Black v. Lane, 92-3627

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
Citation22 F.3d 1395
Docket NumberNo. 92-3627,92-3627
PartiesMuriel D. BLACK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, Michael Neal, P.A. Severs, Captain, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date31 May 1994

Barbara S. Steiner, Diana C. White, Jerold S. Solovy, Howard S. Suskin, Paul A. Sheldon (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jan E. Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., John P. Schmidt (argued), Office of Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for defendants-appellees.

Before LAY, * RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Muriel D. Black, after obtaining a default judgment against several of the defendants, appeals from an order of the magistrate judge dismissing his complaint for failing to state a claim for retaliation and for denial of his rights under the Due Process Clause. 1 We vacate the magistrate judge's order of dismissal and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Black, an African-American prison inmate confined at the Menard Correctional Center in Illinois ("Menard"), filed pro se an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against numerous prison officials. 2 Black alleged violations of his civil rights in the form of harassment, false disciplinary charges, segregation and other punishment. He complained of racial discrimination in job assignments; retaliation for filing complaints of racial discrimination, in violation of his First Amendment rights; violation of his right of access to the courts; and denial of both substantive and procedural due process. 3 Almost ten years after Black first filed suit, he finds himself at the conclusion of his second appeal to this court, still at the pleadings stage.

Black filed his original pro se complaint on May 11, 1984, and he filed a supplemental complaint on June 12, 1984. In July and September of 1984, the defendants filed motions to dismiss Black's complaint or alternatively for summary judgment. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of some of the defendants and dismissed the complaint against the other defendants in October of 1985. In July of 1987, this court reversed the 1985 judgment order, finding that Black had stated a cause of action for racial discrimination and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Black was confined because of racial discrimination or in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights in complaining of racial discrimination. See Black v. Lane, 824 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.1987) ("Black I "). This court directed the appointment of counsel and remanded.

Black was appointed counsel in the fall of 1987 and, after some turnover in appointed counsel, in October of 1989 he filed a second amended complaint (the "complaint"). The defendants filed a motion to strike Black's amended complaint. This motion was denied in January of 1990. In April of 1990 the defendants requested an extension of time to file their answer. They were granted an extension until April 30, 1990, which deadline they missed. The defendants requested and were granted another extension until May 7, 1990, to file their answer. The defendants again missed the deadline, and their third motion for extension of time to respond was denied on May 9, 1990. The defendants did not request reconsideration of the court's order. Black then filed a motion for default judgment. On June 27, 1990, the court entered a default order against the defendants. In October of 1990 the court denied the defendants' motion to vacate entry of default. The magistrate judge subsequently held hearings on the issue of damages in November and December of 1990.

In September of 1991, the court issued its order granting Black partial relief by awarding him $50.00 for racial discrimination. 4 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the magistrate judge dismissed substantial parts of Black's complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. At this point, the magistrate judge also dismissed approximately half of the defendants. The court dismissed as insubstantial the allegations that Black was denied access to the courts because the "period of time between plaintiff's activities and the alleged retaliatory conduct precludes a reasonable inference of retaliation." The court also dismissed Black's claim that he was denied due process when false disciplinary charges were levied against him, reasoning that being prosecuted under fabricated charges is not in itself a violation of procedural due process. Finally, the court ruled that Black's allegations of retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights failed to allege personal involvement of the defendants or improper racial discrimination. On appeal, Black claims that his complaint states a claim for retaliation and for denial of his due process rights.

II.

At the outset, we note that it was improper for the district court to dismiss any of Black's claims at a damages hearing without providing Black notice that the merits would be considered. See Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that it was inappropriate for the district court to dismiss complaint for lack of evidence, after the entry of default, where court did not notify plaintiff that court intended to consider issue of liability).

A. Retaliation

The district court dismissed Black's claim that he was retaliated against after filing a complaint of employment discrimination with the Office of Civil Rights Compliance of the United States Department of Justice. The court decided that the facts alleged by Black did not make out a claim for retaliation for the exercise of his right to petition for redress of grievances. The district court was not at liberty to make this determination, however, because almost six years ago this court found that Black had "made several specific allegations in support of his retaliation charge." Black I, 824 F.2d at 562. For example, this court observed:

These allegations are best illustrated by the experiences that Black had with two prison officers when he tried to perform the job that he began in December 1983.... Black alleged that Sergeant Aldridge and Officer Inman prevented him from doing his job by locking him in his cell when he should have been performing his duties as a counselors' clerk. In addition, Black claimed that when the officers did allow him out of his cell, they harassed him and prevented him from collecting inmates' counselor request slips, a duty that was an integral part of his job. The activities of Sergeant Aldridge and Officer Inman are only one example of the treatment that Black alleges he received because he filed a complaint with the Department of Justice.

Id. (emphasis added). The same allegations were pleaded in Black's second amended complaint. Under the law of the case doctrine, the district court may not ignore this court's earlier decree. See Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir.1991) ("The gist of the [law of the case] doctrine is that once an appellate court either expressly or by necessary implication decides an issue, the decision will be binding upon all subsequent proceedings in the same case."). 5 Not only was the district court required to accept this court's finding that Black had stated a claim of retaliation, but the district court also was obligated to accept as true all facts alleged in Black's complaint. All of Black's factual allegations are treated as true because a default judgment was entered against the defendants. When a default judgment is entered, facts alleged in the complaint may not be contested. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 5 S.Ct. 788, 29 L.Ed. 105 (1885); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d) ("Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required ... are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading."). Furthermore, "[a]s a general rule, a default judgment establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in the complaint." United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir.1989). The entry of a default order does not, however, preclude a party from challenging the sufficiency of the complaint. Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 168, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989).

In light of this court's previous decision in Black I, and considering that all facts alleged in Black's complaint are deemed true, we find without hesitation that it was erroneous for the district court to dismiss Black's claim of retaliation.

B. The Second Amended Complaint

Even in the absence of the law of the case doctrine we find it was erroneous for the district court to dismiss Black's claim of retaliation. To state a cause of action for retaliatory treatment, a complaint need only "allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred." Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (quoting Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir.1985)); see also Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir.1988).

Reviewing the actions of the various defendants, as is outlined in more detail in the addendum, 6 it is evident that Black has alleged continuous acts of harassment and beatings since the time he filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Justice. Immediately after the filing of the administrative complaint, and for the three-year period following it, the defendants interfered with Black's assigned tasks, withheld privileges, wrongfully confined him to his cell, and wrongfully issued false disciplinary tickets against Black. He was also confined for three days to a hot, flooded cell that had been closed as unfit for human habitation, where he...

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