Woodruff v. Matson

• Decision Date: 29 October 1889
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WOODRUFF v. MATSON, Sheriff.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

129 Ill. 591

22 N.E. 456

PEOPLE ex rel. WOODRUFF

v.MATSON, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 29, 1889.

Original proceedings in habeas corpus.

Seth F. Crews and H. E. Porter, for petitioner.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Frank J. Woodruff, alias Frank J. Black, petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus, and to be discharged from imprisonment, to which he alleges he is unlawfully subjected by the sheriff of Cook county. The petition alleges that an indictment was returned against the petitioner, with others, at the May term, 1889, of the criminal court of Cook county, for the crime of murder; that he was arrested on the 29th day of May, 1889; and that he is now, and ever since his arrest has been, continuously confined in the jail of said county under a capias issued upon said indictment. It is further alleged that at the June term of said criminal court, 1889, being the first term of said court after his indictment and arrest, the cause was continued, on motion of the state's attorney, to the July term succeeding of said court, and to which the petitioner in no wise consented; and, further, that at the July term, 1889, of said court, the cause was again continued to the August term, by the consent and agreement of the petitioner. It is then shown that at said August term, 1889, of said criminal court, the petitioner applied for a separate trial from his co-defendants, and, upon his application, such proceedings were had that a severance was ordered, and the petitioner awarded a separate trial upon said indictment. At said term, and upon such separate trial being granted, the petitioner alleges that he demanded an immediate trial of said indictment; but the court, at the instance of the state's attorney, and without any cause being shown therefor, and against the wishes and without the consent of the petitioner, continued said cause of petitioner to the September term, 1889, of said court, and at said September term the cause was by procurement of the people again continued. It is alleged that none of said continuances were granted upon the application of the petitioner; nor had he done anything at any of said terms of said court to work delay in the trial of said indictment, except the agreement to continue the cause at the July term; and that at both the August and September terms of said court he demanded an immediate trial, or release from custody, which was denied him. The petition alleges ‘that his (petitioner's) co-defendants on said charge of murder were placed on trial in one of the branches of the criminal court at the August term, 1889, of said court, and that said trial has been in progress from that time up to, and is in progress now;’ that is, at the time of filing the petition for a habeas corpus. It is also alleged that there are three branches of the criminal court of Cook county in session; that they were so in session during the months of August and September, 1889, and two of such branches of said court have been in session ever since the finding of said indictment. It is also stated that there are connected with the office of state's attorney of said county the state's attorney and four assistant state's attorneys. It is alleged, therefore, ‘that the machinery of said court has been ample and adequate to grant petitioner his constitutional right of a speedy trial.’ The petition also contains proper allegations that the petitioner is not detained for any of the causes specified in section 21 of the habeas corpus act.

Do the facts alleged in this petition, if admitted to be true to their fullest extent, entitle the defendant to be discharged from custody? If they do not, it is apparent that no case is made for issuing the writ, and that its issue would be of no avail. The application is based upon the supposed right of petitioner to be set at liberty in pursuance of paragraph 498 of the Criminal Code, (Starr & C. St.; Rev. St. Ill., Ed. 1889, c. 38, § 438,) which provides: ‘Any person committed for a criminal or supposed criminal matter, and not admitted to bail, and not tried at or before the second term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, shall be set at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner. If such court, at the second term, shall be satisfied that due exertions have been made to procure the evidence for and on behalf of the people, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be procured at the third term, it shall have power to continue such case till the third term.’ The residue of the section relates to cases where the defendant has been admitted to bail, and has no application here. Gallagher v. People, 88 Ill. 335. There can be no question, upon the case made by the petition, that the defendant is entitled to be set at liberty, unless the delay in his trial upon said indictment ‘has happened on the application of the prisoner;’ there being nothing shown that would authorize the continuance at the second term, as it is contemplated may be done at the instance of the people by the latter clause of the statute above quoted. The statute is in conservation of the liberty of the citizen, and is intended, as said by counsel, to give effect to the clear constitutional right to a speedy trial, and it is therefore to be construed liberally. It nevertheless remains to be considered whether the delay in the trial of the defendant has happened because of any act of the petitioner, or because of any application made by him.

It is shown by the petition, and conceded by counsel, that the first term at which the defendants could have been put upon trial was the June term, 1889. Counting that term,-and the propriety of counting it may well be questioned, in view of the subsequent continuance by the agreement of the defendants,-the second term at which the defendant could demand trial was the August term of the criminal court. It is conceded that the continuance at the July term was by the consent and agreement of the petitioner, and it cannot be said that the same was not upon his application. It is apparent that an agreement of the parties to continue a cause is in effect an application to the court by each of the parties for a continuance. It is shown that the defendant was indicted with others...