are accordingly dismissed. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S.Ct. 358 ().
Plaintiffs allege Diaz, Smithson, and Astorino, in their individual capacities, deprived plaintiffs of their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress by ignoring or otherwise mishandling their grievances.
Notwithstanding the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the government for redress, “inmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution, and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures [do] not give rise to a cognizable [Section] 1983 claim.” Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F.Supp.2d 362, 369–70 (W.D.N.Y.2005) ; see also Mimms v. Carr, 2011 WL 2360059, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011) ().
Here, as plaintiffs' only allegation involving Diaz is that he ignored or refused to accept their grievance, plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Diaz.9
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