Reid v. Donelan
| Decision Date | 27 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–cv–30125–MAP.,13–cv–30125–MAP. |
| Citation | 22 F.Supp.3d 84 |
| Parties | Mark Anthony REID, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. Christopher DONELAN, Sheriff of Franklin County, et al., Defendants/Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Muneer I. Ahmad, A. Nicole Hallett, Miriam Hinman, Kendall Hoechst Yale, Lunar Mai, Elizabeth Song, Ruth Swift, Tina M. Thomas, Michael J. Wishnie, Mary Yanik, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Sameer Ahmed, Mark C. Fleming, Rebecca Fabian Izzo, Anant K. Saraswat, Wilmer Hale LLP, Boston, MA, Lauren Carasik, Western New England College, School of Law, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff/Petitioner.
Yamileth G. Davila, Regan Hildebrand, Colin Abbott Kisor, Elianis N. Perez, J. Max Weintraub, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Karen L. Goodwin, United States Attorney's Office, Springfield, MA, for Defendants/Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NOTICE OF CLASS CERTIFICATION, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Mark Anthony Reid has brought this suit on behalf of all aliens in Massachusetts who were or will be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and not provided an individualized bail hearing. On January 9, 2014, the court granted Plaintiff's individual habeas petition and concluded that detention beyond six months, absent an individualized assessment, was presumptively unreasonable. Reid v. Donelan, 991 F.Supp.2d 275, 2014 WL 105026 (D.Mass. Jan. 9, 2014) (“Reid I ”). On February 10, 2014, the court determined that the case could proceed as a class action. Reid v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 185 (D.Mass.2014) (“Reid II ”). Currently pending before the court are Plaintiff's Motion for Notice of Class Certification (Dkt. No. 95), Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 96), and cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 117 & 123).
As the curtain closes on this litigation, two issues require examination. The penultimate question is whether either party is entitled to summary judgment. The court, reaffirming its view that § 1226(c) includes a six-month “reasonableness” limitation on the length of no-bail detention, will formally award the class judgment as a matter of law.
The more difficult issue is whether the class should receive permanent, equitable relief. That analysis requires the court to address three questions. Is a class-wide injunction permissible? Is it proper? If so, what should it include? Ultimately, because the court possesses jurisdiction to issue class-wide equitable relief and because the relevant factors all suggest that such a remedy is appropriate, an order enjoining Defendants from applying § 1226(c) to the class, detailed in the conclusion of this memorandum, will issue.
Plaintiff, Mark Anthony Reid, represents a class of aliens who were (or will be) detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), were not provided an individualized bail hearing, and were in custody for over six months. The background of this litigation and the underlying statutory framework have previously been outlined in detail. See Reid v. Donelan, 991 F.Supp.2d 275, 2014 WL 105026 (D.Mass. Jan.9, 2014) (“Reid I ”). As a result, only a summary is required here.
Plaintiff came to the United States in 1978 as a lawful permanent resident. He has since amassed a substantial criminal history. In 2010, he was convicted of several crimes in Connecticut state court and was sentenced to twelve years in prison, to be suspended after five.
On November 13, 2012, after serving two years, the state transferred Plaintiff into the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). ICE immediately initiated proceedings to remove him based on four non-violent state drug convictions.1 ICE detained Plaintiff under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) —a statute that mandates detention for certain criminally convicted aliens and does not provide them any opportunity for a bail hearing.2 Pursuant to this law, Plaintiff was not afforded any opportunity to seek an individual bail assessment. A different section of the statute, § 1226(a), permits non-mandatory detention and provides those aliens an opportunity for conditional release.
After more than six months of detention, Plaintiff, on July 1, 2013, filed an individual habeas petition seeking the opportunity to argue for release on bail. The driving legal question presented in his petition was whether § 1226(c) included a “reasonableness” requirement after which an individual's detention, absent a bail hearing, became unreasonable.3 Plaintiff anchored his claim on Bourguignon v. MacDonald, 667 F.Supp.2d 175 (D.Mass.2009), where the court found that such a limit did exist. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Class Certification on August 15, 2013. (Dkt. No. 33.) The next day, Defendants moved to dismiss the case. (Dkt. No. 35.)
After hearing argument on December 12, 2013, the court, on January 9, 2014, granted Plaintiff's individual petition for habeas corpus. Reid I, 991 F.Supp.2d 275, 2014 WL 105026. After reexamining its prior decision in Bourguignon, it concluded that § 1226(c) must be read as including a “reasonableness” limit to comport with due process. That limitation was set, consistent with an approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit, at six months. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.2013).
On February 10, 2014, the court allowed Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Reid II, 297 F.R.D. at 194. It defined the class, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, as “all individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond hearing.” Id.
Plaintiff, on March 2, 2014, filed a Motion for Notice of Class Certification (Dkt. No. 95) and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 96). Given the procedural posture of the case, Defendants argued that briefing on those issues should be consolidated with the parties' dispositive motions. (Dkt. No. 103.) The court agreed with Defendants and ordered an expedited briefing schedule. (Dkt. No. 111.) Accordingly, the parties filed their cross-motions for summary judgment on April 4, 2014, (Dkt. Nos. 117 & 123), and counsel appeared for argument on May 7, 2014. The court then took the matter under advisement.
Though a number of motions are currently pending, they raise two broad questions. The first—whether either party is entitled to summary judgment—is easily answered in Plaintiff's favor given the court's previous rulings.
The more challenging question is what relief is appropriate. This analysis, like the one presented in the court's recent decision in Gordon, comprises three issues: whether class-wide equitable relief is permissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), whether equitable relief is appropriate in this case, and what such relief, if any, should entail.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts in that party's favor. Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Eaton Vance Mgmt., 369 F.3d 584, 588 (1st Cir.2004). In the absence of a dispute over a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997). When addressing cross-motions for summary judgment, “the court must consider each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn.” Id. at 6.
Both parties agree that the question before the court is one purely of law: whether § 1226(c) includes a “reasonableness” limit on the length of time an individual can be detained without an individual bond hearing and, if so, where that limit lies. Plaintiff believes that the analysis employed for his individual habeas petition equally resolves the class-wide motion here. Defendants argue that the court's prior decisions were incorrect and should be reconsidered.4
After reviewing Reid I and Bourguignon, the court again concludes that due process requires § 1226(c) to be read as including a “reasonableness” limit requiring the government to provide detainees a chance at conditional release after that threshold is crossed. That view, as discussed at length in those two decisions, is compelled by two Supreme Court opinions: Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that detention following issuance of an order of removal, absent a bail hearing, was only permissible so long as removal was “reasonably foreseeable.” 533 U.S. at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491.5 After six months, the court concluded that the detention became presumptively invalid and a bail hearing was required. Id. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court grounded this limit on its concern that indefinite detention would violate due process.
Two years later, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of § 1226(c) in Demore. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, but assumed that the removal process would be relatively brief. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 123 S.Ct. 1708. Critically, Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that “a lawful permanent resident ... could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (Kennedy, J., concurring)(citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86, 121 S.Ct. 2491 ).
Weighed together, these two cases mandate that § 1226(c) be read as including a temporal limit on detention to avoid due process...
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