Ballantine v. Proudfoot (In re Stewart)

• Decision Date: 03 February 1885
• Citation: 62 Wis. 216,22 N.W. 392
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE STEWART, DECEASED. BALLANTINE v. PROUDFOOT.

62 Wis. 216

22 N.W. 392

IN RE STEWART, DECEASED.BALLANTINE

v.PROUDFOOT.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed February 3, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Grant county.

Bushnell, Clark & Watkins, for appellant.

George Clementson, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

The learned counsel for the proponent of the will insists that the real questions at issue were not properly submitted to the jury nor determined by the court. The circuit court submitted the question whether the proposed will was executed as the free act and deed of Margaret Stewart, which question the jury answered in the negative. In the judgment it is recited that the court, after having taken time to consider of its judgment on the verdict, finds that the will was not executed as the free act and deed of Mrs. Stewart, therefore orders and adjudges that the same ought not to be admitted to probate as such. The proponent's counsel requested the court to submit the questions: (1) Was the testatrix, when she executed the will, of sound mind? (2) Was the execution of the will by the testatrix procured by any undue influence? (3) Was such execution procured by any undue influence exercised by James Ballantine, who was the proponent of the will?

In this class of cases it has been held that the verdict of a jury on questions submitted has essentially the same effect that it had upon a feigned issue in chancery. It is not conclusive and binding upon the court even as to the facts. Jackman's Will, 26 Wis. 104;Chafin Will Case, 32 Wis. 557;Owens' Appeal, 37 Wis. 68. This being the case, the precise form of the questions submitted is of less importance than in actions at law, because the court must determine from the whole evidence whether the proposed will should be admitted to probate. If the evidence shows that the person executing the will was wanting in testamentary capacity to make a disposition of his property; or was induced by some undue influence to execute it; or that it was the offspring of some insane delusion in respect to those having claims upon his bounty,--the will must be set aside, notwithstanding a verdict which sustains it. In this case it is impossible to tell from the record whether the verdict was based on the ground that the evidence showed that the will was the result of undue influence, or that the testatrix had not the requisite capacity to execute a will, or that she was laboring under some insane delusion in regard to her daughter's treatment of her. The jury found that the will was not the free act and deed of Mrs. Stewart, which might imply that she was induced to execute it through some undue influence exercised over her by some one. The more probable supposition is that the jury were satisfied that Mrs. Stewart had taken up an insane delusion in regard to her daughter when she disinherited her, and that this led her to execute the will giving her property to the proponent's children, a thing she would not have done but for this delusion under which she acted.

The evidence conclusively shows that, for a considerable period and up to the time of executing the will, Mrs. Stewart labored under the strange delusion that her only living child and the husband of that daughter had ill-treated her; had purposely made her uncomfortable and unhappy while she lived with them; had permitted their young children to annoy her in different ways, and had even attempted to poison her. Several of the proponent's witnesses testified to conversations had with the testatrix, in which she complained of her daughter and son-in-law's treatment of her, and said that she believed they proposed to poison her, or make way with her in some way. So impressed was she with this notion that she would not eat food which her daughter or her family brought to her, and often repeated the story that she had thrown a piece of suspected meat, which had been given her to eat, to a dog, and that the meat poisoned the dog. It is not necessary to go over this testimony in detail. Suffice it to say that it establishes the fact, beyond doubt, that Mrs. Stewart was laboring under these insane delusions as to the conduct and motives of her daughter and son-in-law, and that these delusions, in all probability, influenced her in disposing of her property. It is needless to inquire whether this mental disorder was brought on by...